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Chapter 1
Information Security Planning
In the 1996 Datapro Information Security Survey, 67% of US

companies responding stated that they had a dedicated corporate
function for information security. Fifty-four percent of companies
confirmed having a published information security policy in

place, and another twenty-six percent said that they planned to

develop such a document in the next 12 months. In view of these
statistics, it is clear that information security planning is a major
concern of companies nationwide, and that it will continue to be
so in the years to come. Currently, the response to information

security concerns seems to be the establishment of a formal

information security function and the publication of various
security and computer-use policy documents in accordance with
an information security planning process.

This book will prepare you to coordinate your organization's
information security planning through a step-by-step method
using a team approach. By considering the topics presented in
chapter order, you will make your way through the various

concepts related to information security and conduct
comprehensive information security planning in the process.

Along the way, you'll consider the benefits of documents such as

a Computer Use Policy and an Information Security Policy, and
decide which components of these documents are relevant to
your organization. By way of introduction, we'll review the

following topics in this chapter:

•

The role of the CPA in information security.

•

The balancing concept of risk management.
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•

The Information Security Team-who should participate?

•

The coordination of planning, practice, and policy in
information security, and how best to use this book.

The Role of the CPA in Information Security
Few of us have been left untouched by the information
revolution. Workpapers and analyses that used to be prepared

with pencils and ledger sheets are now prepared with personal

computers with spreadsheet programs. The two- or three-day
delivery mailed letter has been replaced by the five-minute
delivery electronic mail message. We maintain databases of

information that we can access with a keyboard or mouse instead
of rifling through file drawers. The flow of information has gotten

bigger, faster, and, to be honest, more difficult to control.
For a profession such as accounting, in which issues of

confidentiality and assurance are paramount, electronic

information presents new and important challenges. Few of us
would give up our notebook computers or Internet research
capabilities, but many of us would like to know just who has

access to our computer system and what information is available
to them. In addition to our own concerns, we have clients and

colleagues asking us which data security measures are most
effective and how to construct information security policies and

plans.

For these reasons and many others, the Information Technology
Division of the AICPA rated "Security" the number one

technology affecting the accounting profession in 1997. The
explosive growth in use of local area networks, portable

computers, and the Internet have all contributed to the critical
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importance of this subject. At a time when the popular press is
reporting almost daily on Internet scares and cracker intrusions,
accountants need to be able to separate the hype from the

legitimate concerns and construct effective information security
mechanisms for themselves, their organizations, and their clients.

In many organizations, especially smaller offices and mid-sized

companies, the CPA serves as a general business manager and

information services expert. In addition, CPAs are entering
technology consulting in increasing numbers. In his inaugural
address to the AICPA in late 1996, current president Robert

Mednick stressed the important roles that CPAs can play in

advising clients on the selection of technology for their needs and
building procedures for its effective use. You can find many

documents addressing the role information technology in the

accounting profession at the AICPA Online Web site at
http://www.aicpa.org.
Figure 1.1

AICPA Online
Web site, source
of information on
how technology
is affecting the
accounting
profession.

In addition, CPAs are often responsible for specific securityrelated tasks in information systems projects. Audits and quality

assurance reviews are commonly the responsibility of the CPA,
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who is often also the operations, administrative, or accounting
manager leading the systems development project. As new

transaction-oriented systems built on electronic commerce and
electronic data interchange (EDI) models flourish, this role is
likely to expand and extend into other departments.

Experts project that 6.5 billion dollars' worth of retail sales will
take place via the Internet in the year 2000 (Forrester Research,
Cambridge, Massachusetts). This very specific security concern is

only one of the issues for corporations in the technology age:

consider, for instance, the thousands of corporate Internet sites

that do not utilize electronic commerce, and the hundreds of
thousands of local area networks in use in organizations today.

When we broaden our perspective to include the millions of

stand-alone desktop and laptop personal computers in use by
businesspersons-computers containing valuable documents that

represent work product and proprietary corporate

information-well, the security concerns can be overwhelming
indeed.
Fortunately, pioneering information scientists and security
analysts have developed organized, methodical approaches to

considering information security issues. For instance, the 1996
Datapro survey discussed above indicates that corporate

information security planning usually falls into the following
categories:

•

Authorized software use.

•

Computer viruses.

•

Microcomputer/PC security.

•

Disaster recovery.

•

Release of proprietary information.

•

Dial-up security.

•

Mainframe security.
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•

Computer ethics.

•

Client/server security.

In addition, US organizations describe the major threats and risks

to information security in a relatively small group of categories,

ranked in order of perceived importance:
•

Viruses and malicious code.

•

Unauthorized network/system access.

•

Internet access.

•

Password exposure.

•

Theft of computer equipment.

When seen from this vantage point, information security planning

seems a little more manageable, and the results seem much more
predictable. By following the step-by-step approach presented in

this book, you can help your organization or a client's company
plan for information security and implement the policies

appropriate for specific computer-use scenarios.

Risk Management: The Balance of Security
It's very important to understand that, in security, one simply
cannot say "What's the best firewall?" or "How can I prevent
absolutely any theft from occurring in my office space?" There

are two extremes: absolute security and absolute access. It is an

old adage among security experts that the closest we can get to
an absolutely secure computer is one unplugged from the

network and its power supply, locked in a safe, and thrown to the

bottom of the ocean. Unfortunately, the computer isn't terribly

useful in this state. By contrast, a machine with absolute access is
extremely convenient to use-it's simply there, and will do
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whatever you tell it, without questions, authorization, passwords,

or any other mechanism. However, this isn't terribly practical (or
safe), either. Corporate networks and the public Internet are,

unfortunately, the media of some destructive persons.

This is no different from our daily lives. We constantly make
decisions about what risks we're willing to accept. When we get

in a car and drive to work, there's a certain risk that we're taking.
It's possible that something completely out of control will cause

us to become part of an accident on the highway. When we get
on an airplane, we're accepting the level of risk involved as the

price of convenience. However, most people have a mental

picture of what an acceptable risk is, and won't go beyond that in

most circumstances. For instance, if you happen to be upstairs at
home, and you want to leave for work, you're probably not going

to jump out the window. Yes, it would be faster and more
convenient, but the risk of injury outweighs the advantage of
convenience. Similarly, every organization needs to decide where

between the two extremes of total security and total access it

needs to be. In the approach recommended in this book, you will

be making these decisions in the context of a group of managers
and stakeholders in the information of your organization-the

Information Security Team.
For financial professionals, computer consultants, and attorneys,

risk analysis is a common activity with structured parameters. For
instance, the illustration below shows the model developed by

Jyrki Kontio at the University of Maryland for assessing risks in

software development (http://www.cs.umd.edu/~jkontio/
Riskit.html):
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Figure 1.2

The Riskit
process of the
"Riskit Method
for Software Risk
Management. "*

The concepts used in information security risk analysis are really
quite similar. In Chapter 7, we'll show you how to bring together

the information you've gathered throughout the planning
exercises in this book and establish a comprehensive information
security policy based on the assets you're trying to protect and
the likely threats to those valuable information resources.

The Information Security Team
If you are planning security for a single PC used by one person,

clearly that person is the only one that needs to be involved in
the planning. If the system is larger or shared by multiple users,
the planning gets a bit more complex. The more you include

various groups in security planning, the more easily accepted the

final security measures will be. A security guideline needs to be
followed to be effective, and it is much easier to get people to

adhere to rules that they have been a part of creating. This is
especially the case if your organization decides to implement a

Figure reprinted with permission. Copyright 1997, Jyrki Kontio, all rights reserved.
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Computer Use Policy or an Information Security Policy as part of

its information security planning.
An important first step in security planning is making contact with

all parties that will be affected by the security measures to be

implemented. If passwords have never been required and you

have decided that they should be utilized, users need to be
contacted and the change in practice explained. People can also
be designated as responsible parties for various aspects of the

site's security. The security planning should also define the
responsibilities of users, system administrators, and system
managers. In most offices, the computers or local area networks
are overseen by a network administrator, who might be a

dedicated staffer or someone whose responsibilities include
coordinating network activity.
Deciding who will be part of your organization's information

security team is a relatively simple matter if you use the concept
of "stakeholder" to guide you. In the field of data processing, a

stakeholder is anyone in the organization who has a role in

creating or using the documents and data stored on the
computers or networks. For instance, the marketing department is

a stakeholder in mailing list and marketing database data and
applications; the accounting department is a stakeholder in the
accounts payable and receivable and payroll data; and the R&D

group is a stakeholder in the research databases residing on an
organization's system. In addition, each of these departments

probably would have at least several users of shared computing

resources, such as a network, and, therefore, would be affected
by security measures such as new virus protection practices.

When building your information security team, be sure to
include: a coordinator (perhaps yourself), the system or network
administrator, a representative of each group of users of the

system(s), and a representative of all stakeholder groups.
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Planning, Practice, and Policy: Using this Book
This book is about information security PLANNING. The concept

of security planning is much more broad than simply buying anti
virus software or drafting a policy. An adequate information

security planning process will address: mechanisms for revisions

and update when technology changes; assigned responsibilities

for security issues; and a clear statement of an organization's
information security objectives and acceptable levels of risk. An

information security plan might be a simple, one-page document

stored in the network administrator's file cabinet, and the
contents of the plan might be put into practice simply through the
network administrator's activities. In larger organizations, or ones

with more complex information systems, the information security
plan will be a large, distributed entity that encompasses several

policies, a set of formal procedures, and additional
documentation such as logs. Specific documents such as an

Information Security Policy and a Computer Use Policy might
cover only certain topics or address a more narrow range of
issues.

In this text, we first present a consideration of issues that the PC
and Internet users of your organization need to consider. Chapter 2,
"Individual Computer Use," discusses how you and your

organization's staff can protect sensitive personal information
when communicating via electronic mail or the World Wide
Web. You'll learn how to help employees devise and use effective

system passwords. In addition, we review important issues such
as acceptable use, appropriate Internet conduct, and copyrights

which can affect how you use the information you find on the

Internet, and how to determine appropriate computer-use
practices for employees.
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The next three chapters present terms and concepts involved in
organizational information security in three categories: physical
security; viruses, and encryption. In Chapter 3, "Physical

Security," you'll learn about the mechanisms available to protect

your organization's computers from theft and tampering. The
importance of regular and adequate data backups is discussed,
along with a presentation of the various types of backup media

and equipment available. Finally, we'll take a look at the

importance of planning for how your organization will move

forward with critical business functions in the event of a physical
disaster that destroys computer equipment.

Chapter 6, "Network Security," presents an overview of the
considerations important for groups of interconnected computers

and networks connected to the Internet. Rather than taking an
environment-specific approach, this chapter presents concepts
common to all networks, giving advice on how to customize the
strategies for specific platforms such as Novell's Netware or

Windows NT. Through a consideration of the general ISO/OSI
Reference Model for networks, this chapter explains the levels of
network operation and the security concerns related to each.

At the end of each of these chapters, you will find a planning

section and a worksheet. Here, you can assess your
organization's current practice or policy in the subject area of the
chapter and plan for the changes you might recommend to your

information security team. You can use the worksheet yourself or
in the context of your team's planning effort to ensure that you
have considered and planned for the security risks discussed in
each chapter.

The final chapter, "The Information Security Policy" discusses
what you need to consider to build an organization-wide

Information Security Policy for your own or a client's site. From
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analyzing risks and threats to dealing with policy infractions, this
chapter presents a comprehensive listing of those issues that will

impact your organization's implementation of a formalized
policy.

Each of the chapters of this book shares several features. As noted
above, the final section of each chapter is comprised of a list of

planning considerations and a worksheet. Before the planning
section, each chapter contains a list of sources of additional
information on the chapter's subject, under the "Learning More
About..." heading. At the end of this text, you will find a listing

of Internet sites with useful information for CPAs organized under

the categories of Accounting, Auditing, Searching, and Security.

In addition, Appendix A contains sample security-related policies
for your review, and Appendix B contains the text of the

InterNIC's important Site Security Handbook, reprinted for your

convenience.
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Chapter 2
Individual Computer Use
When planning for your organization's information security, you

will likely assign responsibility for certain tasks to different
persons. For instance, your local area network administrator
might be responsible for assigning and implementing the rights to

certain server directories and stored information, and your
operations manager might be responsible for implementing the

physical security measures discussed in Chapter 3. However,

there will be certain security concerns that are common to all
employees of the organization, or, at least, all employees that use
the computing resources of the firm.
In addition, when employees begin to traverse a space like a

local area network or the Internet with work computers, the
circumstances can sometimes change faster than the rules. In this

chapter, we will alert you to some risks involved when employees
use work computers and additional risks they incur when
accessing the Internet or other online services at work and how to

avoid them, including:

•

Acceptable use.

•

Information access rights.

•

Passwords.

•

Personal information and the Internet.

•

Professional presence and professionalism.

Lastly, we'll discuss a specific document you can use to structure
each person's use of your organization's information resources:

The Computer Use Policy. Organizations that implement such
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policies often use them to address individual rights and

responsibilities when using computers and to define the

parameters of acceptable activities.

Acceptable Use
The phrase "acceptable use" covers a wide range of behavior and
activities. In general, it is used to describe what an organization
will allow employees and users to do with its computer systems.

Acceptable use parameters can clarify issues such as whether or
not employees are permitted to use computers for personal work

such as freelance jobs or college papers, whether or not games or
other non-work-related activities are allowed, and what the

intended uses of organizational computer systems are. For

instance, the "Acceptable Use" section of the Security Policy of
the Queensland Parallel Supercomputing Facilities stipulates that

the following activities are prohibited by users of computer

resources: (1) playing games; (2) accessing other computers to
play games; (3) antisocial activities; and (4) activities that are
likely to detrimentally affect other users (see the full policy online

at http://www.qpsf.edu.au/admin/security.html).
Many organizations documents the terms of acceptable use of

computer equipment, along with the penalties for deviating from
acceptable uses, in the form of an employee policy. As with the

other security issues discussed in this chapter, you may wish to
document such terms in a Computer Use Policy to be distributed

to all employees. When defining what will constitute acceptable
use of your organization's computers, you and your Information

Security Team may want to consider specifically prohibiting the
following types of uses, depending on the level of protection you

wish to enforce:
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•

Personal correspondence via email.

•

Personal work.

•

Playing computer games.

•

Installing personal software.

•

Violating any software license agreement.

•

Distribution of proprietary or confidential company
information.

•

Accessing, or attempting to access, unauthorized
confidential information, files, or data.

•

Any illegal activity under federal, state, or local law.

•

Using computers for any purposes other than specifically

defined in an acceptable use statement (such as using a

specific set of applications or programs to complete

work-related tasks).

Information Access Rights
In addition to the risks posed by misconduct, you will probably

wish to protect certain types of confidential or proprietary

information that resides on either stand-alone computers or

networked computers in your office. The people who pose a risk
for compromising this information reside in two places: inside

your organization and outside your organization. This section will
cover concerns related to threats from internal personnel. Chapters

5, 6, and 7 cover issues related to external persons.
When thinking about internal information access rights, you can

use the simple analogy of a filing cabinet to consider the threats
and alternatives for protection. For instance, if you are the payroll
manager of a large corporation, it is likely that you keep your

hard-copy payroll files under lock and key all day long. Probably
only one or two other persons have access to these files-maybe
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your secretary and perhaps your boss, the vice president of
administration. If a manager of a particular department comes to
you for payroll information on her department's employees, you
will release to her the files relevant to her own employees, not

the files for her peer managers or the employees of another
department. It would be understood that this manager would not

release the payroll information for one employee to another, and
that she would not publish her department's payroll information

company-wide or world-wide.
Now, for comparison, let's suppose that you have an automated

payroll software system that runs from the server of your local
area network. Perhaps that system has built-in password
authorization levels in place for managers to access information
in their employees' payroll records. Perhaps the system

administrator has implemented a step whereby a manager can
only read that information, but to change it, say, to give an

employee a pay raise, she must have the approval of you, the
payroll manager. These are useful security measures, and you

should use them as appropriate for your organization, but their
efficacy depends on each authorized person using the

information only as intended. As an example: what good would
the multi-level password system be if the manager accessed the
confidential information in an authorized manner, but then

printed it on her laser printer, photocopied it, and gave a copy to

each company employee?
What you need in this instance is a clear definition of the

information access rights of each level of employee in your
organization. Even if these "rights" are defined by software

parameters, you should document why they are in place and how

employees should handle data after they have retrieved it. If, for

instance, the marketing research your company spends millions

of dollars to conduct is crucial to its competitiveness, employees
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should be made aware that it is proprietary, protected

information. We know of one company that administers its local
area network as follows: each employee has only a workstation

computer and operating software on their desk; all application

software and data reside on the network server; and it is a

violation of policy for any employee to store any company data
on the hard drive of their desktop computer workstation-period.
Another firm handles the same issue in this slightly different way:

each department stores the data necessary for its operation in a
separate sub-directory of the network server; certain employees

have password rights to retrieve (but not modify) the data in
certain departments' sub-directories; however, no one is

authorized to store a copy of protected data from another
department's sub-directory in their own department's sub

directory.
When deciding about information access rights, you can use a
rule of thumb common to the medical and legal professions,

called the "need to know" rule. According to this rule, only
employees who need to know information to perform their jobs

should have it. For instance, a manager who evaluates
employees' performance and grants merit raises obviously needs

to know her employees' salaries, but very few other people do.

Everyone in the company probably needs to know the contents of
the company's strategic plan, but very few people need to know

the competitor analysis on which certain aspects of the plan were

based. As you work through the level of information that
particular classes of employees "need to know," you can use a
table to keep track of your decisions.
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Passwords
Passwords are the oldest line of computer defense. Although

passwords have been used for almost 30 years, they are still
misunderstood and misused. Employees who think nothing of

using a key to get into their offices may balk when asked to enter
a password to use the company computer system. In the early
days of mainframe computing, physical access to the computer
console could be controlled and a system would have only 30 to

100 users. Today a computer that is fully connected to the

Internet has millions of potential users. In this section you will
learn to make your own computer system passwords safer, and,

by extention, how to include such guidelines in company-wide
practices.
If you have an account on a shared system, such as a Unix

system, you may think that since you have nothing sensitive in

your account, you don't need to worry about the security of your
password. Most system attacks involve more than just the account

to which the intruder gains access; that account is used as a
springboard for further attacks, so the security of the entire system
depends on the security of each account. At Kent State University,

the Department of Mathematics and Computer Science runs a
large network of Unix machines. The department was not

concerned about password security, until a visiting professor left

her account open to remote log-ins. Someone used her account
to install and run programs designed to crack the root password

to gain access to every file on the system. System administrators
worked two weeks of 24-hour days to clean up and secure the
system. You should make every effort to use a secure password.
Implementing every other aspect of information security correctly

can be instantly negated by ineffective user passwords.
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Some common password problems are easy to avoid. The most
common password security problems are "Joes." Joes are account

passwords that are variations of the name of the account's owner.
One consulting company theorized that there is at least one "Joe"

account on every system, and found at least one such account on

every client's system that the team tested. This problem most
often results when users are assigned default passwords, such as

their last names, when accounts are created, and then employees
don't change them to something more secure. To avoid this

problem, accounts should never be given default passwords that
are easily guessed, and users should be informed how to change

their passwords and advised to do so the first time they use their
account to log-in to the system.

Another password problem occurs when accounts have no

password or some commonly-known default password. Some

application programs that need access to shared information will
create an account for the program at installation and set the
password to some common default. Even some operating systems

set up guest or demo accounts with no password when they are
installed. To prevent problems like these, always make sure that
you understand the installation of system software and its effect

on the password files. If the software requires shared accounts, be

certain that you change the password to something other than the
default so every purchaser of the software doesn't have access to

the account on your machine. (Consult Chapter 6 about network
security in local area network environments.)

Some users of your system may have accounts on many
machines within the company or elsewhere. These users will
often use the same password for each account they hold. Using
the same password for different systems is secure only when
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•

The two systems are logically equivalent, like two PC file
servers in the same company.

•

The two systems are run by the same information system
center with the same security measures.

If the systems are run by different organizations, have different
security levels, or have different operating systems, users should

have a unique password for each system. Let's say that you have
an account on your local file server and also on a commercial

database system. If someone cracks your password on the local
system and they discover that you have an account on the

database server, the cracked password will be the first thing they
try when they attempt to gain access to your other account.

Password Security Checklist
Use this list to help employees choose passwords that are safe
and appropriate. You might wish to include the checklist as part
of your organization's Computer Use Policy or Information

Security Policy.
1.

Is your password shorter than eight characters? Increasing
the length of your password from six to eight characters
makes a cracker check many more possibilities.

2.

Is your password "letmein," "password," "hello," or some

other clever response to the password prompt? These are
commonly known and are the first checked by cracker
programs.

3.

Is your password your log-in name in any form? Is it your

license plate number, telephone number, street name, or

the make of car you drive? Information like this is easy to
discover, and so it makes an insecure password.
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4.

Is your password all digits (like "12345678"), or a

repeated character (like "aaaaaaaa")? Is it a repeated
sequence of digits, or a keyboard pattern (like

"12341234" or "asdfasdf")? Passwords like these

significantly decrease the length of time needed to crack

a password.
5.

Is your password in ANY dictionary? Crackers first check

words in online dictionaries, both in English and some
other languages.
6.

Is your password a word in a dictionary modified by

prepending or appending a digit? Passwords like

"house1" are not secure; cracker programs check
appended and prepended digits as a matter of course.

7.

Is your password a word constructed by rotating or

reversing one of the above classes? For example, Frank
may think that "knarf" (his name backwards) or "rankf"
(his name with the first character moved to the end) is
more secure than his name, but this is not true.

8.

Is your password an example taken from a printed
source?

If you answered "no" to all of the questions above, your
password is probably secure. If it is not, consider the following
suggestions:

1.

If the system distinguishes between upper and lower case
letters in a password, mix the case of letters in your
password. "TomCaT" is more secure than "tomcat" or

"TOMCAT."
2.

Use non-alphabetic characters INSIDE the password.

"Tom3CaT" is more secure than "TomCaT" or
"TomCaT3."

3.

Choose a line or two from a favorite song or poem and

use the first letters of each word. For example, "To be or

not to be, that is the question" becomes "2Bon2btit?"
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4.

Choose two short words and concatenate them together
with a punctuation character between them. For
example: "dog+rain," "book!mug," "kid?goat."

5.

Choose an adjective, a noun, a verb, and an adverb. This
will make a (possibly nonsense) sentence that you can

remember. Now use the first two letters of each word for
your password. For example: "Orange Cars Fly Silently"
becomes "OrCaFlSi."

You often will find warnings about not writing your passwords
down. Keeping them online in a file is certainly not advised, nor
is writing them on Post-It notes and sticking the notes to your

monitor or to the underside of your keyboard. But, keeping a note
in your purse or wallet containing your password is probably OK.

It is better to have a secure password that you have to write down
to remember for the first couple of weeks than it is to have a
password that is so easy to remember that anyone could crack it.

Personal Information
Many employees are unaware of the conventions of network and

Internet conduct, and, more importantly, they also are not
familiar with the security risks of using computers in such an

environment. You can help employees avoid some of these risks
by making them aware of how and when to release personal

information on computer networks, how to apply the standards of
professional conduct in the online world, and how to protect
sensitive or copyrighted organizational information. You may
wish to include guidelines to this effect in your organization's

Computer Use Policy. This section describes how to handle

personal information on the Internet and how to help your

employees do the same.
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In general, the "billboard maxim" is a good rule of thumb to

remember when using all areas of the Internet. The billboard
maxim goes something like: "When using the Internet, never

post anything that you would not mind seeing on a billboard."
Would you want your credit card number painted on a billboard?
Probably not. Would you want your home address and phone
number to be there? Would you wish to see your checking
account number, the name and addresses of your kids' schools, or
your car license plate number on a busy freeway billboard? See

how it works? On the other hand, you probably wouldn't mind

having your company name, your office address, your position
title, or your email address distributed publicly-many

businesspersons routinely do this to promote their services. You
might even feel comfortable painting your work phone number or

pager number on a billboard. If you use this rule of thumb before

posting personal information, you can avoid unintentionally

compromising your own privacy.

In the case of transmitting credit card numbers, extra caution is

mandatory. Never release your credit card number to anyone on
the Internet through a public area such as Usenet or a
subscription mailing list. Even email is a risky way to transmit

such information. Remember that the shared communication
lines of the Internet can be compared to the telephone party lines

of years gone by. Anyone with a couple of pieces of equipment

and moderate programming skill can "crack" their way into

Internet communication lines and search for distinctive sequences
of characters like credit card numbers.

Reputable commercial online services, Internet service providers,
and online vendors have put considerable effort toward
protecting your credit card number when you conduct online

transactions. They will always inform you of these measures
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when asking you to provide your number. For instance,
CompuServe, a major commercial online service, informs users

that they are accessing the CompuServe computers through
secured, closed telephone circuits when they provide credit card

information during the initial procedure for obtaining an Internet
account. In addition, commercial online services such as

CompuServe provide secured communication lines for dial-up

users, and they store credit card information on computers that
are not attached to the Internet. Unless you are accessing your
commercial online service account through an Internet-based

function, like Telnet, your line is very secure. If you don't feel

certain that appropriate security measures are in place, don't
release your credit card number. Instead, send an email to any
prospective vendor asking what protection is in place, or find

another way to order goods or services from that vendor.

In recent months, software developers have been working to find
convenient ways to conduct secure credit card transactions via
the World Wide Web (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of how the

process of encryption fits into these methods). This will be an
important development for commercial use of the Internet. You

may even be thinking about the services you could provide to
clients over the Internet and how you might obtain payment for
them. It is cumbersome and expensive to achieve security by
dedicating one computer to credit card transactions and another

to Internet access.
Chris Hibbert, of the Computer Professionals for Social

Responsibility, makes a very good argument for protecting your

Social Security Number with the same rigor as any other
confidential information. Hibbert reminds us that a Social
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Security Number is often the only piece of verifying information
an institution will ask for before releasing highly sensitive

information such as credit history or medical records to a
requesting party. To learn about techniques for protecting yourself

from invasion of privacy through access to your Social Security
Number, retrieve and read the FAQ document at ftp://cpsr.org/

cpsr/privacy/ssn/oldSSN/ssn.faq.html. This site also contains

other information on computer security and privacy issues and
the group also maintains a Web site at http://www.cpsr.org/dox/

home.html.
Figure 2.1

Computer
Professionals
for Social
Responsibility
Web site.

Electronic Mail
Sending email over the Internet is like sending a post card. Email

messages can be intercepted, read, and altered, unless you make
your messages secure. Sales of software that insures the security

of Internet messages have been soaring among corporate
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accounting and finance departments, banks, investment advisors,
and stock brokers. These groups have been using the Internet to

communicate sensitive financial data and have a compelling

need to keep their communications secure. While it is easy to
understand why a stock broker and client might need to have a

channel for secure messages, it is more difficult to consider this
need in terms of casual or general messages. To consider your

need for message security, remember the billboard maxim. Do
you regularly send messages via an internal network or the

Internet, perhaps personnel recommendations or contracts, that

you would not wish to see painted on a billboard? If so, you may
want to investigate message security systems. In general, message

security is provided by encryption software. See Chapter 5 for a

complete discussion of the processes of encryption and
decryption, how they work, and how to select good encryption

software. If you intend to require that employees use a method
for keeping email messages secure, you will want to include

guidelines for this process in your Computer Use Policy or
Information Security Policy as discussed in Chapter 5.

Professional Presence on the Internet
Many companies are giving employees access to electronic mail

and other Internet functions, and for good reason. Electronic

communication greatly enhances productivity and reduces
overhead costs for items such as express delivery and long
distance calling. Online research can save time and dollars, and

the information to be gleaned from subscription mailing lists and
Usenet newsgroups is very valuable. However, granting

employees Internet access carries with it an additional set of risks.

It is much more difficult to control your company's image and the
information released when each employee can speak on behalf of
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the company in a world forum of many millions of Internet users.
One way to lessen the risks of employee Internet access is to

establish guidelines for company and personal use of tools such

as email. Another is to provide information to employees about

how to handle sticky online situations and present your
organization in the best possible light. Taken together, the rules of

Internet conduct are sometimes called "Netiquette." Although
they may seem like only niceties, Netiquette guidelines can
determine how your organization is perceived through the

individual Internet communications of its employees. Observing
these guidelines can help your organization protect one of its

most valuable assets-its image. In addition, intellectual property
and copyright issues can expose your firm to a whole new set of

risks.

Netiquette
Just like any other kind of manners, the rules of behavior on the

Internet, collectively called "Netiquette," are based mostly on
common sense and common goals. The Internet is a community

of millions of individuals interacting with each other. It has grown
by leaps and bounds over the last several years because it is the

fastest, most economical, most efficient way to communicate
with others. The tenets of Netiquette aim to keep the Net just that

way: fast, economical, and efficient. If you keep these goals in
mind during your Net travels, you'll avoid embarrassing errors
and project the competent, helpful image so important to

accounting professionals.

Email
Most of your Internet communication with individuals will be
through email. You'll certainly use email to correspond with
clients and colleagues, and you may use it to take up private
conversations with people you've met online (perhaps in a

Usenet newsgroup or subscription mailing list). In both cases, you
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will want your reader to be able to easily identify your message,

understand its contents clearly, and do both of these things
quickly. So, the Netiquette guidelines for email aim toward the

objectives of identification, clarity, and brevity.
If your mail program has an option for inserting your real name in
the From field on your email messages, use it. It is much easier to
recognize a person's name than an email address. Most Unix
shell accounts allow a user to customize the From field as an

option while composing each message. PC-based mail
management software allows the user to change the From field so

it will appear in modified form on every message. In addition,
you can further identify your message by using a clear and

descriptive subject line. Subjects like "Response," "Request," and
"Query" are not very helpful to readers who may receive 50 such
emails per day. On the other hand, subjects like "Request for
Book Prices" or "Staff Meeting Minutes (4/30)" can help your
readers organize their correspondence and their workdays.

Netiquette guidelines for writing style are the subject of lively
debate among Internet users of all types. There is certainly room

for individual expression and style in email writing, and each
person must decide what it means to be clear and concise. Long

time Internet guru Mark Moraes has compiled a useful set of
writing guidelines for Usenet postings; they apply equally well to

all kinds of Internet correspondence. You can find this guide,

called Hints on Writing Style for Usenet in the newsgroup
news.announce.newusers, where it is posted regularly. In

addition, there are some general points on which most people
can agree when discussing the text of email messages:

Your Reader Cannot See You: Email, although lightning fast and
very cheap, leaves some important channels of interpersonal

communication closed. In email, you cannot highlight certain
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phrases in your message with facial expressions, body language,
or gestures. While you may make a comment jokingly, your email

reader may take it seriously. Using emoticons such as a smiley
face :) or markings such as the grin symbol <g> can help to make
up for the chuckle that your reader cannot hear, although overuse

of such markings can be annoying to readers.
In contrast, the Internet equivalent of shouting at someone is
TYPING IN ALL CAPITAL LETTERS. You may be perfectly calm
and friendly, but the use of all capital letters will convey an

aggressive tone in email correspondence. Save the use of all caps
for strong emphasis only, and you'll avoid startling your readers.

This guideline applies to email message subject lines as well. It is
very annoying to be confronted with a list of email headers
shouting their subjects first thing in the morning on a busy office
day.

Business as Usual: Always remember that the documents you
send via the Internet are just as real, official, and enduring as the
ones you send on your company letterhead. This means that you

should give email messages and discussion group postings the
same attention as your printed correspondence. Take the time to

check the spelling and grammar of your messages. Use the same

professional tone in Usenet postings as you would in any other

letter. Your Usenet and email messages might be stored on disk
for months or years and used for later reference-make sure they
represent you professionally.

In addition, some basic conventions of business communication

become even more important in electronic communication.
Perhaps the most important is making sure that the objective of

your correspondence and the desired action of the reader are
perfectly clear. You can test your message by reading it over

before you send it and asking yourself what you would do if you
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received it. Will your reader know what action should be taken
in response to your message? Have you identified an action step

(like, "Please respond by December 11 if you will be attending
the conference")? Does your reader know how to reach you, via
phone or regular mail if not by email? Is your reason for sending

the message clear to your reader (for instance, "I am commenting

on your draft of the overtime policy")?

Use Excerpts Sparingly: Many Internet correspondents include
excerpts of previous messages in their responses to emails or
Usenet postings. This can be very helpful to a reader who can
use the excerpt to identify the conversation to which the message

belongs and place your response in context. The common

practice is to precede each line of an excerpt with a special
character such as a caret (>) and to set it off from the rest of the

message by indenting it or double-spacing it from the body of the
message text. Many PC-based mail management programs now

have automatic functions for handling excerpts, as do many Unix
shell mail management tools. While this courtesy can be helpful,

it can also be over-used. Consider your reader's perspective when
deciding whether or not to excerpt a message you're responding

to. Will the excerpt help your reader remember an issue or topic

of discussion? Will it clarify your message? Or, will it merely add
bulk to your message or take the place of a sentence or phrase
that you could have written? We recommend using excerpts only

when other ways of expressing your point are not as effective or
feasible.

Keep Your Signature Simple: In email jargon, the word signature
refers to a standardized document closing that appears at the

bottom of an email message or Usenet posting. Many types of
Internet software allow a user to create a personalized signature
block that is automatically appended to each message the user
sends. Most people use the signature section to include helpful
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contact information such as company name, company phone
number, organizational affiliation, or return address. Some
imaginative persons, however, use this space to create elaborate

drawings with ASCII characters or to insert a favorite quote from

a politician or philosopher. It's a matter of personal taste, of

course, but we strongly recommend against elaborate, creative
signatures. A signature of three lines or less is usually considered
appropriate. Again, the criterion for judging your own signature
block is simple: does this signature contribute to the goal of fast,

economical, efficient communication? If not, don't use it.
Usenet Newsgroups
The basic Netiquette guidelines for Usenet newsgroups are the
same as those for email, outlined above. However, the sheer

number of persons participating in newsgroups makes for more
potential problems. So, first remember that your Usenet posting is

essentially an electronic mail message-one that will be delivered

to hundreds or thousands of readers. Whatever you do will
impact those thousands of persons, and you should plan
accordingly. The guidelines outlined below have one thing in

common: in newsgroups, time solves most problems. Take the
time to learn about the subject of the newsgroup; take the time to
think before sending a message; and give the other newsgroup

subscribers a chance to respond or drop a volatile subject.

It's easy to identify "newbies" in a newsgroup (newbies are
inexperienced Internet users). They are the people who post
inappropriate questions; for instance, they post a message to the

Celtic Culture newsgroup (alt.celtic) asking how to delete email
messages from their mail program in-boxes. Also easy to spot are

online crabs. Crabs spend time correcting trivial facts in other

postings. They split hairs on subjects tangent to the thread
discussion. They are quick to point out spelling and grammar
errors in others' messages. Even worse, newbies and crabs
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sometimes make postings under a particular thread subject that

are entirely irrelevant to the thread. If you spend a little time

observing a particular newsgroup before jumping into the
discussion, you'll avoid tipping anyone off to your newbie status
or presenting yourself as an online crab.

First, subscribe to the newsgroup and do nothing but read the
postings for a week. You'll soon be able to identify the frequent

and prolific participants in the newsgroup and their particular
areas of expertise. Second (and you can do this during your week
of waiting and reading), download and read the newsgroup's

FAQ (list of frequently asked questions). FAQs are some of the
most useful resources available on the Net, compiling the

questions frequently asked by users new to the group or new to
the subject. The answers have been honed over time by experts

on the subject. FAQs are often subject to public review and

revision, so you can usually be confident that the information in
this document is fairly accurate and current. Then, dip your toes

into the newsgroup by posting a question or a response to

someone else's question. By now, you'll be confident that you are

posting your comment to the appropriate newsgroup in a relevant
subject area. Keep your comments brief and to the point, and

you're on your way to rewarding newsgroup interactions.

The Internet equivalent of picking bar fights is called "flaming."
Flaming is the practice of being unnecessarily belligerent, rude,
denigrating, or otherwise hostile in Internet email, newsgroups,

mailing lists, or other public-accessible space on commercial

online services, such as discussion forums. Flaming usually
occurs in Usenet newsgroups, and it is annoying and time

wasting for the thousands of other newsgroup members who wish

to use the Internet to exchange useful information and take part
in constructive conversations.
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The best way to put out flames is to ignore them. If someone's
posting is out-of-line or inappropriately negative and personal,
simply don't respond. Perhaps the other newsgroup subscribers

will follow suit, and the flamer will lose interest. Even if the
debate continues, at least you are not stuck spending time on

childish name-calling. If you feel that you must respond to a

flame, perhaps because it was directed at you or you feel strongly

about the subject, compose your reply carefully and with a level

head. Then, leave your computer keyboard for a few moments
and send the reply only after you have returned and reconsidered

sending it. If you cannot avoid the temptation of responding to a
flame, send only one reply to avoid escalating the interchange

into an unnecessary waste of time and Internet resources.

If you are having a hard time ending an online disagreement with
someone because they will not let the matter drop, you can
report the harassing behavior to the system administrator of the

offender's Internet service provider. The address of a system

administrator is usually sysadmin followed by the domain, as in:
sysadmin@domain.name. If this address does not work, you can

try addressing a complaint to the system postmaster: postmaster@

domain.name. Either way, use this option as a last resort, because
system administrators are very busy people and arbitrating

between Internet users is not a very good use of their time.
If you feel that any online behavior directed toward you or

anyone else is illegal (such as physical threats or fraud), you
should report this behavior to your local law enforcement

authorities. As a last note of caution, remember that divulging
your home address or phone number in a newsgroup posting is

roughly equivalent to painting it on a billboard. Newsgroups are
public discussions, and you have no control over who reads your
postings. If you would like to share personal information with

someone you have met online, make sure that you know and can
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trust your correspondent, and then release the information only in

a private email message. And, NEVER release your credit card
number or bank account number to anyone in a newsgroup.

Legitimate vendors provide separate, secured circuits for online
ordering, and they inform their customers of these security
measures as part of the ordering process.

Subscription Mailing Lists
When participating in Internet mailing lists, you should follow the
same guidelines as those described for Usenet, above. There is

one other possible slip to make with mailings lists, however, and
you should be careful to avoid it. When requesting information

on a mailing list, subscribing to, or un-subscribing from the list,
remember to address your email message properly to the

majordomo, listserv, or listproc as indicated in the subscription
instructions. If you send such a message to the list name, your

administrative message will be sent to all list subscribers. It will

annoy them, embarrass you, and, in the case of a new

subscription, it will provide a very poor introduction for you in
the group of Internet and professional peers you are hoping to

join.

Marketing and Commercial Use

This subject covers a great deal of ground, and marketing on the
Internet has become a very murky area since the Net was opened
for commercial use. An important distinction to remember is the
difference between the public and the commercial areas of the
Internet. If you keep this distinction in mind, you can avoid

participating in inappropriate commercial activity in public
Internet areas. Public areas are the newsgroups, mailing lists, and
document repositories of sites open to the public. In general,

commercial solicitation and marketing activities are prohibited in
public areas. Commercial areas are sites established by for-profit
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entities specifically for commercial activity. You can conduct
marketing in these areas only.
For instance, posting a newsgroup message listing your

accounting expertise, contact information, and hourly fees is not

permitted on Usenet-this is marketing in a public area. Posting
such a message to many newsgroups (called "spamming") is very
poor form and is prohibited by most Internet service providers

(who will cancel your account if you do it). However, posting
such a message in the Classified Advertisements section of a
commercial online service such as CompuServe is entirely

appropriate, and so is sending an email message to someone in a

newsgroup or mailing list who specifically requests this

information. You can also respond to a specific request for this
type of information in the context of a related newsgroup.

Savvy users of the Internet realize the great benefit to be gained

by establishing a presence as an expert in particular newsgroups
or mailing lists. While this is not strictly considered marketing
activity, it is certainly one way to promote your expertise and

reputation. For instance, if you gain the respect and trust of

newsgroup users by consistently answering questions on
accounting topics with reliable and clear information, you'll

probably find that other newsgroup subscribers occasionally

contact you via private email to inquire about your services. At
this point, you are free to negotiate with this potential client and
do any self-promotion you wish.

Copyrights
An initial caveat: This section is intended to guide Internet users
in learning about the concept of copyright and the issues relating
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to copyright pertinent to Internet use. This is not legal advice or a
substitute. If you think you need legal advice regarding your own

material or your use of someone else's copyrighted material,
please consult with an attorney. Discussing the exact facts of your

situation with an attorney is the best way to protect yourself.

The basic concept of copyright, although intimidating and
confusing for many, is really fairly simple. The first portion of the

word, "copy," refers to text-that is, words appearing in a certain

order as expressed by a certain person or entity. The words you
are reading in this text constitute copy. They are words expressed

by authors in a certain order and manner, and they appear here
on the page as copy. The second part of copyright, the "right"
part, refers to the legal concept of holding rights to intellectual

property. So, a copyright is a way of expressing the legal rights of
someone who has created an original text or work.
Basically, anyone who creates a work (and this category includes

many non-language objects such as songs, photographs, and

computer programs) holds a group of rights relating to the work's
reproduction, distribution, revision, performance, and other

related activities. Since 3/1/89, when the U.S. adopted the

International Berne Convention, the creator of an original work
holds copyright to the work from the moment it is fixed in a

tangible form, whether or not the document is published and

whether or not a copyright notice appears on the work. Anyone
who wishes to use the work for any purpose other than personal

information is obligated to obtain the creator or copyright

owner's permission to do so. This is the law, and it's that
simple-use any portion of someone else's words or creative work
without permission, and you've violated their copyright.

In reality, and in the courts, there are certain circumstances in
which one can technically violate copyrights of another without
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being legally liable. This group of circumstances is sometimes

referred to as "fair use." Unfortunately, there are no objective
measures of fair use, and this legal concept gets interpreted in

many different ways. In general, fair use is reproduction or use of

a work which both does not harm the commercial value of the
original work and also indicates no potential for commercial gain

on the part of the user. Some examples of activities that could be
considered fair use are: quoting a copyrighted work in a critical
review of the work, reproduction of a small portion of a work for
educational purposes, and using illustrative passages from a work
in a scholarly article. For our purposes, using the Internet to

conduct business and personal communication, we can assume

that everything appearing on the Internet in any form is

copyrighted unless the document specifically states that its
creator has released it to the public domain, thereby forfeiting all

copyright benefits. This assumption applies to all objects on the

Internet, including newsgroup postings, email messages,

computer programs, digitized photographs, clip art, and so on.
Many files you will encounter on the Internet are already in
violation of copyright by virtue of being posted to the Net; for
instance, images scanned from published documents are the

intellectual property of the document creator or publisher. Thus,
you cannot use any file you find on the Internet for anything

other than your personal information or its intended purpose
(reading an email, using a program on your personal computer, or

responding to a posting) unless you have the permission of the
work's creator. Period. This is the safe and courteous way to

operate on the Internet, and it avoids possible confusion

regarding permissible fair use, various copyright laws and their
years of effect, and legal interpretation of limited licenses.
For the most part, it's fairly easy to avoid infringing someone's
copyright. Most importantly, copyright does not apply to facts and

figures, only to the author's original way of expressing the
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information. For instance, as part of our research in creating this
text, we have read Terry Carroll's excellent six-part FAQ on
copyright available in many Usenet newsgroups or for FTP

download from rtfm.mit.edu (you should download it and read it
too-it's the most comprehensive and understandable document

available regarding copyright issues and Internet use). Some of

the facts we have used, such as the fact that the U.S. adopted the
Berne Convention in 1989, came from that document. However,
we have refrained from using, or even substantially paraphrasing,
Terry Carroll's own words and expression in that document,

because such activities would infringe his copyright. It happens
that Carroll has included a copyright notice on his FAQ, but we
would be obliged to respect his copyright even if he had not
done so.

If you wish to use someone's copyrighted material in your own
document, permission is usually easy to obtain (provided, of

course, that you will not benefit from the use at the author's
expense). For instance, suppose that you would like to quote a

paragraph of someone's informative mailing list message
regarding relational databases in your own report for a client
recommending the purchase of personal computer software. You

can simply drop the author a note explaining your request and
exactly how the material will be used. If the author grants
permission, keep a copy of the letter or email message for your

file and proceed with your use. However, if you change the use

you are making of the material, even if only by distributing it
more widely than you originally described, you must obtain

permission again.
As you might assume, copyright violations are usually only

litigated in serious cases where the creator/plaintiff has the
financial resources to bring the suit to court and the defendant
has made a blatant violation and has gained financially from the
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violation at the creator's expense. However, using someone else's
material without their permission, whether or not you intend to

gain financially, is both against the law and is in very poor

Netiquette taste. To keep the Internet the cooperative, mutually
beneficial community it has come to be, always respect copyright
and give permission freely for reasonable use of your own

material.

The best way to ensure that people are aware that you intend to
protect your own copyright to a work is to place a copyright
notice on it. A notice is not necessary for a copyright to be in
effect; however, if your document carries a notice, you can now

easily show that a person who violated your copyright was

indeed aware that the document was copyrighted, and this can
be useful in litigation. To construct a copyright notice on your
document, use these three components: (1) the letter "c" within a
circle or the word copyright spelled out, (2) the year of the work's
first publication, and (3) the name of the owner of the copyright.
For instance, the copyright notice appearing on this text is:

Copyright 1997. Kent Information Services, Inc.
Another level of protection for you as an author or creator of a

work is to register your copyrighted work with the U.S. Copyright
Office. Registration consists of sending two copies of the work to
the Copyright Office, along with a registration form and filing fee.

Call the Copyright Office hotline at (202) 707-9100 to obtain

information and registration packets for all types of works. U.S.
law currently requires a U.S. copyright owner to register a work
before infringement litigation. This may change, but registration is

surely a good way to communicate your intent to protect a work.
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The Computer Use Policy
All of the issues discussed in this chapter can be documented in a
Computer Use Policy and distributed to all employees. In

addition, employees should be made aware of their

responsibilities for performing information security tasks such as
virus scanning, encryption of messages, and protection of

physical equipment, as discussed in other chapters of this book.
To begin a Computer Use Policy, you can use the following

topics as a starting point. Then, as you progress through this

book, you will probably add individual rights and responsibilities

as they come up in your Information Security Team's planning
activities.
•

Acceptable use parameters.

•

Devising and using appropriate system passwords.

•

Releasing personal information over the Internet.

•

Appropriate and professional Internet behavior.

•

Releasing confidential or proprietary organizational

information to anyone, internal or external.

•

Guidelines for use of copyrighted material.

The policy should state clearly what the penalties will be for

violation of certain terms, and whom employees should contact if

they need clarification of topics covered in the policy.

Learning More about Individual Computer Use Issues
If you decide to establish a Computer Use Policy for employees,

there are several samples available online that you can use as a
basis. One well-researched one is provided by the Computer
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Professionals for Social Responsibility group discussed above. At
their Web site (http://www.cpsr.org), CPSR provides "A sample E-

mail and Voice-mail policy" (http://www.cpsr.org/dox/program/

emailpolicy.html). ON Technology, a provider of network security
software, has issued a white paper to help companies compose

Internet usage policies, available at http://www.on.com.

The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, a non-profit group begun at
the University of San Diego, operates a Web site located at

http://www.privacyrights.org/. Here you can find a series of
papers on personal security and privacy and how technology

affects individual rights. This site also contains a list of useful
links on security and privacy issues.

To learn more about Netiquette, visit The Core Rules of Netiquette
site at http://www.albion.com/netiquette/corerules.html. This

site is provided by Albion Books, publisher of Virginia Shea's
book called Netiquette. Shea has here provided links to excerpted

material in many of the categories she treats in her book.
Figure 2.2

The Core Rules
of Netiquette
Web site
containing
excerpts from the
book Netiquette.
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Visit the informational Web site at http://spam.abuse.net/spam/

to learn more about guidelines for appropriate commercial use of

Internet functions. Established by an international group of
concerned Internet users, this site provides definitions, sample
policies, and specific techniques for users and site administrators
to block unwanted "spamming" activity.
CCC Online is a site maintained by the Copyright Clearance

Center (CCC), a not-for-profit organization created at the
suggestion of Congress to help organizations comply with U.S.
copyright law (http://www.copyright.com). At this site, you can

learn how to obtain an account to automate your payments for
use of copyrighted material. You can also visit the "Resource

Center" section of the site to find links to many other sources of

information on copyright law.
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Chapter 3
Physical Security
Many businesspersons think that information security is

concerned exclusively with complicated computer code and
system administration schemes. But, in fact, sophisticated

software-based approaches cover only one aspect of information

security. Planning for the physical security of your organization's

information systems can be just as important. For instance, what
good does an elaborate, password-based security system do if

someone can walk into your offices and walk out with the PC on
which the crucial data is stored? In this chapter, we'll review

•

Secure office computing concepts.

•

Data backup procedures.

•

Disaster recovery planning.

Secure Office Computing
For some reason, many managers just don't think about their

computers in the same light as other important company

resources such as marketing plans, the checkbook, or personnel

files. But they should-computers hold all of the information

contained in these traditional items and much more. Strategies for
keeping computers physically safe are much the same as keeping

any other office resource safe, and they are based on limiting
access to the equipment, making the equipment stationary, and
securing the office in which the equipment resides.
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Common sense is the best guide in office security. By placing

computers only in lockable rooms, you can gain a great measure
of security. For computers that must be located in common areas
such as reception rooms or shared cubicle installations, office

supply companies sell a variety of cables and plates that can be

used to deter theft. Computer Security Products, Inc.
(http://www.ComputerSecurity.com/), a company that provides
such equipment, reports that the theft of computers now accounts

for over 10 billion dollars per year in losses. Compu-Gard,
another physical security product vendor, sells a unique disk
locking and cable combination device that also protects

notebook computers, which are very vulnerable to theft:
Figure 3.1

Compu-Gard's
Note-Gard
product for
securing
notebook
computers.

For offices that may have problems with the theft of internal
computer components, Barracuda Security

(http://www.powernet.co.uk/barracuda/) provides an expansion
card device that detects unauthorized tampering and emits a loud

alarm. The card also distributes indelible dye on internal PC
components when activated, making it more difficult for someone

to sell stolen parts such as highly-portable random-access
memory chips or communication cards. CMS Technologies
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(http://www.cmstech.com/products.htm) has designed a product
that protects PC workstations on a LAN through the existing
network wiring. Their Web page gives a graphic illustration of

how easy it can be to clip the cables on lock-down devices (just

like cutting a bicycle lock cable):
Figure 3.2

CMS
Technologies
Web site,
featuring various
computer
security
products.

When selecting among these types of security products, you will

need to balance the potential risks against the expense and
installation costs of the devices. For instance, if you have an
elaborate office alarm system with motion detectors and video
cameras, it probably would be redundant to install security

devices on each PC. However, if your client has a PC located in a

very public area with wide access, such as a sales desk in an auto

supply store, you would be wise to recommend equipment to
physically secure the computer to the counter. And, once you
have made sure that computers are installed securely, you should

also ensure that only authorized employees have keys to the

offices where they are kept and that there is a rigorous procedure

for distributing the keys and reclaiming them. Lastly, you should
make sure that your computers are properly insured so they can
be replaced promptly if the worst happens.
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Data Backup Procedures
Security experts who plan for the data security of large mainframe
installations use complex terms like volume dumps, incremental

dumps, synchronization, and geometric device differences. These
IS professionals are responsible for planning for the possible

restoration of the contents of many large data storage devices,
each of which can hold many gigabytes of information-often the

data of organizations such as banks, healthcare facilities, and
universities. When disaster strikes such a data center, the lives of

hundreds or thousands of persons can be affected by the loss of
the data.

In contrast, most physical incidents associated with personal

computers and local area networks are, relatively speaking, minor

problems. When the hard drive on an employee's desktop
computer finally gives out, you can usually have a new one

installed by the next office day. If a computer gets dropped during
an office move, your insurance policy provides for its

replacement. If a worker's notebook computer is stolen during a
business trip, you can arrange for shared time on an office

machine while a new one is purchased.

But, what about the data that is lost during these incidents? If

you don't have backup copies of your critical files and software
applications, what should be a minor inconvenience can become

a major productivity set-back, or worse. Companies that don't
provide for some sort of regular, procedure-driven backup system

are asking for big trouble. However, those that do so are able to

weather the small and large storms associated with being so

dependant on those "boxes" on our desks.
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When you think about data backup procedures for your

organization, you have two categories of decisions to make. The
first is technology-dependent: what hardware and software will
you use to make duplicate copies of the contents of the hard

drives of computers? The second category of decisions is
situation-dependant: what procedural system makes the most

sense for your organization? Because data backup technology
runs the gamut of prices, it might make sense to approach the
technology category first by deciding how much your

organization is willing to spend for reliable backups and how
much training you are willing to provide to employees. Then, you

can integrate these factors into the data backup procedures.

The simplest and least expensive way to perform a backup of the
contents of a PC's hard drive is to use the backup function of the
computer's operating system. DOS, Windows 95, Unix, and OS/2
all provide for some sort of prompted backup from the hard drive

to floppy diskettes. If you've ever used this method, you've

probably already discovered some of its problems-it's time
consuming and cumbersome to perform a "manual" backup. To
make manual backups somewhat easier, you can purchase

specialized backup or utility software. Norton Utilities, FastBack,
and PC Tools are examples of DOS and Windows-based
programs that are inexpensive and easy to use. UniTrends

Software Corp. (http://www.unitrends.com) is one of the many
companies making such programs for the Unix platform.
Next on the cost/complexity continuum is a group of hardware
devices for backing up data. Still the most-used of such

equipment, streaming tape drives were very popular in the late

1980's and early 1990's. Designed as either internal devices
(requiring a card slot) or external devices using a serial or parallel

port, tape drives provide convenient storage of large amounts of

data on high-volume tapes formatted especially for the purpose.
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Tecmar Technologies (http://www.tecmar.com) is a large

producer of tape backup hardware in several formats.
Figure 3.3

Web site of
Tecmar
Technologies,
producer of tape
backup systems.

Tape backup can be very convenient for organizations with a
LAN, on which the server backup can be performed by one
person, or organizations that assign one person responsibility for

backing up each PC every week or specified interval. However,

due to the linear nature of magnetic tape wrapped around

spooling reels, these storage tapes do not generally accommodate

any other uses than restoring data. Many smaller organizations
find tape drive backup systems expensive and difficult to use, and

they do not have the staff necessary to dedicate one person's time
to ensuring that everyone's PC is backed up regularly.

More recently-developed backup and storage options work
around some of these problems. Bernoulli and Iomega are two

companies that manufacture lines of disk drives that use high-

volume, removable disks. With one of Iomega's zip drives, for

instance, a user can backup selected files to a 100-megabyte or
larger zip disk and restore them to any other computer equipped
with Iomega's software and a zip drive. Of course, data backup is
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only one of the many uses of such a device-professionals such as
architects and graphic designers are quickly learning the
advantages of transporting very large files between computer
systems conveniently.

Some innovative Internet services companies are beginning to

understand the problems associated with backup hardware and
software, and they are offering products to solve those problems.

For instance, Sound Data Incorporated offers a service called
Intervault, which combines client software for each employee's

PC, software for the office network's server, transmission of the

data via the Internet, and vaulted storage of the data for one fee.

The data on each PC is backed-up, gathered by the network
server, encrypted, sent to the Sound Data server, and stored by
the company for a specified interval.
Figure 3.4

The Intervault
backup service
of Sound Data
Incorporated.

Another company, Data Recall, LLC, offers a similar service that

is also usuable with a stand-alone PC. By dialing directly to Data

Recall on a modem with communication software, the PC can

perform an automatic, encrypted backup for itself during off

hours. Data Recall offers a multi-media presentation and
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demonstration of its product at its Web site at http://www.
datarecall.com.

Whatever combination of backup hardware and software you
choose, the most critical aspect of making sure that you will have

your important data when you need it is your organization's
backup procedure. If each employee is responsible for making a
backup of important data each week, this task should be written

into job descriptions or the Computer Use Policy. If one
employee is responsible for the task, that person should should
document the operation of the equipment and train another

person to do this job as a contingency measure.
Many organizations use an interval iteration scheme to organize

backed up data. This process ensures that there is more than one
copy of any particular computer's data and that at least one copy
is stored off-site. For instance, a large healthcare facility we know

of requires that each employee in its data center backup each

PC's entire hard drive to zip disks once per week. The most

recent backup is stored in the locked media room of the data
center. The second-oldest backup is transported to the data
center's off-site storage facility. The oldest backup is rotated back
from the off-site storage facility for the disks to be distributed and

re-used for the current week's iteration. (See the "Off-Site
Processing and Storage" section below for a discussion of off-site
facilities.)

A final note on backups: A surprise that many businesspersons

encounter when trying to restore backed up data is that the
backup did not work. Unbelievable as it seems (especially at the

time), this is a frequent problem. There can be many problems
with backup media: old, worn-out tapes or disks; media that gets

damaged in transit; an employee using the backup software
improperly. At regular intervals, you should ensure that your
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organization tests its data backups to verify their integrity. Most
backup software has a verification function, wherein the original

data will be compared to the backed up data. If your software

does not, you can restore a small, selected portion of backup data
to another computer and compare the contents of the file to the

original. For instance, the Microsoft Backup program verifies

backed up data with the Compare function, as illustrated below:
Figure 3.4

Using Microsoft
Backup
to verify the
integrity
of backed up
data.

Disaster Recovery Planning
According to disaster recovery planning consulting firm Koehn
Consulting (http://www.mailbag.com/users/koehn/drp.html),

disaster recovery plans can vary widely among organizations, but
thorough ones share some common elements:

•

A list of recovery team members, and alternates.

•

Locations where backup equipment and additional

•

A description of what constitutes a disaster and how to

copies of the plan are stored.

notify key personnel.
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•

Names and locations of key vendors and other external
companies.

•

Recovery procedures.

•

Policies to prevent disasters from occurring.

•

Procedures for updating the plan.

In very large organizations, the disaster recovery plan is one

portion of a larger document called a contingency plan. The
contingency plan covers many aspects of how the business will

approach any unusual incident or interruption in business
activities, and the disaster recovery plan deals specifically with
how the business will react to such things as earthquakes,
terrorism, fires, and floods.
For smaller organizations, the disaster recovery plan may be the

only portion of a contingency plan in place, and it may be a very

simple document. But any organization needs to plan for the
possibility that the physical location, or offices, can be

inaccessible or destroyed. In such a scenario, the information

processing portions of the organization's tasks will need to be

performed elsewhere-at an off-site location.

Off-Site Processing and Storage
In the past, only the managers of large, mainframe-based data
centers have seen the need to plan for where information

processing will occur in the case of the destruction of the data
center. There are many companies specializing in providing such

services, and most large IS departments have a contract with such
a site. Terms of the contract usually provide that the off-site
facility will install and run the mainframe operating software,
along with necessary application systems and databases, in the

case of an emergency shut-down of the organization's primary

data center.

Physical Security 55

Fortunately, planning for off-site processing is somewhat less
complicated for a small or medium-sized organization that uses

personal computers for data processing. One accountant we

know has the simplest off-site processing plan of all. He has a
comparably capable PC system to the ones in his office at home,
and he has installed his crucial office application software on that
PC. In the event of a physical disaster at his office, he can still

run payroll and support other critical functions on his home PC.
Other businesses establish procedures for quickly acquiring
identical or compatible computer hardware and re-installing

software applications quickly.
Although the larger disaster recovery firms generally specialize in
mainframe-based services, some do contract with customers to
provide ready access to personal computer equipment in the case

of an emergency. Other options for off-site processing for smaller
enterprises are: (1) making an agreement with another firm to use

a stand-by PC; (2) configuring employees' notebook computers to
perform business-critical functions in the case of a disaster; (3)
establishing a short-term lease or rental agreement with your

local computer store for acquiring replacement PCs and
establishing an agreement with your building owner or another
commercial real estate owner for the short-term lease of an office
in the case of an emergency. Of course, all of these procedures

should be researched and documented beforehand, and the

disaster recovery plan should be kept in a safe storage location
away from your organization's main office.
Off-site facilities can also accomodate storage of backed up data,

as mentioned above. One Canadian off-site storage firm, Data

Base File Tech (http://www.islandnetcom/~cvcprod/dbft.htm)
informs potential customers that any data stored within 15
kilometers of the customer's place of business is not "safe."

Again, when approaching disaster recovery planning, it makes

sense to balance the risks with the benefits. How many of your
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critical business functions would be affected if information
processing stopped for 3 days, 5 days, or a week? What are the

ramifications to your clients if your electronic files are destroyed?
How many security redundancies can you afford? Each of these

factors will affect the choices your information security team
makes when designing procedures.

Learning More About Physical Security
There are literally hundreds of vendors of computer security and
backup products. Visit your favorite Internet search engine site
and use queries such as computer security, computer theft, and

data backup. The Disaster Recovery Journal maintains a Web site

with archived articles, vendor information, and links to other

security-related organizations:
Figure 3-5

Web site of the
Disaster
Recovery
Journal.

For discussion of physical security topics applicable to your

organization's computing platform, check a hardware-specific

newsgroup such as comp.sys.ibm.as400.misc. The

comp.security.misc newsgroup often carries discussions of
backup strategies and disaster recovery planning.
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Chapter 4
Viruses
The very mention of the word "virus" causes managers, system
administrators, and personal computer users to shudder. Almost

everyone has a story to tell about a co-worker or friend who lost
that irreplaceable report or crucial database due to a damaging

virus. A recent National Computer Security Association survey

reports that about 98% of the corporations and large
organizations in North America have experienced virus infection
of their personal computers. But, the good news is that viruses

rarely adversely affect computers immediately, and the damage is

often minimal. With some basic information, a few precautions,
and good software, your organization can use its PCs with a high

degree of confidence that its computers are safe from virus
damage. In this chapter, we'll review

•

What computer viruses are, and how they can affect

personal computers.
•

Signs of virus infection on a PC.

•

How to protect your organization's PCs from viruses and
virus-caused damage.

•

Where to find virus protection software, and how to

•

Where to find more information on computer viruses.

install and use it.

This chapter deals with viruses as they affect stand-alone
PCs-those that are used in isolation to perform tasks and access
Internet sites using client software. In the case of a local area
network, especially one containing an Internet server, virus
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protection gets more complicated. Network security issues are

covered in more detail in Chapter 6.

What Is a Computer Virus?
A computer virus is simply a program designed to reproduce and
spread within a computer system or network without revealing its
presence. A computer virus attaches to files or to boot sectors of

hard or floppy disks (the portions of the disk that contain system
configuration information). Once in a computer system, the virus

replicates itself; in fact, some viruses do nothing else. Even so,

there is no such thing as a truly harmless virus, since, at the very
least, viruses expand, taking up hard-drive space and slowing the

performance of a computer.
Viruses are typically classified by the way they "infect" a

computer's system. For example, viruses that infect executable
programs residing on a computer (such as .exe files) are referred

to as "program viruses." Viruses that infect the boot section or

partition tables on a hard disk or floppy disk are called "boot
viruses." Viruses that are capable of infecting both are referred to
as "multipartite viruses." Viruses that are contained within
automated step sequences in a data file are called "macro"

viruses, due to the fact that these step sequences are called
macros by many software manufacturers. Because a virus is
simply computer code, once it enters a computer system, it can

spread by being transmitted along with any legitimate software or

file that is running or stored on the computer or a floppy disk.

A typical virus program consists of four main parts: the

replication instructions, the protection instructions, the trigger,
and the payload. The replication instructions are simply the parts
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of the program that allow the virus to copy itself. The protection

instructions are the parts of the program that protect the virus
from being detected. (Protection can include encryption or a
"stealth" technique that interferes with anti-virus software). The

trigger is the part of the program that controls when the virus is

triggered into activity. A virus can remain inactive on a computer
for a long time before the trigger activates it. For example, a virus
might remain inactive until the computer has been turned on a

specific number of times or until the computer's clock indicates a
certain day or time (such as the infamous Michelangelo virus that
is triggered on March 6). The payload is that part of the program

that is executed when the trigger is activated. Sometimes

payloads are simply messages that indicate that the PC has been
infected, but other pay loads are more damaging, such as the
deletion of files or the altering of data.

Once a computer is infected by a virus, many types and levels of
damage can result. Some levels may be considered negligible, as
in the cases of viruses that do nothing more than replicate or

viruses that alter or delete files that can be easily reloaded when
the viruses are removed. Other viruses might destroy all the files

on a computer's hard drive, and, although this sounds like an
overwhelming loss, if backups have been made regularly, even
this level of damage can be easily corrected by removing the

virus and reloading programs and data from the backups. More

difficult to recover from are viruses which slowly corrupt data
over a long period of time without ever revealing their presence
in the system. In cases such as this, backups are corrupted as

well, and data must be rebuilt from scratch. Perhaps the most

dangerous types of viruses are those designed to do nothing

except discover and report crucial system information, such as

the password of the system administrator of a LAN. If one of these
"discovery" viruses is successful, unlimited damage to the system
and its data is possible.
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Signs of Computer Viruses
Although these descriptions are chilling to those of us who

depend heavily on our computers, there are simple ways to

protect ourselves from these viruses and ways to recognize when
certain types of viruses are residing on our systems. Some of the

symptoms of a computer infected by a virus include
•

Changes in the sizes of programs.

•

Longer load times for programs.

•

Slower system operation.

•

Unusual error messages.

•

Reduced memory or disk space.

•

Unusual screen activity.

•

Incorrect changes in file dates and time information.

•

Unexpected writes to a drive.

For instance, a journalist we know found that her laptop
computer was infected with a version of the Word Concept virus.
This is a macro virus with several variations that is carried in the

.doc files created by Microsoft's very popular Word for Windows
word processing program. The symptom she noticed was that the
Save As command under the File menu did not work properly-it

was disabled at odd times and did not allow her to save
documents under new names. Fortunately, a quick trip to the

National Computer Security Association, or NCSA, Web site was
all she needed to download the correction for the virus

(http://www.ncsa.com). By following the NCSA instructions for
opening the "fix" document that contained ameliorative macros

(illustrated below), she was able to remove the virus and repair
all affected documents as she opened and re-saved them during
the course of the next few weeks.

Viruses 63

Figure 4.1

The "Fix" page
for the Word
Concept virus at
the NCSA Web
site.

A systems engineer we know was not quite so fortunate. As she

worked from her home office, she noticed over the course of a

couple of days that several data files on her primary PC seemed
to be missing-she received error messages when trying to retrieve
them. Within a few more days, she also noticed that some
programs did not run properly, creating system errors and

protection faults. After running disk analysis software, she
discovered many corrupted and damaged files on the hard disk.

More investigation with anti-virus software uncovered the fact
that her hard disk contained a particularly destructive stealth virus
in the boot sector, and that the virus had replicated to affect

nearly all programs and data files on the PC. She was able to

boot her PC from a floppy diskette with anti-virus protection and

locate and delete the virus from the hard drive; however, the
damage was irreversible and extensive. She spent several days re
installing her operating system and programs and chasing down

duplicate copies of important documents and files. Because she
uses her home PC to support clients remotely for her employer, a
healthcare software company, the potential for spreading the virus

was great. "My team spent a few frantic hours checking all my
clients' systems for evidence of the virus," she reports. "Luckily, it
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had not spread, but if it had, we probably would have had to
spend weeks repairing the damage."

Both these examples show how a seemingly unimportant system
oddity can really be an indication of much more serious trouble.
In the first example, the journalist should have investigated the
change in available menu options right away, especially one she

had used so regularly in the past, such as the Save As command.
In the second example, the systems engineer should have

immediately suspected trouble when data files began
disappearing. Of course, both incidents probably could have

been avoided through the regular use of anti-virus software.

Protecting Your PC From Viruses
There are a few relatively simple steps you can take to eliminate
the majority of virus threats to your documents and programs.

The first, and most important, is to protect against the damage a

virus might do by keeping complete and regular backups of your

system. (See Chapter 3 for more information on system backups.)
In addition, you should follow these guidelines:
1.

Back up all your work and system files regularly.

2.

Install and use reputable anti-virus software.

3.

Update your anti-virus software regularly.

4.

Always scan floppy disks and CD-ROMs for viruses.

5.

Do not boot your PC from a floppy disk unless you are
sure the disk is virus-free.

6.

Whenever possible, use the write-protect tab when using

floppy disks to prevent viruses from copying themselves.
7.

When downloading from the Internet, scan files for

viruses before running them.
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8.

Use only licensed copies of software obtained from
reputable sources.

The most effective way to avoid virus damage is to obtain virus
detection software and to use it consistently. Most of these

programs work by allowing you to perform scans of your
random-access memory (RAM), hard disk, and floppy disks for

suspicious strings of executable code. Several, such as Norton
Anti-Virus, also allow you to inoculate files on floppy disks or

your hard disk to detect future virus infection (that is, the
deposition of viruses known to the program). Some programs

even allow you to keep them running in memory so that an
infected program file can be caught as soon as it is copied,
launched, or identified. And, the newest and most sophisticated

virus protection software automatically scans files as they are
downloaded from Internet sites to determine their safety.
One of the most important characteristics of virus protection

software is its currency. A particular software package can only
recognize viruses that have been identified, classified, and

defined in the program. Most programs provide a virus definition
table so that you can determine which viruses a particular

program update can identify, such as the Virus List from Microsoft

Anti-Virus program illustrated below:
Figure 4.2

The Virus List
screen
of the Microsoft
Anti-Virus
program.
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For this reason, most of the leading software manufacturers

maintain extensive update programs through their Web sites. For

instance, users of the popular McAfee anti-virus software,
VirusScan, can visit the McAfee site at http://www.mcafee.com

to download the very latest virus definition tables (DAT files) for
their software, as shown below.
Figure 4.3

Downloading
anti-virus
software updates
from
the Mcafee Web
site.

The NCSA survey mentioned above found that over two-thirds of
virus infections among large organizations were caused by the
use of infected floppy disks. Therefore, it is crucially important for

you to scan every floppy disk every time you insert it into a drive

on your computer. And, since the Word Concept virus and similar

macro-type viruses are both very common and difficult to

identify, you should scan floppies before opening any documents

from them and scan documents attached to email messages just
as consistently as you scan program files.
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Downloading, Installing, and Using Anti-Virus Software
Downloading and Installing Anti-Virus Software
Most virus protection software is available for online download.
In the case of McAfee products, you can download a 30-day trial

version from the McAfee Web site at http://www.mcafee.com. To
download and install the VirusScan program, follow these steps:

=> Use your Web browser client software to visit the
download page of the McAfee site at

http://www.mcafee.com/leads/evallead.htmI, illustrated

below:
Figure 4.4

Download page
for Mcafee's
VirusScan
program.

=> Fill in the requested information in the form on the page.
=> Click on the button labeled Submit this form.
=> On the next page, click on the link for the software you

wish to download. For this example, we chose

VirusScan.
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=> On the next page, select the appropriate version for your
PC's operating system and choose one of the compressed

files to download, as illustrated below:
Figure 4.5

Choosing a
version
of VirusScan.

=> When prompted by your browser software, select the
temp sub-directory for storing the downloaded file.
=> Unzip the downloaded file (called X.zip, where X is the

name of the version you chose).
=> Run the setup.exe file by double-clicking on it in File

Manager, selecting it through the Run function under the
File menu of Program Manager, or executing it through

Windows 95 Start menu.

=> Follow the on-screen instructions to complete the
program installation.

Using Anti-Virus Software
To use anti-virus software, you will need to follow the
manufacturer's instructions, which can usually be found on the
Help screens or in a readme.txt file supplied with the software.

However, most virus software packages operate with similar
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features. The example described below uses the Microsoft AntiVirus program.

=> Open the program by double-clicking on the Microsoft
Anti-Virus icon (or choosing the program from the
Windows 95 Start menu).
=> Select a disk drive to scan for viruses by double-clicking

on the drive in the left-hand box, as illustrated below:
Figure 4.6

Selecting a drive
to scan for viruses
with Microsoft
Anti-Virus.

=> Choose either Detect or Detect and Clean by clicking on

the appropriate button. If you choose Detect only, and
the program finds a virus, you will be prompted to
respond OK to a Clean function
Many virus protection programs include an "options" or

"preferences" menu in which you can customize your program's

operation and select those functions of the software you wish to
use. The Options screen of Microsoft Anti-Virus is shown below:
Figure 4.7

The Options
screen of
Microsoft
Anti-Virus.
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In addition, some products are designed to run as memory

resident programs, enabling them to check all files transmitted via
a network or downloaded from the Internet as the transmission
occurs (rather than the user performing a separate checking step

before opening or executing the file).

Learning More About Viruses
If you are responsible for a network or for advising your clients
on how to avoid losses due to computer viruses, you will need to
make sure that you stay updated on new developments in this

field and on the new viruses infecting computers. One way to do
so is to regularly read the messages posted to the comp.virus

Usenet newsgroup, or to subscribe to its companion email
discussion list, Virus-L. To subscribe to Virus-L, send a message

addressed to listserv@lehigh.edu with the following in the body
of the message: SUB VIRUS-L Your Name. Before posting any

messages to the mailing list or newsgroup, be sure to read the
excellent FAQ sheet on this subject maintained by Nick

FitzGerald. You can download the FAQ from the comp.virus
archive site at ftp.infospace.com/pub/virus-l/. Note: Because

computer security experts understand the importance of message

encryption and authentication, you will find that many
documents distributed by them, including this FAQ, are digitally
signed, encrypted, or both. This FAQ is digitally signed with Nick

FitzGerald's PGP key, and you can use PGP software to
determine the authenticity of the copy you download if you wish
(see Chapter 5 for a full discussion of message authentication and
PGP software).

In addition to comp.virus and Virus-L, there is a wealth of

information available online about computer viruses. Many
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companies that sell anti-virus software market their products
online. To attract potential buyers to their sites, they also provide

useful information about viruses and virus prevention. These sites

can be rich resources for virus research, and, not coincidentally,
very good sources for purchasing reputable virus-prevention and

recovery software. One such site is the Symantec Antivirus

Research Center at http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/

index.html. The Symantec site includes a virus research library
with many useful descriptive documents, coverage of recent

viruses, a virus information database, a downloadable software
library, special coverage of Macintosh viruses, and, of course,

product information about Symantec software.
Figure 4.8

The Symantec
Antivirus
Research Center
Web site.

Another software site that offers valuable information is Dr.
Solomon's Online at http://www.sands.com. Dr. Solomon's

Online is an information center for users of Dr. Solomon's anti
virus products. The site includes a virus tutorial, virus alerts, and

information about Dr. Solomon's software (such as technical
support, white papers, and independent comparative reviews).

Similarly, Seven Locks Software at http://www.sevenlocks.com

provides a good deal of technical information in support of their
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Safe@Home anti-virus product. A list of white papers available at
this site includes topics such as "Viruses and Windows NT,"
"Virus Prevention Policies that Work," and "Managing Computer

Virus Incidents."

Other virus resources are developed and maintained by groups
without particular software products to market, such as the

National Computer Security Association at http://www.ncsa.com.
The NCSA describes its mission this way: "To foster improvement

in all aspects of world-wide digital security, reliability and ethics,
providing key services to three principal constituencies: end

users of digital technologies, computer and communications
industry product developers and vendors, and computer and
information security experts." To fulfill these objectives, the

NCSA provides access to an in-depth virus study (in addition to
the survey discussed above), a listing of conferences and

seminars, a catalog of books and journals on information security
issues, virus information alerts, and links to NCSA-certified

software producers.
Figure 4.9

Web site of the
National
Computer
Security
Association.
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To find more specific information on a particular virus, visit Data

Fellows Virus News Updates page at http://www.datafellows.fi/
news/vir-news/. At this site you can access a database of

information about viruses through an alphabetical listing or
through a keyword search form. The database entries provide

descriptions of how viruses spread, what they do, and alerts users

to any variants of the virus that may also be circulating.
Figure 4.10

Virus News
Updates page at
Data Fellows
Web site.
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Chapter 5
Encryption
One way to protect the information assets of your organization is
to physically secure them, as we described in Chapter 3. Another
way is to make sure that damaging pieces of computer code,

called viruses, cannot infect PC systems and damage the
programs and data residing on them, as discussed in Chapter 4.

However, there may be times when the sensitive and valuable
information your company has worked long and hard to compile
and store is exposed to the "open air." Perhaps an element of

your physical security system will fail, and data files will be taken

from computer storage. Perhaps your company will wish to send

email and work files over a network using public telephone lines,
such as the Internet, or conduct electronic commerce through a
company World Wide Web site. Or, perhaps your organization

wishes to transmit sensitive material, such as payroll records, over
a wide area network (WAN) or local area network (LAN). The
best way to keep information private and secure when

transmitting it or storing it is to make it unreadable and
unrecognizable through a process called encryption. In this

chapter, we'll review
•

The basics of encryption theory and the current status of
encryption programs.

•

Ways that encryption is currently used: data archive,

email, and WWW browsers.

•

Governmental issues related to encryption.

•

How to select quality encryption software.

•

Where to find more information on encryption.
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An Old Strategy Meets the Information Age
Encrypting information through the use of a secret code is an age-

old tactic. For thousands of years, political leaders have encoded

messages before sending them via messenger, or mail, or radio

wave, to friends and allies. The "shift-by-three" code of Julius
Caesar is one famous legend: the recipients of the ruler's
messages could only read them by replacing each letter in the
message text with a letter three positions away from it in the

alphabet. For instance, the word hello would be encoded to

appear as khoor, and the recipient could decode it by shifting
each letter three positions to its left in the listing of alphabet

letters.

Today, the study of encryption and decryption, called cryptology,
is a field populated by experts in mathematics, information

theory, and computer science. Simple schemes such as "shift-by-

three" have developed into complex algebraic algorithms, and
most of the activities of cryptologists center on computers and

sophisticated software. Discovering the secret codes used in
encryption, through a process called cryptanalysis, is considered

the necessary basic training for all aspiring cryptologists and

anyone who sets out to create a credible encryption system.

Some cryptanalysis techniques used in World War II are believed
to be so advanced and valuable that they are still categorized as

"classified" by the US government.

A Few Basic Concepts
No matter how sophisticated the mathematical techniques behind
an encryption system are, there are a few concepts that are
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common to all systems. For instance, any process of encryption
endeavors to create a ciphertext (an encoded, unreadable string
of characters) from a plaintext (the original characters of the

message). This is the process of encrypting, or encoding,
information. The reverse process of creating plaintext from

ciphertext is called decrypting, or decoding.1

Encryption software is based on the mathematical conversion of
plaintext to ciphertext (and back) through the use of a
mathematical formula called an algorithm. A key, which is a

unique string of characters, is fed into the algorithm along with
the text to be encrypted. Thus, keys become part of the process

that is used to encode and decode messages. Keys are widely

used in many types of computer programs. For instance, your
word processing software might have a function that uses a

password key to lock and unlock your documents. File

compression utilities, such as WinZip, use various compression
and decompression keys to make files more compact for storage.

Encryption systems can be classified according to how they
handle the creation and distribution of these unique strings of

characters called keys. Symmetric encryption systems require
both the sender and recipient of the data to have the same key,

and they are often called secret key systems. The private key is

used by the sender to encrypt the data and the very same key is
used again by the recipient to decrypt the data. In this type of

system, two or more correspondents must each have a copy of
the program or secret key. While this type of system is a very
efficient way to keep messages secure, it also has disadvantages.
To use a secret key system, you must know the person with

1 Portions of the text of this chapter, along with a good deal of useful
information, have been gleaned from the Internet document called Snake
Oil Warning Signs: Encryption Software to Avoid by Matt Curtin and
others (copyright 1997, Matt Curtin, all rights reserved, adapted and
reprinted with permission). Referred to as Snake Oil FAQ, the latest
version of this document is archived at ftp://rtfm.mit.edu/pub/usenet/
news.answers/cryptography-faq/snake-oil.
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whom you wish to exchange messages and provide them with
the software and secret key in advance of sending any messages.

In addition, the secret key must be sent through a secure channel
(not the Internet), because if the secret key is intercepted, the

security of all messages among members of the group using the

system will be compromised.
An example of a secret key system is Kerberos, developed by the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). In this system, there
is a designated Internet site called the Kerberos server that

generates keys whenever a group of users wishes to send

messages. Another secret key system is called DES (see the

"Governmental Issues" section below for more discussion of
DES). Parties that wish to share encoded messages use a common

numerical string (DES key) along with the DES program to encode
and decode messages.
Asymmetric encryption systems, in contrast, assign one pair of

keys each to the sender and the receiver. Also called public key
systems, asymmetric encryption tools provide for the sender and

receiver to have both a public key and a private key. Public key
systems were designed so that users would not need to access

other sites to generate keys and so users could distribute keys
through unsecured channels, such as the Internet. Users distribute

their public keys to anyone to wishes to send a secure message.
Public keys are posted at key distribution sites so that anyone

with access to the Internet can acquire anyone else's public key.

For example, if a client wanted to send private financial data to
her accountant over the Internet using a public key system, she
would locate and verify the accountant's public key, use the
accountant's public key to encrypt her file with encryption

software, and send the encrypted file via email to the accountant.

(Anyone who knows that the accountant has a public key could
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visit the Internet site serving as the repository of public keys for
the accountant's chosen encryption system and do the same

thing.) The accountant would then use his private key, which

only he knows, to decrypt the message after receiving it. PGP, or
Pretty Good Privacy, is an example of a public key encryption
system. To better understand the differences between private key

and public key systems, compare Figures 5-1 and 5-2.
Figure 5.1

Message traffic
flow in a secret
key system.

Secret Key System

Figure 5.2

Message traffic
flow in a public
key system.

Public Key System
Private Key
for Party B

Encrypted
Messages

Private Key
for Party C

AD H
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In both symmetric and asymmetric encryption systems, the length
of the key is a crucial factor. In a world where sophisticated
computer programs can be used to analyze and "break"

encryption schemes, the longer the key, the more robust the
encryption system. Because cryptanalysis techniques use various
probability schemes to discover keys, the time required to break a

system increases exponentially with each incremental increase in

key length. This is why both the sales hype and the technical
discussions of encryption center on key length. And, this is why

the US government is concerned with encryption systems and

their export (see the "Governmental Issues" section below).
In addition to encrypting and decrypting data, encryption
software vendors often also build in features that protect files
from being altered in transit or from being transmitted by

impostors. The process of verifying that a message was sent by
the person who has signed it and that it has not been altered

during transmission is called authentication. In practice,
authentication usually uses a form of digital signature to assure

that a document has been sent legitimately by its stated sender
and that the contents remain unaltered. In public key systems, a

message recipient can also use someone's public key to verify
their digital signature and thus assure that the message is

authentic.

Uses of Encryption
Individuals and organizations generally use encryption for three
purposes: (1) to protect archived data; (2) to protect email

transmissions; and (3) to protect World Wide Web transmissions,

such as electronic commerce transactions.
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Archival Encryption
As mentioned above, one of the factors determining whether or

not an encryption system is "breakable" through cryptanalysis
techniques is time-figured as how much computing power is

needed to perform the cryptanalysis. The longer it takes to
discover a system's key, the more secure it is considered to be.

However, the factor of time impacts different data types
differently. For instance, the time an email message must remain

secure and confidential might be only one day, while banking
account information and personnel records need to be kept
confidential for much longer. Therefore, many experts

recommend that organizations use much stronger encryption
systems for archived data than for message transmission. So,

when planning for the security of an organization's archived

information, you should consider both its physical security (see

Chapter 3) and the merits of the encryption system used.

Email Encryption
The most popular system used for the encryption of email
messages is PGP, or Pretty Good Privacy, developed by Philip
Zimmerman and others. PGP uses a formula to create a

numerical string (key) from two prime numbers using the RSA,
Inc. public-key system invented in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi

Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. The key is used to encode
messages, and to encode them, one must know the two original
prime numbers. PGP public keys can also be used to authenticate

signatures and ensure message integrity, as discussed above. For
instance, a bank may wish to send its customers a message

changing a deposit procedure. The bank can use PGP to create

an elaborate digital signature that contains not only the bank's

signature but also an encrypted digest of the message. The

customer can process the bank's message and signature with PGP
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and the bank's public key and verify that the message was from
the bank and that it was not altered on its way.
PGP is available for non-commercial use by using Telnet to visit

the net-dist.mit.edu site. Log-in as getpgp, answer the questions,
and then use FTP to visit the net-dist.mit.edu site and follow the

directions to download and install the software. PGP for

commercial use is available from PGP Inc. (http://www.pgp.com).
The commercial version, called WinPGP, is much more

integrated with Windows software programs and provides an

efficient cut-and-paste method of encrypting and decrypting

messages.
In addition to third-party encryption systems, such as PGP,
various email programs are beginning to include encryption as
components of email composition and transmission software.
One protocol gaining acceptance as a broad standard for Internet

email security is S-MIME, based on the RSA encryption system.

When using an email package, such as Netscape Mail or Eudora
Pro, that supports S-MIME, encryption and decryption takes place

transparently to the user. As the export issues surrounding
encryption systems are resolved and users pressure software

makers for easier ways to protect Internet messages, this type of
embedded encryption will become more and more popular.

World Wide Web Encryption
In the continuing debate about Internet standards, the encryption
of HTTP transmissions is a hot topic. At stake is the security of all
electronic commerce conducted via Web sites. Some companies,

like Netscape, are advocating for standardization on open, non
proprietary security schemes, such as their proposed Secure

Sockets Layer, or SSL. Other firms, especially makers of

specialized electronic commerce systems, would like to see each
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site using the software of their choice, which may or may not be

based on a proprietary encryption system.
As of this printing, SSL seems to be fast gaining acceptance as a
standard for secure Web transmissions. As Netscape has

envisioned it, SSL is a layer of protocol located logically between

Internet client software (such as software used to access the

Telnet, FTP, or Usenet functions of the Internet) and the TCP/IP
software (also called the TCP/IP stack or the winsock). In addition
to data encryption based on the RSA system, SSL provides for

server authentication, client authentication, and message integrity.
When accessing a server that supports SSL, you will see that the

protocol indicator at the beginning of the URL begins with HTTPS

(as opposed to HTTP). In addition, if you are using an SSLenabled WWW browser you will see an indication on your

browser screen that you are connected with a secure server-for
instance, when using Netscape Navigator, the small key icon at

the lower left-hand corner of the browser screen changes from a
broken key to an intact key, as illustrated below on the order

screen for Netscape's Enterprise Server software:
Figure 5.3

Secure WWW
connection to a
Netscape server.
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When you are sending information, such as credit card data or
account information, to an SSL-enabled server with an SSL-

enabled client, the data is encrypted automatically with the
server's public key on the client side and is decrypted with a

private key on the server side. The same is true in reverse;
however, the private and public keys are generated randomly by
the client software and the user is not required to perform any

special decrypting steps. Netscape Navigator informs the user

when a secure form has been requested through the browser

software with the following screen:
Figure 5.4

Security Information

Security
Information
screen of
Netscape
Navigator.

Governmental Issues
You've probably seen references in the popular press to the

debate about the US government's role in restricting the export of
encryption technology. This issue will continue to affect
encryption software development and distribution. In order for

you to make informed choices about selecting and implementing
encryption software in your organization, you should be aware of
the history and progression of this public policy.
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In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Act, an act that
allowed law enforcement agencies to conduct electronic

surveillance. In brief, the Congress decided that "the public safety

interests [are] important enough within the confines of the Fourth
Amendment to warrant extremely strict regimes of control to be
implemented, adhered to, and vigorously enforced"

(http://www.fbi.gov/crypto.htm). In the early seventies, debates
began to rage in Congress about whether or not the same logic
applies to the Internet. Should the government or law

enforcement officials have complete access to the electronic
information being relayed on the Internet?

These debates continue today. According to the Director of the

FBI, Louis Freeh, in his speech given before the Congress on
September 21, 1995, this debate is essentially about the same

issues that the Congress was facing in 1968, only now the
Congress is questioning who is permitted to encrypt what

information and how well that information can be encrypted. The
American government has maintained a policy of only allowing
40-bit encryption on messages transferred outside of the US.

Furthermore, US companies are forbidden to sell encryption
systems of over 40-bits to other countries. This policy has, of

course, hurt companies attempting to conduct international
electronic commerce because they cannot transfer secure
messages over the Internet, and it has hurt American encryption

companies who wish to market and sell their products in the
growing overseas arenas.

Both the US and other governments are worried that encryption
techniques that allow information to be encoded too well will
allow all manner of "bad guys" (such as terrorists, organized
criminals, nuclear smugglers, drug traffickers, or spies) to send

messages and make plans over the phone lines-right under the

government's nose-hence the ban on the export of any
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encryption system over 40-bits. D. James Bidzos, President of

RSA Data Security, Inc., a leading manufacturer of encryption
software, says of his company's role in producing encryption
tools, "I am occasionally asked how I feel about heading a

company that is developing and marketing technology that may
allow criminals to conceal their activities from the government...
I'm sure that my response is similar to the response you would

get if you asked the automotive industry how they feel about
making a product that will, with absolute certainty, cause the

deaths of more than 40,000 people annually....the risk is
acceptable because it is outweighed by the benefits, and the
alternatives are unacceptable" (http://www.rsa.com/PRESSBOX/

releases/commit~1 .htm).
Peter Trei, a senior software engineer at Process Software

Corporation of Framingham, Massachusetts, says of the current
encryption ban, "The whole law's kind of ridiculous." Trei claims
that 40-bit encryption technology is neither strong enough to

safeguard commercial transactions nor to protect against
industrial espionage (http://techweb.cmpcom/cwi/current/
50n1.html). Witness to this statement is Damien Doligez, a

French researcher who cracked the encryption code of the non

US version of Netscape Navigator in just eight days. "Once the

bugs are worked out," Doligez said, "a group of computers will
be able to crack Netscape's 40-bit code in as little as half a day."

And, just as he predicted, two separate groups recently
accomplished the task in under four hours.

The debate over encryption and the loss of international trade
due to the lack of appropriate encryption software has been a hot
issue during the Clinton administration. In 1994, a product
developed by the National Security Agency, the "Clipper Chip,"

was touted by the Clinton administration as the answer to
international encryption problems. The Clipper system is based
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on the idea of key-escrow. Basically, for any company

subscribing to the Clipper Chip, two government agencies would
hold the keys to encryption in "escrow." Then, anytime a law

enforcement official desires to view the company's electronic
records, the two government agencies would supply the keys to

unlock the code-all subject to court order, of course.

US companies that develop and produce encryption hardware

and software are justifiably anxious about the potential market
that they are losing overseas. D. James Bidzos testified to the
Congress in June of 1996 that European and Middle Eastern

companies are currently manufacturing and selling high-powered

encryption systems to companies all over the world using
encryption technology originally developed right here in the
United States. Bidzos claims that the US ban on encryption
export "did not recognize the threat to US industry from foreign

competition. . . . Lost market share is hard to recover"

(http://www.rsa.com/PRESSBOX/releases/commit~1.htm).
Bidzos also insinuated that the US firms that develop and

distribute encryption software are not only losing the competitive
edge in the international market, but also within the US market,
for the United States does not have any type of import ban on

encryption systems.
All of this controversy has caused businesses wanting to
implement electronic commerce sites to be, legitimately, skeptical

and somewhat fearful about implementation. However, a solution

to the government encryption ban is in sight. The Clinton

administration announced in August of 1996 that it would "soon

release an alternative to the US government's Clipper Chip system
that would allow companies to export software with 64-bit

encryption capabilities" (http://techweb.cmp.com/cwi/current/

50n1.html). A 64-bit system, being longer, would require more

time and computing power to decode and would be secure
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enough to protect most electronic transfers, according to Mike

Homer, Vice President of Marketing at Netscape.

On October 1, 1996, Vice President Al Gore announced the
Clinton administration's answer to the encryption ban policy and
the new initiative of the government to promote international
electronic commerce and encryption sales. The new initiative did

not allow for the export of the expected 64-bit encryption systems,

but, instead, systems with 56-bit encryption capabilities will be
released for export beginning on January 1, 1997
(http://doradus.einet.net/tradewave/press/pr.govtstandards.1096

.html). Gore stated that "under this initiative, the export of 56-bit

key length encryption products will be permitted under a general
license after one-time review, and contingent upon industry
commitments to build and market future products that support

key recovery" (http://www.rsa.com/PRESSBOX/releases/

56bitGore.htm). This type of encryption system also operates
under the "key escrow" idea, except that the keys are not held by
the US government, but by some trusted third party, maybe even

someone internal to the user's organization. Access to these keys
would, of course, be limited to the laws of the country in which
the business is operating, but Gore says that here in the US, the

administration will introduce legislation that will "facilitate
commercial key recovery, including providing penalties for
improper release of keys, and protecting key recovery agents
against liability when they properly release a key"

(http://www.rsa.com/PRESSBOX/releases/56bitGore.htm).

Choosing Encryption Software
Software makers will come and go, but the basics of choosing
good encryption software are relatively simple. Use the two
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sections below to establish what your objectives are in encrypting
data and to measure the marketing claims of software companies.

Organizational Encryption Objectives
For many users of computer-based encryption, preserving the

contents of a message is as important as protecting its secrecy.
Damage caused by tampering can often be worse than damage

caused by disclosure. For example, it may be disquieting to
discover that a cracker has read the contents of your fundstransfer authorization, but it's a disaster for him to change the
transfer destination to his own account.

Encryption by itself does not protect a message from tampering.
In fact, there are several techniques for changing the contents of
an encrypted message without ever figuring out the encryption

key. If the integrity of your messages is important, don't rely on
just secrecy to protect them. Check how the vendor protects

messages from undetected modification.
Key Sizes

Even if a cipher is secure against analytical attacks (which form
the basis of most cryptanalysis techniques), it will be vulnerable

to brute-force attacks with moderate computing power if the key
is too small. In a brute-force attack, the attacker simply tries every

possible key until the right one is found. How long this takes
depends on the size of the key and the amount of processing
power available. So when trying to secure data, you need to
consider how long it must remain secure and how much

computing power an attacker can use. Any reliable encryption

software vendor should be able to provide you with estimates of
how long it would take to break the system it uses and the

conditions under which that could occur.
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Keys vs. Passphrases
A key is not the same thing as a passphrase or password. In order
to resist cryptanalysis techniques, all possible keys must be
equally probable. If some keys are more likely to be used than

others, then an unauthorized person can use this information to

reduce the work needed to break the cipher. Essentially, the key

must be random. However, a passphrase generally needs to be
easy to remember, so it has significantly less randomness than its

length suggests. For example, a 20-letter English phrase, rather
than having 20 x 8 = 150 bits of randomness, only has about 20

x 2 = 40 bits of randomness. So, most encryption software will

convert a passphrase into a key through a process called hashing
or key initialization. Avoid encryption systems that skip this phase

by using a password directly as a key.
Implementation Environment

Other factors that can influence the relative security of a product
are related to its environment. For example, in software-based

encryption packages, is there any plaintext that's written to disk

(perhaps in temporary files)? What about operating systems that
have the ability to swap processes out of memory on to disk?

When something to be encrypted has its plaintext counterpart
deleted, is the extent of its deletion a standard removal of its

name from the directory contents, or has it been written over? If
it's been written over, how well has it been written over? Is that
level of security an issue for you? Are you storing encryption

system keys on a multi-user machine? If so, the likelihood of
having your keys illicitly accessed is much higher.

Software Warning Signs
Below is a list of claims and practices that should make you think

twice about a particular software vendor. Some very reputable
systems might use one of these marketing angles to promote their

product, but, in general, any vendor that makes impossible claims
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or unreasonable assurances is probably over-stating their system's
security. When buying encryption software, that old adage is

unfortunately true: "If it sounds too good to be true, it probably is."

Trust Us, We Know What We're Doing
Perhaps the biggest warning sign of all is the "trust us, we know

what we're doing" message that's either stated directly or implied
by the vendor. This message is usually communicated in lieu of a
complete explanation of the security features of the product, with
the implication that describing the product in exhaustive detail

would somehow compromise the secret "inner workings" of the

system. If the vendor is concerned about the security of their
system after describing exactly how it works, it is certainly of

questionable effectiveness. Regardless of whether or not they tell,
cryptanalysts will be able to figure it out.

Technobabble
If the vendor's description appears to be confusing nonsense, it
may very well be so, even to an expert in the field. One sign of
technobabble is a description which uses newly-invented terms
or trademarked terms without actually explaining how the system

works. Technobabble is a good way to confuse a potential user
and to mask the vendor's own lack of expertise. And consider

this: if the marketing material isn't clear, will the user manual be

any better? Even the best product can be compromised if it isn't
used properly. If you can't understand what a vendor is saying,

you're probably better off finding something that makes more
sense.

Secret Algorithms

Avoid software which uses secret algorithms. This is not
considered a safe means of protecting data. If the vendor isn't

confident that its encryption method can withstand scrutiny, then
you should be wary of trusting it. A common excuse for not
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disclosing an algorithm is that "crackers might try to break the
program's security." While this may be a valid concern, it should

be noted that sophisticated cryptanalysts can reverse-engineer the
program to see how it works anyway. This is not a problem if the
algorithm is strong and the program is implemented properly.

Using a well-known and trusted algorithm, providing technical
notes explaining the implementation, and making the source

code available are signs that a vendor is confident about its
product's security.

Revolutionary Breakthroughs

Beware of any vendor who claims to have invented a "new type
of cryptography" or a "revolutionary breakthrough." True

breakthroughs are likely to show up in research literature, and
professionals in the field typically won't trust them until after
years of analysis, when they're not so new anymore. The strength

of any encryption scheme is only proven by the test of time.
Unbreakability

Some vendors will claim that their software is "unbreakable,"
however, no algorithm is unbreakable. Even the best algorithms

are susceptible to brute-force attacks, though this can be
impractical if the key is large enough. Some companies that claim

unbreakability actually have serious reasons for saying so.

Unfortunately, these reasons generally depend on some narrow
definition of what it means to "break" security. For example, one
time pads (see the next section) are technically unbreakable as far

as secrecy goes, but only if several difficult and important
conditions are true. Even then, they are trivially vulnerable to
known plaintext attacks on the message's integrity. Other systems

may be unbreakable only if one of the communicating devices

(such as a laptop computer) isn't stolen. So be sure to find out
exactly what the "unbreakable" properties of the system are, and

see if the more breakable parts of the system also provide
adequate security.

Encryption 93

One-Time-Pads
A vendor might claim the system uses a one-time-pad (OTP),
which is provably unbreakable. Technically, the encrypted output
of an OTP system is equally likely to decrypt to any same-size

plaintext. For example, the ciphertext below:
598v *$ _+~xCtMBO

has an equal chance of decrypting to any of these:

The answer is yes
The answer is no!
You are so naive!
An OTP system works by having a "pad" of random bits in the

possession of both the sender and recipient, but absolutely no
one else. Originally, paper pads were used-thus, the term pad.

The pad must be sent from one party to the other securely. To
encrypt an n-bit message, the next n bits in the pad are used as a
key. After the bits are used from the pad, they're destroyed, and

can never be used again.

The bits in the pad cannot be generated by an algorithm or other
encryption tool. They must be truly random, using a real random

source such as specialized hardware. The real limitation to

practical use of OTPs is the generation and distribution of truly
random keys. You have to distribute at least one bit of key for

every bit of data transmitted. So OTPs are awkward for general-

purpose cryptography. Further, if pads are provided by a vendor,
you cannot verify the quality of the pads. Also, some vendors

may try to confuse random session keys or initialization

vectors with OTPs.
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Recoverable Keys

If there is a key-backup or key-escrow system, are you in control
of the backup and organizational implementation of key escrow
or does someone else hold a copy of the key? If the vendor

claims it can recover lost keys without using some type of key
escrow service, the security is obviously flawed.

Exportable from the USA

If the software is made in the USA, can it be exported? As
discussed above, strong cryptography is considered dangerous
munitions by the United States and requires approval from the US

State Department before it can leave the country. Chances are, if
the software has been approved for export, the algorithm is weak

or crackable, as the recent demonstrations of the exportable

version of Netscape Navigator demonstrate.
Military Grade
Many encryption system vendors claim that their system is

"military grade." This is a meaningless term, since there isn't a
standard that defines "military grade," other than the fact that a

system is actually being used by various armed forces.

Unfortunately, many reputable makers of reliable encryption
software use this marketing claim.

Other Considerations:

•

Avoid vendors who don't seem to understand any

concepts described in this chapter.

•

Avoid any system that doesn't let you generate your own

keys (e.g., the vendor sends you keys in the mail, or keys
are embedded in the copy of the software you buy).

•

Avoid anything that allows someone inappropriately

accessing the software on a particular PC to retrieve
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encrypted data without needing some sort of key or

passphrase.
•

Beware of products that are designed for a specific task,
such as data archiving, and have encryption as an
additional feature. Typically, it's better to use an

encryption utility for encryption, rather than some tool

designed for another purpose that adds encryption as an
afterthought.

•

No product is secure if used improperly. Make sure that
your organization includes the appropriate use of
encryption systems in procedures and policies.

•

Interface isn't everything: user-friendliness is important,

but be wary of a system that puts too much emphasis on
ease of use without due consideration to cryptographic
strength.

Learning More About Encryption
Since the experts in cryptology are computer scientists and
theoretical mathematicians, you can find lots of discussion

among cryptologists on the Internet. The Usenet newsgroup

sci.crypt is the place to find serious, theoretical discussion of new
encryption systems and their testing. For discussion of general
social and regulatory issues regarding encryption tools, try
talk.politics.crypto. In misc.legal.computing, you can find lively

debate about issues like the patenting of encryption technologies,

privacy rights, and government involvement.

The very long, 10-part Cryptography FAQ provides a
comprehensive overview of the terms and concepts cryptologists
use to discuss their work. You can find it in the sci.crypt

newsgroup (posted every 21 days), and the most recent version is
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archived at ftp://rtfm.mit.edu/pub/usenet/news.answers/
cryptogrpahy-faq/. Section 3 of this document, titled "Basic

Cryptology," is an especially useful basic introduction to various

kinds of systems and their efficacy.
The RSA Data Security Web site is another good source of general

encryption information and discussions of organizational issues

involving information security (http://www.rsa.com). At this site,

you can find a very informative FAQ on export issues called
Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About Cryptography

Export Laws in Adobe Acrobat PDF format. In addition, RSA
publishes a customer newsletter called Ciphertext, each issue of
which is also posted as a PDF file at the Web site.
Figure 5.5

Web site of
encryption
vender
RSA Data
Security, Inc.

If you want to learn more about Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and

Netscape's plans for its integration into browser software and

other Internet functions, take a look at the following two online
documents: On Internet Security (http://home.mcom.com/info/

security-doc.html) and Netscape Data Security: An Overview of

Implementations and Plans from Netscape Communications

(http://home.mcom.com/newsref/ref/netscape-security.html).
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You can also subscribe to Netscape's discussion mailing list about

SSL by sending mail to ssl-talk-request@netscape.com and
including the word subscribe in the body of your message.
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Chapter 6
Network Security
*
As we discussed in Chapter 2, the security issues of stand-alone

PCs are relatively simple. If the person using the PC is aware of
computer use and corporate image issues, and the PC does not

provide any server functions over the Internet, the risks are low.

The data residing on the PC can be kept confidential and safe
through the appropriate use of encryption, anti-virus, and

physical security measures, as discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

However, when computers are networked, and especially when
that network is connected to a larger communication channel
such as the Internet, the risks are much more numerous and the

measures needed to protect the system are more complex. In this

chapter, we'll review
•

Network basics.

•

TCP/IP: the Internet protocol.

•

Network risk management.

•

Types and sources of network threats.

•

Firewalls.

•

Secure network devices.

Introduction to Networking
A basic understanding of computer networks is requisite in order

to understand the principles of network security. In this section,
* This chapter was authored by Matt Curtin, Chief Scientist with
Megasoft, Inc. (cmcurtin@research.megasoft.com; http://www.research.
megasoft.com/people/cmcurtin/).
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we'll cover some of the foundations of computer networking,
then move on to an overview of some popular networks.
Following that, we'll take a more in-depth look at TCP/IP, the

network protocol suite that is used to run the Internet and many
intranets.

What Is a Network?
A "network" has been defined as "any set of interlinking lines

resembling a net, a network of roads an interconnected system, a

network of alliances" (The New Lexicon Webster's Encyclopedic
Dictionary of the English Language). This definition suits our

purpose well: a computer network is simply a system of
interconnected computers. How they're connected is variable-as
we'll soon see, there are a number of ways to do this.

The ISO/OSI Reference Model
The International Standards Organization (ISO) Open Systems
Interconnect (OSI) Reference Model defines seven layers of
communications types, and the interfaces among them (see

Figure 6.1). Each layer depends on the services provided by the
layer below it, all the way down to the physical network
hardware, such as the computer's network interface card and the

wires that connect the cards together.
Figure 6.1

The ISO/OSI
Reference
Model.

Application

Presentation
Session
Network

Data Link
Physical
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An easy way to look at this is to compare this model with

something we use daily: the telephone. In order for you to talk to
someone out of earshot, you need a device like a telephone. (In

the ISO/OSI model, this is at the application layer.) The
telephones, of course, are not useful unless they have the ability

to translate the sound into electronic pulses that can be

transferred over wire and back again. (These functions are
provided in layers below the application layer.) Finally, there is
the physical connection: both must be plugged into an outlet that
is connected to a switch that's part of the telephone system's

network of switches.
If I place a call to you, I pick up the receiver and dial your

number. This number specifies which central office to which to
send my request, and then which phone from that central office

to ring. Once you answer the phone, we begin talking, and our

session has begun. Conceptually, computer networks function
exactly the same way. Thus, each layer of the ISO/OSI Reference

Model cannot work without the services provided by the layer
below it.

What Are Some Popular Networks?
Over the last 25 years or so, a number of networks and network
protocols have been defined and used. We're going to look at
two of these networks, both of which are "public" networks.
Anyone can connect to either of these networks, or use types of

networks to connect their own hosts (computers) together without
connecting to the public networks. Each type takes a very

different approach to providing network services.

UUCP

UUCP (Unix-to-Unix CoPy) was originally developed to connect
Unix hosts together. UUCP has since been ported to many
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different architectures, including PCs, Macs, Amigas, Apple Ils,

VMS hosts, and many other types of devices. Additionally, a
number of systems have been developed around the same
principles as UUCP.

Batch-Oriented Processing

UUCP and similar systems are batch-oriented systems-everything
that they have to do is added to a queue, and then at some
specified time, everything in the queue is processed.
Implementation Environment

UUCP networks are commonly built using dial-up (modem)

connections. However, this doesn't have to be the case. UUCP
can be used over any sort of connection between two computers,

including an Internet connection. Building a UUCP network is a

simple matter of configuring two hosts to recognize each other
and know how to get in touch with each other. Adding on to the
network is simple; if hosts called A and B have a UUCP network

between them, and C would like to join the network, then it must

be configured to talk to A or B. Naturally, anything that C talks to

must be made aware of C's existence before any connections will
work. Now, to connect D to the network, a connection must be
established with at least one of the hosts on the network, and so

on. Figure 6.2 shows a sample UUCP network.
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Figure 6.2

A sample UUCP
network.

In a UUCP network, users are identified in the format host!userid.

The "I" character (pronounced "bang" in networking circles) is
used to separate hosts and users. A bangpath is a string of host(s)
and a userid like Alcmcurtin or C!B!A!cmcurtin. If I am a user on

host A and you are a user on host E, I might be known as
Alcmcurtin and you as E!you. Because there is no direct link

between your host (E) and mine (A), in order for us to
communicate, we need to do so through a host that has

connectivity to both E and A. In our sample network, C has the
connectivity we need. So, to send me a file, or piece of email,

you would address it to C!A!cmcurtin. Or, to take the long way

around, you can address me as C!B!A!cmcurtin. The "public"
UUCP network is simply a huge worldwide network of hosts

connected to each other.

Popularity

The public UUCP network has been shrinking in size over the
years, with the rise of the availability of inexpensive Internet

connections. Additionally, since UUCP connections are typically
made hourly, daily, or weekly, there is a fair bit of delay in getting
data from one user on a UUCP network to a user on the other
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end of the network. UUCP isn't very flexible, as it's used for

simply copying files (which can be news, email, documents, etc.).

Interactive protocols (that make applications such as the World
Wide Web possible) have become much more the norm, and are

preferred in most cases.
However, there are still many people whose needs for email and
Usenet news are served quite well by UUCP, and its integration

into the Internet has greatly reduced the amount of cumbersome

addressing that had to be accomplished in times past.
Security
UUCP, like any other application, has security trade-offs. Some
strong elements in its security are: (1) it is fairly limited in what it

can do, and it's therefore more difficult to trick into doing
something it shouldn't; and (2) it's been around a long time, and

most of its bugs have been discovered, analyzed, and fixed.
Because UUCP networks are made up of occasional connections

to other hosts, it isn't possible for someone on host E to directly

make contact with host B and take advantage of that connection
to do something unauthorized.

On the other hand, UUCP typically works by having a systemwide UUCP user account and password. Any system that has a

UUCP connection with another must know the appropriate
password for the uucp or nuucp account. Identifying a host

beyond that point has traditionally been little more than a matter
of trusting that the host is who it claims to be, and that a

connection is allowed at that time. More recently, there has been

an additional layer of authentication, whereby both hosts must
have the same sequence number that is incremented each time a

connection is made.
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Hence, if I run host B, I know the uucp password on host A. If,
though, I want to impersonate host C, I'll need to connect,
identify myself as C, hope that I've done so at a time that A will

allow it, and try to guess the correct sequence number for the

session. While this might not be an easy attack for someone to

make, the process isn't considered very secure.

The Internet

The Internet is the world's largest network of networks. When you
want to access the resources offered by the Internet, you don't

really connect to the Internet-you connect to a network that is
eventually connected to the Internet backbone, a network of

extremely fast (and sometimes, unfortunately, overloaded)
network components. This is an important point: the Internet is a

network of networks, not a network of hosts. A simple network

can be constructed using the same protocols that the Internet uses
without actually connecting it to anything else. Such a basic

network is shown in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3

A simple
local area
network.

Let's say that I have a host connected to one of my employer's

networks. We have a number of networks, which are all
connected together on a backbone, a network of our networks.

Our backbone is then connected to other networks, one of which
is an Internet Service Provider (ISP) whose backbone is connected

to other networks, one of which is the Internet backbone.
If you have a connection "to the Internet" through a local ISP, you

are actually connecting your computer to one of their networks,
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which is connected to another, and so on. To use a service from

my host, such as a Web server, you would tell your Web browser
to connect to my host (by entering my URL). Underlying services
and protocols would send packets (small datagrams) with your

query to your ISP's network, and then a network they're

connected to, and so on, until they found a path to my

employer's backbone, and to the exact network my host is on.
My host would then respond appropriately, and the same would

happen in reverse-packets would traverse all of the connections
until they found their way back to your computer, and then you

would be viewing my Web page.
In Figure 6.4, the network shown in Figure 6.3 is designated

"LAN 1" and shown in the bottom-right of the picture. This shows
how the hosts on that network are provided connectivity to other
hosts on the same LAN, within the same company, outside of the

company, but within the same ISP, and then from another ISP
somewhere on the Internet.
Figure 6.4

A wider view of
Internetconnected
networks.
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TCP/IP: The Language of the Internet
The Internet is made up of a wide variety of hosts, from
supercomputers to personal computers, including every

imaginable type of hardware and software. How do all of these
computers understand each other and work together?
TCP/IP (Transport Control Protocol/lnternet Protocol) is the

"language" of the Internet. Anything that can learn to "speak

TCP/IP" can communicate on the Internet. This is functionality
that occurs at the Network (IP) and Transport (TCP) layers in the
ISO/OSI Reference Model. Consequently, a host operating system

that has TCP/IP functionality (such as Unix, OS/2, MacOS, or
Windows NT) can easily support applications (such as Netscape

Navigator) that use the network.

Open Design
One of the most important features of TCP/IP isn't a technological

one: the protocol is an "open" protocol, and anyone who wishes

to implement it may do so freely. Engineers and scientists from all
over the world participate in the IETF (Internet Engineering Task

Force) working groups that design the protocols that make the
Internet work. Their time is typically donated by their companies,
and the result is work that benefits everyone.

IP
As noted above, IP is a "network layer" protocol. This is the layer
that allows the hosts to actually "talk" to each other. Talking to

each other would include such things as carrying datagrams,
mapping the Internet address (such as 10.2.3.4) to a physical

network address (such as 08:00:69:0a:ca:8f), and routing, which

takes care of making sure that all of the devices that have Internet
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connectivity can find the way to each other. IP has a number of

very important features which make it an extremely robust and

flexible protocol. For our purposes, though, we're going to focus
on the security of IP, or, more specifically, the lack thereof.
Attacks Against IP

A number of attacks against IP are possible. Typically, these

exploit the fact that IP does not provide a robust mechanism for
authentication, which is proving that a packet came from where

it claims it did. A packet simply claims to originate from a given
address, and there isn't a way to be sure that the host that sent
the packet is telling the truth. This isn't necessarily a weakness,

per se, but it is an important point, because it means that the

facility of host authentication has to be provided at a higher layer
in the ISO/OSI Reference Model. Today, applications that require

strong host authentication (such as cryptographic applications) do

this at the application layer.
IP Spoofing
This is an attack where one host claims to have the IP address of
another. Since many systems (such as router access control lists)
define which packets may and which packets may not pass based

on the sender's IP address, this is a useful technique to an

attacker: he can send packets to a host, perhaps causing it to take

some sort of action. Additionally, some applications allow login
based on the IP address of the person making the request (such as
the Berkeley "r-commands"). These are both good examples how

trusting untrustable layers can provide security that is, at best,
weak.
IP Session Hijacking

This is a relatively sophisticated attack, first described by Steve
Bellovin. It is very dangerous, however, because there are now

toolkits available in the underground community that allow
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otherwise unskilled crackers to perpetrate this attack. IP Session

Hijacking is an attack whereby a user's session is taken over,

being in the control of the attacker. If the user was in the middle

of email, the attacker is looking at the email, and then can
execute any commands he wishes as the attacked user. The
attacked user simply sees his session dropped, and may simply

login again, perhaps not even noticing that the attacker is still
logged in and doing things.

For a description of how this attack works, let's return to our large
network of networks in Figure 6.4. In this attack, a user on host A
is carrying on a session with host G. Perhaps this is a Telnet

session, where the user is reading his email, or using a Unix shell
account from home. Somewhere in the network between A and
G sits host H which is run by an unauthorized person. The

unauthorized person on host H watches the traffic between A and

G and runs a tool which starts to impersonate A to G, and at the
same time terminates A's session, perhaps trying to convince A

that G is no longer on the network (which might happen in the
event of a crash or major network outage). After a few seconds of

this, if the attack is successful, the unauthorized person has

"hijacked" the session of our user. Anything that the user can do
legitimately can now be done by the attacker, illegitimately. As
far as G knows, nothing has happened.

TCP
TCP is a transport-layer protocol. It needs to operate on top of a

network-layer protocol, and it was designed to operate over IP.
(Just as IP was designed to carry, among other things, TCP

packets.) Because TCP and IP were designed together, and

wherever you find one you typically find the other, the entire
suite of Internet protocols is known collectively as "TCP/IP." TCP

itself has a number of important features that we'll cover briefly.
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Probably the most important feature of TCP is guaranteed packet

delivery. Host A sending packets to host B expects to get an
acknowledgment back for each packet. If B does not send an
acknowledgment within a specified amount of time, A will re
send the packet. Applications on host B will expect a data stream

from a TCP session to be complete, and in order. As noted, if a

packet is missing, it will be resent by A, and if packets arrive out

of order, B will arrange them in proper order before passing the
data to the requesting application.

This is suited well toward a number of applications, such as a
Telnet session. A user wants to be sure every keystroke is received
by the remote host, and that it gets an acknowlegment for every
packet sent back, even if this means occasional slight delays in

responsiveness while a lost packet is resent or while out-of-order

packets are rearranged. It is not suited well toward other
applications, such as streaming audio or video, however. In these,
it doesn't really matter if a packet is lost (a lost packet in a stream
of 100 won't be distinguishable) but it does matter if they arrive

late (because of a host re-sending a packet presumed lost), since
the data stream will be paused while the lost packet is being

resent. Once the lost packet is received, it will be put in the
proper slot in the data stream, and then passed up to the

application.

UDP
UDP (User Datagram Protocol) is a simpler transport-layer
protocol. It does not provide the same features as TCP, and is thus
generally considered unreliable in the Internet community.

However, although this is unsuitable for some applications, it

does have much more applicability in other applications than the
more reliable and robust TCP. One of the things that makes UDP
nice is its simplicity. Because it doesn't need to keep track of the
sequence of packets or whether they ever made it to their
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destination, it has lower overhead than TCP. This is one reason
why it's more suited to streaming-data applications. We may hear

more about UDP and its network applicability in the future.

Types And Sources Of Network Threats
Now, we've covered enough background information on

networking to look at some specific security measures you can
take to protect your network. First, well review the types of
threats that exist for networked computers, and then we'll discuss

some protective strategies.

Denial-of-Service
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks are perhaps the worst and most

difficult to address. This is because they're very easy to launch,
difficult (sometimes impossible) to track, and it isn't easy to refuse
the requests of the attacker without also refusing legitimate
requests for service. The premise of a DoS attack is simple: send

more requests to the machine than it can handle. There are

toolkits available in the underground community that make this a

simple matter of running a program and telling it which host to
overload with requests. The attacker's program simply makes a
connection on some service port, perhaps forging the packet's

header information that says where the packet came from, and
then dropping the connection. If the host is able to answer 20
requests per second and the attacker is sending 50 per second,

obviously the host will be unable to service all of the attacker's
requests, much less any legitimate requests (requests to the Web

site running there, for example). Such attacks were fairly common
in late 1996 and early 1997, but are now becoming less popular.
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Some things that can be done to reduce the risk of your network
security being comprised by a DoS attack include:

•

Not running your servers at a level too close to capacity.

•

Using packet filtering to prevent obviously forged packets

from entering into your network address space.
Obviously forged packets would include those that claim

to come from your own hosts, addresses reserved for
private networks as defined in RFC 1918, and the

loopback network (127.0.0.0).
•

Keeping up-to-date on security-related patches for your
hosts' operating systems.

Unauthorized Access
"Unauthorized access" is a very high-level term that can refer to

a number of different sorts of attacks. The goal of these attacks is

to access some resource that your machine should not provide
the attacker. For example, a host might be a Web server, and
should provide anyone with requested Web pages. However, that
host should not provide command shell access without being

sure that the person making such a request is someone

authorized, such as a local administrator.

Excepting Commands Illicitly
It's obviously undesirable for an unknown and untrusted person

to be able to execute commands on your server machines. There

are two main classifications of the severity of this problem,
normal user access and administrator access. A normal user can
do a number of things on a system (such as read files, mail them

to other people, etc.) that an attacker should not be able to do.

This might, then, be all the access that an attacker needs to
perform an unauthorized action. On the other hand, an attacker
might wish to make configuration changes to a host (perhaps
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changing its IP address, putting a start-up script in place to cause

the machine to shut down every time it's started, or something

similar). In this case, the attacker will need to gain administrator
privileges on the host.

Confidentiality Breaches
There is certain information that could be quite damaging if it fell

into the hands of a competitor, a criminal, or the public. In these

cases, it's possible that compromise of a normal user's account
on the machine can be enough to cause damage (perhaps in the
form of advantage to a competitor or exposure of a client's

personal financial records). While many of the perpetrators of
these sorts of break-ins are merely thrill-seekers interested in

nothing more than to see a shell prompt for your computer on

their screen, there are those who are more malicious, as we'll
consider next.

Destructive Behavior
Among the destructive sorts of break-ins and attacks, there are

two major categories.

Data Alteration

This type of attack is likely the most difficult sort, since the fact of
a break-in might not be immediately obvious. Perhaps the
attacker revises the numbers in your spreadsheets or changes the
dates in your projections and plans. Maybe he's changing the
account numbers for the auto-deposit of certain paychecks. In

any case, rare is the case when you'll come in to work one day
and simply know that something is wrong. An accounting

procedure might turn up a discrepancy in the books three or four
months after the fact. Trying to track the problem down will
certainly be difficult, and once that problem is discovered, how

can any of your numbers from that time period be trusted? How
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far back do you have to go before you think that your data is

safe?
Data Destruction

In the case of wholesale destruction of data, the impact on your
computing capability-and consequently your business-is not

much less than if a fire or other disaster caused your computing

equipment to be completely destroyed.

Where Do They Come From?
How, though, does an attacker gain access to your network?

Through any connection that you have to the outside world. This
includes Internet connections, dial-up modems, and even
physical access. (How do you know that one of the temporary

workers that you've brought in to help with the data entry isn't

really a system cracker looking for passwords, data phone
numbers, vulnerabilities and anything else that can get him
access to your equipment?) Thus, in order to be able to

adequately address network security, all possible avenues of entry

must be identified and evaluated.

Lessons Learned
From looking at the sorts of attacks that are common, we can
devise a relatively short list of high-level practices that can help
prevent network security disasters and help control the damage in

the event that preventative measures are unsuccessful in warding

off an attack.
Make Sure You Have Backups
As discussed in Chapter 3, backing up data regularly is a good

practice for several reasons. A breach of network security is only
one source of risk to your network's data. If you have safely

stored and reliable backup data, you can run your critical
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business applications from another location or restore damaged
data on a compromised network.

Don't Put Data Where It Doesn't Need To Be

Although this should go without saying, many organizations do

not observe this principle. As a result, information that doesn't
need to be accessible from the outside world sometimes is, and
this can needlessly increase the severity of a break-in
dramatically.

Avoid Systems with Single Points of Failure
Any security system that can be broken by breaking through any

one component isn't really very strong. In security, a degree of
redundancy is good, and can help you protect your organization
from a minor security breach becoming a catastrophe.

Stay Current with Relevant Operating System Patches

Exploiting old bugs is still one of the most common (and most
effective) means of breaking into systems, so be sure that you

have a staff member assigned to be responsible for staying in
contact with your LAN system vendor and regularly updating

your software.

Watch for Relevant Security Advisories
In addition to staying up to date with your network vendor,
regularly read the publications of CERT (Computer Emergency

Response Team, http://www.cert.org/) and CIAC (Computer
Incident Advisory Capability, http://ciac.llnl.gov/ciac/).
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Firewalls
As we've seen in our discussion of the Internet and similar
networks, connecting an organization to the Internet provides a

two-way flow of traffic. This is clearly undesirable in many
organizations, as proprietary information is often displayed freely
within a corporate intranet (that is, a TCP/IP network, modeled

after the Internet, that only works within the organization). In

order to provide some level of separation between an

organization's LAN or intranet and the Internet, firewalls have
been employed. A firewall is simply a group of components that
collectively form a barrier between two networks. A number of
terms specific to firewalls and networking are going to be used

throughout this section, so we'll review them first.

Bastion host: A generaI-purpose computer used to control access
between the internal (private) network and the Internet (or any
other untrusted network). Typically, these are hosts running a

version of the Unix operating system that has been customized in
order to reduce its functionality to only what is necessary in order

to support its functions. Many of the general-purpose features

have been turned off, and, in many cases, completely removed,
in order to improve the security of the machine.

Router: A special purpose computer for connecting networks
together. Routers also handle certain functions, such as routing,

or managing the traffic on the networks they connect.
Access Control List (ACL): Many routers now have the ability to

selectively perform their duties, based on a number of facts about
a packet that comes to it. This includes things like origination
address, destination address, destination service port, and so on.
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These can be employed to limit the sorts of packets that are
allowed to come in and go out of a given network.

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ): The DMZ is a critical part of a
firewall. It is a network that is neither part of the untrusted
network nor part of the trusted network. But, this is a network

that connects the untrusted to the trusted. The importance of a

DMZ is tremendous-someone who breaks into your network
from the Internet should have to get through several layers in

order to successfully do so. Those layers are provided by various

components within the DMZ.
Proxy: This is the process of having one host act on behalf of

another. A host that has the ability to fetch documents from the

Internet might be configured as a proxy server, and hosts on an
internal intranet might be configured to be proxy clients. In this

situation, when a host on the intranet wishes to fetch the

http://www.megasoft.com/ Web page, for example, the browser
will make a connection to the proxy server and request the given

URL. The proxy server will fetch the document and return the

result to the client. In this way, all hosts on the intranet are able

to access resources on the Internet without having the ability to
direct talk to the Internet.

Types of Firewalls
There are three basic types of firewalls, and we'll consider each

of them.
Application Gateways

The first firewalls were application gateways; they are sometimes
known as proxy gateways. These are made up of bastion hosts
that run special software to act as a proxy servers. This software

runs at the Application Layer of the ISO/OSI Reference Model,

hence the name. Clients behind the firewall must be proxitized
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(that is, must know how to use the proxy and be configured to do
so) in order to use Internet services. Traditionally, these have been

the most secure types of firewalls, because they don't allow
anything to pass by default, but need to have the programs

written and turned on in order to begin passing traffic. These are
also typically the slowest, because more processes need to be
started in order to have a request serviced. Figure 6.5 shows an

application gateway.
Figure 6.5

A sample
application
gateway.

Packet Filtering
Packet filtering is a technique whereby routers have ACLs (access

control lists) turned on. By default, a router will pass all traffic
sent though it and will do so without any sort of restrictions.
Employing ACLs is a method for enforcing your security policy

with regard to what sorts of access you allow the outside world to

have to your internal network, and vice versa.
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There is less overhead in packet filtering than with an application
gateway, because the feature of access control is performed at a

lower ISO/OSI layer (typically, the transport or session layer). Due

to the lower overhead and the fact that packet filtering is done
with routers, which are specialized computers optimized for tasks
related to networking, a packet filtering gateway is often much

faster than its application layer cousins. Figure 6.6 shows a

packet filtering gateway.
Figure 6.6

A sample packet
filtering gateway.

Because this type of firewall works at a lower level than an

application gateway, supporting new applications either comes
automatically or is a simple matter of allowing a specific packet
type to pass through the gateway. There are problems with this

method, though. Remember, TCP/IP has absolutely no means of
guaranteeing that the source address is really what it claims to be.

As a result, we have to use layers of packet filters in order to

localize the traffic. We can't get all the way down to the actual
host, but with two layers of packet filters, we can differentiate

between a packet that came from the Internet and one that came
from our internal network. We can identify which network the

packet came from with certainty, but we can't get more specific
than that.
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Hybrid Systems
In an attempt to combine the security of the application layer

gateways with the flexibility and speed of packet filtering, some
vendors have created systems that use the principles of both. In

some of these systems, new connections must be authenticated
and approved at the application layer. Once this has been done,

the remainder of the connection is passed down to the session

layer, where packet filters monitor the connection to ensure that
only packets that are part of an ongoing (already authenticated

and approved) interaction are being passed.

Other possibilities include using both packet filtering and
application layer proxies. The benefits here include providing a

measure of protection for your machines that provide services to
the Internet (such as a public Web server) as well as providing the
security of an application layer gateway to the internal network.

Additionally, using this method, an attacker, in order to get to
services on the internal network, will have to break through the

access router, the bastion host, and the choke router.

Making the Selection
Lots of options are available, and it makes sense to spend some
time with an expert, either your in-house network administrator
or an experienced consultant, who can take the time to

understand your organization's information security policy and
can design and build a firewall architecture that best implements

that policy. Other issues like services required, cost, and upgrade
options might factor in to the final design.

The business of building firewalls is in the process of becoming a
commodity market. Along with commodity markets come lots of

folks who are looking for a way to make a profit without
necessarily keeping their customers' best interests in mind.

Additionally, vendors compete with each other to try and claim
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the greatest security, the greatest east of administration, and the
least visibility to users. In order to try to quantify the potential

security of firewalls, some organizations have taken to issuing

firewall certifications. The certification of a firewall means
nothing more than the fact that it can be configured in such a

way that it can pass a series of tests. Similarly, claims about
meeting or exceeding U.S. Department of Defense "Orange

Book" standards, C-2, B-1, and others, all simply mean that an
organization was able to configure a machine to pass a series of

tests. This doesn't mean that it was loaded with the vendor's

software at the time, or that the machine was even usable.
Such gauges as market share, certification, and the like are no
guarantees of security or quality. Taking a little bit of time to talk

to some knowledgeable consultants can go a long way in
providing you with a comfortable level of security between your
organization's private network and the Internet. Additionally, it's

important to note that many technical consultants are affiliated

with particular vendors. Ask any consultants you talk to about
their vendor affiliations, certifications, and experience in the
network security field.

Secure Network Devices
It's important to remember that the firewall is only one entry
point to your network. Modems, if you allow them to answer
incoming calls, can provide an easy means for an attacker to

sneak around (rather than through) your front door or firewall
Just as castles weren't built with moats only in the front, your
network needs to be protected at all of its entry points.
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Secure Modems and Dial-Back Systems
If modem access is to be provided, this entry point should be
guarded carefully. The terminal server, or network device that

provides dial-up access to your network, needs to be actively
administered, and its logs need to be examined for strange
behavior. Its password need to be strong, and accounts that aren't

actively used should be disabled.
There are some remote access systems that have the feature of a

two-part procedure to establish a connection. The first part is the
remote user dialing into the system and providing the correct ID
and password. The system will then drop the connection and call
the authenticated user back at a known telephone number. Once

the remote user's system answers that call, the connection is
established, and the user is on the network. This works well for

telecommuters working at home, but it can be problematic for
users wishing to dial in from hotel rooms when on business trips.

Other possibilities include one-time password schemes, where
the user enters her ID and is presented with a "challenge," a
string of between six and eight numbers. She types this challenge

into a small device that she carries with her that looks like a
calculator. She then presses enter, and a "response" is displayed
on the LCD screen. The user types the response back into the

logon routine, and, if all is correct, the login will proceed. These

are useful devices for solving the problems of passwords without

requiring dial-back access. However, the devices have their own
problems, as they require the user to carry them, and they must

be tracked, much like building and office keys.

Crypto-Capable Routers
A feature that is being built into some routers is the ability to
enact session encryption between specified routers. Because
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traffic traveling across the Internet can be seen by people in the

middle, these routers are advantageous for providing connectivity
between two sites-for instance, between a main and branch

office.

Virtual Private Networks
Traditionally, for an organization to provide connectivity between

a main office and a satellite one, they had to lease an expensive,
dedicated data line. Now, a solution that is often more

economical is to provide both offices connectivity to the Internet.
Then, using the Internet as the medium, the two offices can
communicate. The danger in doing this, of course, is that there is

no privacy through this communication channel, and it's difficult

to provide the other office access to "internal" resources without

providing those resources to everyone on the Internet.
Virtual Private Networks, or VPNs, provide the ability for two

offices to communicate with each other in such a way that it
looks like they're directly connected over a private leased line.

The session between them, although going over the Internet, is
private (because the link is encrypted). A number of firewall
vendors are including the ability to build VPNs in their offerings,
either directly with their base product or as an add-on. If you have

need to connect several offices together, this might very well be
the best way to do it.

Learning More About Network Security
The most commonly referenced document available about
Internet site security is the InterNIC's Site Security Handbook,
also referred to as RFC 1244 and FYI 8. This document, originally

developed in 1991, is included for your convenience in its
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entirely in this text as Appendix B. The Site Security Handbook is
currently under revision-watch the InterNIC site

(http://internic.net) for the posting of the new version.
Figure 6.7

InterNIC Web
site, location of
RFC 1244, the
Site Security
Handbook.

There are many additional resources available for locating

environment-specific network security tips. One such document
applicable to the Unix operating environment is An Architectural
Overview of Unix Network Security by Robert B. Reinhardt of
ARINC Research Corporation (http://www.alw.nih.gov/Security/
Docs/network-security.html). You can perform a search at your

favorite World Wide Web search engine to locate many

more-phrase your query to include the words network security
and the name of the operating environment you're interested in,

such as Unix.

For general discussions of network security issues, try the

comp.security.misc Usenet newsgroup. To find more platform
specific information, try the newsgroup specific to your
environment, such as comp.os.ms-windows. The highly-popular

Internet server operating system, Unix, has it's own security
discussion newsgroup, comp.security.unix. And, the

comp.security.firewalls newsgroup contains even more specific

information on firewall products, procedures, and configurations.
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Chapter 7
The Information Security Policy
Now that you have become familiar with the various types of

risks and protections applicable to your organization's valuable
information, you can go forward with developing a
comprehensive information security plan. In most companies,
information security planning ultimately takes the form of an

Information Security Policy that is put in place at a high level of
the organization and enforced uniformly throughout the

organization. In this chapter, we'll review

•

Components of the Information Security Policy.

•

Risk analysis.

•

Site assets.

•

Identifying threats.

•

Policy enforcement issues.

Components of the Information Security Policy
The authors of Practical Unix Security define security by saying
that a computer system is secure "if you can depend on it and its

software to behave as you expect it to" (Simson Garfinkel and
Gene Spafford; Sebastopol, CA; O'Reilly & Assoc., 1991). Users
of a computer system should be able to trust the system not only

to protect their information, but also to make it available when

needed.
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The Information Security Policy ("security policy" for short) is a
high-level document that describes the "whats" of security at a

site rather than the "hows." When planning security for a single
computer or a network site, the following types of security should

be considered essential:

Privacy
Users of a computer or network system should be considered

owners of the information (along with the company, of course)
that they enter, and the system should ensure that no one has

access to a user's information unless the owner of the information

expressly grants that access. For instance, if you enter account
information for a client at your stand-alone PC, you should be
able to guarantee its confidentiality. To accomplish this security,

you only need to restrict access to your PC. However, a larger
network system, where employee payroll information is kept, will

need to take more complicated measures to guarantee the privacy
of the information.

Data Integrity
Owners of information and programs need to be assured that
their information is safe from tampering. Deletion and alteration
of information should be possible only with the consent of the

information's owner. To extend the example above, once you
enter your client's account information into your PC, you want to

be assured that when you retrieve it later in the week with the
client in your office that it has not been changed unless changes

were made by you or someone authorized by you.

Availability
The computer system and the information it contains must be
protected against threats that degrade performance or eliminate

access. Again using the above example, if your client visits your
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office and wishes to see some account information, you need to
be able to call up the information quickly. If your computer has

been infected with a virus or has some other problems that don't
allow you to find the file containing the client's information, the

data has been compromised.

Consistency
Users of a computer system require the system to behave as
expected. If programs suddenly start acting strangely, a security
breach could occur. Imagine what would happen if the "dir"

command were suddenly changed so that instead of listing the
files in a directory, it deleted files with names beginning with "i"

or "r." Consistency can fail as a result of an intruder process, but

it can also be compromised as a result of a system software

upgrade.

Isolation
Isolation is the aspect of security most people think of first. A

system must be protected from unauthorized access both by
unauthorized users external to the system and by internal users

attempting to access data or resources beyond their authorization
level. Returning to our example, you clearly don't want your
client's competitors to have access to the accounting records you

store on your PC. In addition, if you have an employee in your
office whose responsibilities do not include working with your
accounting files, you don’t want them to be able to read or print

the contents of your files.

Audit
This aspect of security handles recording activity on the system
and allows administrators to identify the parties responsible for

problems. Most computer system problems originate with
authorized users rather than from outside attacks, so audit trails
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can help remedy internal problems as well as track attacks from
outside the system. In a single-user system, auditing is not usually
important since there are no log-in IDs to track. The file alteration
dates are the only record you have of activity in the file system.

Multi-user systems often have auditing facilities, and these

facilities should be included in a security plan.

Planning
Advance planning is important. A well-planned security policy

addresses the following issues:
1.

What assets are you trying to protect?

2. From whom/what are you trying to protect these assets?
3.

What is the likelihood of a threat?

4. What cost-effective measures can be taken to protect the

assets?
5.

What should happen if an asset is attacked?

6.

What on-going reviews should be in place to keep
protection up-to-date?

Notice that the security policy includes a lot of "whats" and no
"hows." The security policy is a general game plan rather than a

list of specific solutions to anticipated problems. If you are

designing security policy and sentences like "smart cards and

dial-back modems will be used on all systems" creep in, you
know that you are involved in too much detail. In this case, you

can wind up getting more security than you need in some areas
and end up spending more money than is necessary.
One of the main reasons to take the time and come up with a

detailed plan is cost efficiency. It would make little sense to

spend thirty thousand dollars on a firewall system and an alarmed
computer room to protect a personal computer that would cost

two thousand dollars to replace. The overall goal of the security
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policy is to put measures in place that are the most cost-efficient
and least inconvenient while still protecting the value of the
computer system to the company or individual.

The security policy must also conform to existing policies, rules,
and laws both inside and outside the organization. For instance, a
security policy cannot deem it permissible to distribute

copyrighted materials because that distribution is prohibited by

U.S. and international law. Finally, the security policy needs to
consider the system in a global context if it is going to be part of
the Internet community. Each site needs to be aware of its

responsibility for the security of the entire network.

Risk Analysis
Central to the security policy is a risk analysis of the computer

system. The risk analysis will determine what assets you need to
protect, from whom you need to protect the assets, how the
assets can be protected, and the severity of each risk. This task

will define the potential threats to the system and the methods to

be used to reduce the risks posed by these threats. The costs of
the risk reduction methods should also be considered at this
point.

Site Assets
Although it may seem easy to pinpoint the assets of some
companies, in other situations assets may be harder to identify. In

a restaurant, it is easy to take a physical inventory of the stock
and contents of the building, but if the restaurant is known for a

particular dish, the recipe for the dish must also be considered an
asset and protected against theft. Maybe the chef responsible for

creating the dish would also be considered an asset, and if the

134 The Information Security Policy

recipe were written down, the recipe itself would need to be
guarded against theft by the restaurant down the block. If the
kitchen is run on electricity, the utility line carrying power to the
building should also be considered an asset that needs protection.

The assets of a computer system might also be more than just the

computer hardware. Hardware can be replaced relatively easily,

but data that has been accumulated over time may be impossible

to replace and invaluable to the operation of a company. The

asset inventory must also include software that is important to the
operation of the company.

Here's one way to begin to list the assets of a site:

1.

Hardware: List all hardware items necessary to get work
done. Include storage devices like hard disk drives and

output devices like printers.
2.

Software: List all software programs installed on the

system, including operating system software and backup

software.
3.

Data: List all data files and online documents contained
on the system. For example, if your company maintains a

customer list and an inventory list online, the files

involved in these databases should be considered an

asset.
Once you know the things that should be protected, you need to
rank them in terms of their importance. An indispensible asset
should get a value of 10, while an asset that is lightly used should

get a 1. (If an asset gets a 0, how could it be called an asset?) This
step requires input from the users of the system. Again, if the

computer is a stand-alone PC used by a single user, it will be
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fairly easy to rank the assets. The user just needs to look at the
work done on the PC during the course of a day and make note
of which hardware and software is most important to this work.

In a larger company, it might be more difficult to rank the value
of the system assets. You may find that users of larger systems
don't know specifically which pieces of the system are needed to

get their particular tasks done. In this situation, it would be better
to poll the users and have them describe their uses of the system
in their own words and then have a technical person review the

descriptions and decide which assets are important in

accomplishing the work described.
So, to get an idea of the importance of all of the assets in your

list:
1.

Ask all users to rate the importance of each component
in the asset list using 0 if they don't use the component
through 10 if they could not function without it.

2.

Ask users to describe the work they do with the
computer system in their own terms.

3.

Re-evaluate the numeric entries after analyzing the

description in Step 2.

For example, if a single user of a stand-alone computer uses a
database management system to maintain a mailing list for his
consulting business, the assets would include the database

software and the data itself as well as the computer. This user
might rate the computer as a 10 and the database program as a

10 as well, but only give the hard drive a 5. You would need to
increase the rating for the hard drive since it is essential to the

function of the database program. You may also need to rate the
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data files used by the user highly as well. This asset list might be
the result of the asset review:

Asset

Value

Importance

Computer

$2,500

10

Database Management Software

$500

10

Customer List

$1,000

10

Word Processing Software

$495

1

The value of data can usually be estimated by deciding how long
it would take to recreate the data files from scratch, and how
much it would cost to pay the worker or workers needed to do

this reconstruction. In our example, the customer list being
maintained would take the single user a full work week to build

again, and the data entry would cost twenty five dollars per hour,
so the data file is valued at one thousand dollars. (Notice that the

data itself is more valuable than the program that manages it.)
A larger company might have multiple workstations and many

data files used to handle customer orders, shipping, inventory,
and payroll. The asset evaluation would have to involve people

from many departments in the company and would be much
more complex. The main focus to keep in mind is that you need

to establish not only the monetary value of the assets, but also the

value to the users of the system. A single word-processing
program might not be very high on the list of computer system
assets in a ranking by purchase cost, but if every department in a

company uses the program and all clerical work would grind to a
halt if the program were unavailable for some reason, then the

program must be considered very valuable to the company. It

isn't uncommon to find that large systems have many users who
use only a small portion of the system assets, while some assets

are only used by very few users.
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Now you have a list of all of the things you need to protect, and
you can arrange the list according to the value of the asset to the

functioning of the system and start thinking about the risks from
which they need to be protected.

Identifying Threats
Once you have established a list of what is important to you and
your users, it is time to consider what the possible risks to your

assets could be.

Unauthorized Access

Unauthorized access can be as simple as use of an account
owned by another user to access a system. John may leave his

desk for lunch and leave himself logged in. Richard, who walks

by the office and notices that the computer is on, uses John's

terminal to retrieve information to which John has access but
from which Richard is barred. Susan might remember to log

herself out each time she leaves her desk, but keeps her password
on a Post-It note stuck to her monitor. This type of unauthorized

access is much more common than invasion by an outside
person, though much less exciting and newsworthy.
Theft of Information

Any information stored on a computer is open to the threat of

theft. A password file might be stolen to run a cracking program
against the file at another computer. Research data could save a

rival company years of investment in R&D. A new project or
product proposal could be worth millions to a competitor. Any
information that could be valuable to someone other than the

owner of the information should be considered.

Denial of Service
As anyone who uses a computer knows, it doesn't take long for
the computer to become an indispensable tool. If the computer
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becomes unavailable, it is often impossible to get any work done.
Denial of service can come in many forms. A malicious or
incorrect program can flood a network with packets and bring it

to a standstill as discussed in Chapter 6. A virus can infect a
computer system and slow or halt it completely as covered in

Chapter 4. The security policy should determine which services
are provided by the system to its users and try to predict the effect

on the company if these services are disrupted.

Don't forget that electricity is the power behind the whole

system. If you find that a certain file server is essential to

operations and needs to be available twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week, you might consider an uninterruptable power

supply (UPS) for that server.

Policy Issues
If you are designing security for a single-user PC, most of your
work is finished when you have defined the assets and threats to

the computer. If, instead, you are dealing with a multi-user

system, more issues need to be addressed in the security policy,
or they should be addressed in a separate Computer Use Policy,

as discussed in Chapter Two.

Authorized Users
The security policy should explicitly define who is authorized to
use which resources. For example, if a certain file server is to
house payroll information, it should be explicitly stated that only
those people employed by the payroll department are allowed to

access that server or that particular information. The issues of
information access rights covered in Chapter 2 also fall under this

category.
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Acceptable Use
As discussed in Chapter 2, users should also get some guidance
as to what is considered appropriate usage of system resources.

The following items should be addressed in the security policy or
a companion Computer Use Policy:

•

Users should not share accounts. Shared accounts make
it impossible to use system auditing to assess
responsibility for mishaps.

•

If file access permissions are in place on the system,

users should not assume they have permission to read a

file simply because they have permission from the file
system to do so, nor should they think that they have the
right to modify a file they do not own simply because the

operating system permissions allow them to do so. (Just

because Steve mistakenly changed the file access
permissions on the payroll file to allow anyone to edit
the file does not give John the right to give himself a

raise.)

•

Breaking into accounts should not be tolerated.

•

Password cracking should be prohibited. Bill in
accounting should not be permitted to run a password

cracking program in his spare time to try and get a
password for another account. (Note: Some site
administrators perform legitimate password checking

procedures to check the safety of passwords.)

•

Users should not be permitted to disrupt service to other

users.
•

Copyrighted software should not be duplicated.

The more explicit you make the "acceptable use" section of your
security policy, the more clear, easier to follow, and easier to
enforce it will be.
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Responsibilities and Rights of Users
Users should be responsible for understanding and following
security measures for the computer system. In addition, the
security policy should contain the following:

•

Resource consumption guidelines. Let the users know
what is considered "excessive use" of resources like disk
space, printer paper, or even CPU time.

•

Password security guidelines. How cryptic should users

make their passwords? How often (if ever) are users
required to change their passwords? (See Chapter 2 for a
useful set of passwork guidelines.)

•

Backups. Does the network administrator maintain

backups or are users expected to maintain their own?

•

Proprietary Information. Let users know what information
the company considers private and what sanctions exist

for distributing proprietary information.

Responsibilities and Rights of System Administrators
In most multi-user systems, system administrators need to have

unrestricted access to the entire system for maintenance and
control. Your security policy should clearly state what limitations

should be imposed on this access with respect to the users' rights

to privacy. In what situations should a system administrator be
allowed to read a user's files?

Sensitive Information
Somewhere in the security policy, a site needs to decide the level

of security that will be provided. If security measures will be lax,
this must be decided in the early stages and included in the
policy so that users do not assume more security than that which

exists and store sensitive information on your organization's
computer systems. For example, if it is decided that anyone on
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the Internet should be able to use file transfers to place an order

or retrieve a catalog list, and no precautions are going to be taken

to protect its internal network from unauthorized file transfers,
sensitive patent or research information should not be kept

online.

What Happens When Policy Is Violated?
Every rule gets broken. When security policy violations happen,

they are dealt with much more quickly and efficiently if the

process is planned for in advance. Security violations might be

due to user negligence or mistake. Perhaps the policy was not

sufficiently explained or understood. If the course of action to be
taken in the event of a violation is defined in advance,

enforcement can be prompt. There may be legal issues involved
in security violations, and a site is in a much better legal position

if its security policy is well defined and published before

incidents occur.

Sites that are connected to the Internet or other wide area
networks must also establish policies to deal with local users
causing problems on other systems on the network. What is your
company to do when the system administrator gets a call about

someone in payroll that has been caught trying to break into the
payroll record system of a competitor? There may be legal
liability issues that can be cleared up with a carefully formulated

security policy. At the other end, what should happen if an

intrusion on your local system is detected and traced to another
site? Outside organizations like CERT and law enforcement
agencies may need to be contacted, and publicity about the

problem may or may not be released. In any case, the security
policy needs to assign responsibility for making these decisions.

If an intrusion occurs, will the intruder's processes be immediately

terminated, or will the intruder be allowed to continue
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unhampered while the system administrators trace the intruder's

identity? These two strategies are called "protect and proceed"
and "pursue and prosecute" in RFC 1244 (see Appendix B). Each

strategy has its benefits and drawbacks. If the intrusion is
immediately eliminated and the security hole that allowed it

repaired, the system can be repaired and restored to normal
operation more quickly. On the other hand, law enforcement

agencies and prosecutors are urging more prosecutions of
intruders, even though they cannot offer protection to a site
reporting an incident if users initiate lawsuits alleging damage to

their systems and data.

RFC 1244 recommends the following checklist to help decide
between the two different approaches. A site needs to be able to
confirm that all of the following statements are true before it

considers trying to pursue and prosecute an intruder:
1.

The system assets are well protected so that continued
activity by the intruder will do no irreparable damage.

Clearly if there is a risk of losing some irreplaceable data
or program or having a system damaged or destroyed,

then the intrusion should be stopped immediately rather
than being allowed to proceed to gather information.

2.

Good backups of all system software and data are

available that can replace any files damaged by the
intruder. If there is a risk that the intrusion could damage

or corrupt data that is essential to site operations and the

data could not be replaced from backups, the intrusion

should not be allowed to continue. Say an intruder is
detected attempting to access the data on orders received

in the last week. If the file has not been backed up

recently, the intruder should be stopped immediately; the
intruder could alter the file and you would have no way
of getting the original contents back.
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3. Protection against future breakins are worth more to the
site than risk to the assets from the current intrusion. Your
site has had a couple of incidents in the last month or so,

and you plan to continue to do business on the networks.
It would be worth it in the long run to identify and

prosecute the intruder now so that you could proceed
with some guarantee that the attacks would stop.

4.

The attack is one that occurs frequently. Every Monday
morning, you find that someone has attempted to access
your system all weekend.

5.

The site is a natural attraction to intruders. Sites like large
financial and defense institutions or research systems at

universities seem to attract a large number of attempted

breakins.
6.

The site is willing to take the financial (or other) risk
involved with letting the intrusion continue.

7.

The intruder's access to the system can be controlled.

8.

Monitoring tools are in place to gather information

necessary to catch the intruder.

9.

The system staff is sufficiently knowledgeable about the
operating system and utilities to make pursuit
worthwhile. Can they outsmart the intruder?

10. Management is willing to prosecute when the intruder is

identified. This is often not the case; the publicity could
damage a company more than any damage caused by

the breakin.

11. There is sufficient legal knowledge about what type of

information is needed for a successful prosecution.
12. There is established contact with knowledgeable law

enforcement agencies.
13. There is someone at the site who knows the relevant
legal issues.

14. The site is prepared for possible legal action from its own
users if there is damage caused by the intruder.
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The "protect and proceed" philosophy strives to patch the hole
that allowed the intrusion without attempting to identify and
prosecute the offender. You would want to protect and proceed if

any of the following were true:
1.

System assets are not well protected. It would be better

to stop the intruder immediately, try and figure out the
hole that was exploited to admit intrusion, patch it, and

go on from there.

2.

Continued access by the intruder could lead to great

financial risk. Industrial espionage is getting more and
more prevalent as companies become connected. If there
is a chance that an intruder could cause the site to lose

large sums of money, stop the intruder and lock them out
in the future.
3.

The company is unwilling to prosecute intruders. It is

often the case that prosecution and the publicity attached
would do more damage to a company's reputation than

the security breach itself.

4.

The users' work is vulnerable. Much of the work done on
computer systems is done by people who know little
about the systems themselves. If the users at a site are
doing work online that is valuable to other sites, and if

the users are not sophisticated computer users, it is better
to stop intrusions as soon as they are detected.

Implementing the Information Security Policy
Once the security policy has been formulated in general terms, it
is time to outline specific steps that will be taken at the site to put

the security policy into action. The prioritized list of assets will be

used now to devise mechanisms for the actual security of the site.
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Spotting Problems
This list of site vulnerabilities comes from RFC 1244, and as the
authors state, it "is by no means complete," but it gives a good
starting point for hunting down soft spots in a site's security:

1.

Access points
For a single user PC, the only access point is the

keyboard. This system can be secured by securing the

keyboard, either by securing the room where the

computer is located or by using a keyed power switch.
As a system grows, its access points multiply, and each

access point presents a potential security problem. Dialin lines are often provided, allowing intruders access to

an entire system. If the system is connected to the

Internet and offers services like remote login or file
transfer to users outside the site, unauthorized users may
gain access by disguising themselves through the use of
compromised passwords or spoofed origin addresses.
2. Misconfigured systems

Some of today's networked operating systems have
become so complex that just keeping up with the systems
and their included software can become a full-time job.

Hardware and software vendors may also ship products

with insecure default settings. It is important to
understand the default setting and make sure that any
new software or hardware is installed to the

specifications of the security policy, not left in the default
configuration.
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3.

Software bugs
No system as complex as today's computer programs can

be engineered to be completely bug free. Unfortunately,
some bugs can cause significant security holes. System

administrators in charge of security must keep up with
current security literature and always make sure that the

most current versions of software are installed. CERT (The
Computer Emergency Response Team) maintains a

newsletter that informs people of known security holes in
programs only after a work-around has been discovered.

The Usenet security newsgroups are also good sources of
announcements about holes discovered in programs.
4. Insider threats

Contrary to what you see on the news, most computer
security problems emanate from within a site. A

disgruntled employee may vandalize programs or files. A
user may inadvertently delete important files. These

threats are the hardest to prevent, since measures
installed to prevent their occurrence will almost certainly

involve inconvenience to normal system users.

Balancing Protection and Cost
The information gathered in risk assessment will be used to
design the actual security measures to be put in place. Don't
forget that it makes little sense to place outlandish restrictions on
the users and spend vast amounts of money to secure assets

against risks deemed slight in the risk analysis phase of the
security policy. If it was decided that there is very little risk in the

event of power loss, it makes no sense to spend thousands on

redundant uninterruptable power supplies.
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It is also important to choose your controls correctly. There are
ways that users can be authenticated by voice or fingerprint, but
these controls are expensive, and if you have decided that the

site's major risk was from offsite, they make little sense.
Remember that simple controls are just as important as elaborate
security systems. A single user with a poor password can negate
the most elaborate security system.

Learning More About Information Security Policies
One of the best ways to begin learning about information security
policies is to review some. Appendix A of this text includes three
sample policy documents: (1) Contra Costa County's Acceptable
Use, Standard Practice and Security Policies; (2) Hermann
Hospital Clinical Information System's Hermann Hospital

Information Security Policy Draft; and (3) The Arctic Region

Supercomputing Center's User Security Policies.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology's Web site,
called the Computer Security Resource Clearinghouse, maintains

a list of "Security Policy Documents" at http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/
secplcy/. Through this listing, you can link to, among many other
documents, Chapter 10 of the Department of Commerce's DOC

IT Management Handbook, which contains the information

security policies for the Department.
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Figure 7.1

Computer
Security
Resources
Clearinghouse
Web site of the
National Institute
of Standards and
Technology.

Stephen L. Arnold, Ph.D. of Arnold Consulting Inc. has posted a

Web site version of his "Security Policies for the Internet"
presentation delivered at the DECUS US Chapter Symposium in
San Francisco in 1995 (http://www.arnold.com/

POLICIES_9512_SLIDES.HTML). This document contains a lively
discussion of security issues and some useful guidelines for

distinguishing between policy-level information and specific

technical procedures.
In addition to the newsgroups applicable to your system's

operating software, such as comp.os.ms-windows, look for
discussions of security policy issues in comp.security.misc and

comp.security.unix. The comp.admin.policy newsgroupgroup
carries discussions of computer use and information security

policies, as well as other computer administration topics.
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Information Security Polity Outline
I.

Risk Analysis

A.
B.

Site Assets
Identification of Threats

II.

Physical Security (include relevant policy items from Physical Security Planning Worksheet)

III.

Viruses (include relevant policy items from Virus Protection Planning Worksheet)

IV.

Encryption (include relevant policy items from Encryption Planning Worksheet)

V.

Network Security (include relevant policy items from Network Security Planning Worksheet)

VI.

Individual Computer Use (you may decide to detach this section and instead create an
Computer Use Policy with these items)

A.

Authorized Users

B.

Responsibilities and Rights of Users

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
C.

VII.

VIII.

Resource consumption guidelines
Acceptable Use
Information Access Rights
Passwords
Personal Information
Netiquette and Corporate Image
Copyrights and Proprietary Information

Responsibilities and Rights of System Administrators

Enforcement

A.

Penalties for Internal Violators

B.

Approach for External Violators

Security Policy Update Mechanism
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Appendix A
Sample Security Policies
Contra Costa County Acceptable Use, Standard Practice
& Security Policies
Purpose
To define the criteria for acceptable use and the standard

practices that Contra Costa County employees must follow when

using County computers and computer data. Use of computer
technology has grown rapidly in recent years, reflecting the

proliferation of microcomputers and networks. County employees
are making extensive use of technology-based systems for to

conduct business in a more effective, effecient manner.
Furthermore, current and planned developments in County

networks promise to make these capabilities even more
accessible and powerful. Therefore, it is important to ensure these
systems are used appropriately.

Policy
The Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors has established
policies governing the use of County computers and computer

data. Those policies are presented here for completeness. Those
policies are:
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•

Board Resolution 95/560

•

Resolution 95/560 Attachment #1: Employee/Contractor

•

Resolution 95/560 Attachment #1 Exhibit 1: Do's And

Responsibility Statement
Don'ts For Network Users (Passwords, Modem, Security,
Good Practices)
•

Resolution 95/560 Attachment #1 Exhibit 2: Excerpts

•

Resolution 95/560 Attachment #2: W.A.N. Access

From Calif. Penal Code Section 502 On Computer Crime

Standard

•

Computer Security Memorandum Of Agreement (MOA)

Board Resolution 95/560

Upon the recommendation of the County Administrator, the
Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors in its capacity as
governing board of the County of Contra Costa and of all the

Districts and agencies of which it is the ex-officio governing
board,

Resolves that:

This resolution supersedes the Board's September 29, 1987 order
on personal computer use. The following policies govern the use
of Contra Costa County computers and computer data. The

County Administrator is authorized to adopt regulations on the
implementation of these policies:
1.

Employees are to be encouraged to use personal
computers in County departments to promote greater staff
productivity.

2.

The equipment, software, programs and all County data
developed and/or entered on County computers and
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County data entered on home computers is property of
the County.

3.

Subject to applicable legal privileges and confidentiality

requirements, all County data entered on County
computers and County data entered on home computers
is not private and is subject to disclosure upon the

demand of authorized County officers at any time.

4.

County policies on the use of personal computers,

software, software licensing and other desktop
technology are expressed in attachments one and two
hereto.
5.

Department heads shall inform county employees of and
review, on an ongoing basis, adherence to, the County's

policies for the use of personal computers, software,

software licensing and other desktop technology.
6.

Data Processing Services will annually publish a County
wide policy regarding use and licensing of software on

County computers.

7.

Subject to prior written Department head approval and to

the policies expressed herein, County employees may
use County computers for personal matters during non

work hours.

Resolution 95/560 - Attachment #1: Employee/Contractor
Responsibility Statement

Purpose Of This Responsibility Statement And User Agreement:
Computer security has become an increasing concern for County
government as computer access and usage have increased
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through the availability of networks and personal computers. It is
therefore necessary that all employees and contractors using

County computers, or processing County data on home
computers, acknowledge awareness of good computer security

practices and agree to follow these practices. This statement is
intended to protect the County and County employees authorized
to access and use County data from unauthorized access to the

data.
Provisions of This Responsibility Statement:

County employees and contractors shall comply with County
standards for computer security and usage, including, but not

limited to, the following:
•

Good password and modem management (Exhibit 1

attached)
•

Good security practices (Exhibit 1 attached)

•

Proper log-off from systems and networks

•

No introduction of any software or hardware onto
County systems or networks without written

authorization from your Agency/Department computer
systems support staff
•

Regular use of virus protection software

•

No illegal or unlicensed software usage (one user/license)

•

No attempts at unauthorized access to any County
systems or data, or for which you have no legitimate

business need
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•

Use of county Internet access only for legitimate County

business

•

No unauthorized printing of and/or changes to data to
which you have access, or giving of access to that data to

persons not authorized to view or use that data

•

No copying of software from one computer to another
without authorization of your Agency/Department

computer support staff

•

Running only pre-approved processes over networks so
as to avoid generating excessive network traffic that
might negatively impact other network users

•

No masking the identity of an account or machine,
including, but not limited to, sending mail anonymously

•

No usage of County computers for unlawful or illegal

practices; for the personal profit of yourself or others; or

for personal activities that have not been pre-approved in
writing by Agency/Department management.
•

No usage of County computers or network for the

creation or dissemination of harassing or demeaning

statements about individuals or groups, or of sexually

explicit materials
•

California Penal Code Section 502 (excerpts attached as

Exhibit 2)
All information resources on any County-owned network or

system are the property of the County, and are subject to County
and Agency/Department policies on computer security and
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acceptable information resources usage. Any software developed

on County time or using county computer resources is the
property of the County. There is no presumption of privacy for

persons using County computers or County networks. Persons

using computers or sending electronic mail should make the
same provisions to ensure confidentiality as would be taken for

sending hard copy correspondence. All activity on County
computer resources is subject to monitoring by

Agency/Department and County computer systems support staff

as part of their responsibility for ensuring system integrity and
compliance with security standards. Such monitoring may

include access personal computers without notice to investigate

possible security breaches.
Rev. 10/9/95

Resolution 95/560 - Attachment #1 - Exhibit 1: Do's and Don'ts
for Network Users

Passwords
Almost 90% of computer network security incidents can be

traced to poor or mismanaged passwords. Following several basic
rules for passwords is critical in preventing network break-ins.

1.

Never share your password with anyone.

2.

Don't write your password down, and don't be tempted
to give your password to someone over the phone, on
electronic mail or via fax.

3.

Follow the basic rules for constructing good passwords. A

good password is a least 8 characters long and includes
at least one number and/or punctuation character. Good
passwords are words that are not found in the dictionary!
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Don't use your name, your spouse's name or your

children's name as a password.

4.

Choose a password that you can remember. Combine

two meaningful words with punctuation, or select a
phrase and use the first letter form each word. If your

system accepts long passwords, you may want to use a
"passphrase", which is a phrase that your can remember

easily but that someone else cannot guess.
5.

Don't embed your password in a login script or assign it

to a function key.
6.

Change your password at least once a year; more often is

desirable.

Modem Security
1.

Never attach a dial-up modem to a County PC or

workstation without coordinating with your
Agency/Department computer systems support staff.

2.

If you have dial-in access to a county computer, treat the

dial-in number as sensitive information.
3.

The rules for good password management apply to dialin modem passwords.

Good Practices

An alert user can help detect or prevent attempted break-ins.

1.

Some computers supply a "last login" date when you log

in. Pay attention to when the computer thinks you last
logged in;' if there is a discrepancy, notify your System
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Administrator. Someone else may have logged in from

your account!

2.

If you are leaving your desk for a period of time, log off

from the computer - especially if you are
in a public area. If you have a "screen lock" feature, you can
use that instead of logging out.
3.

Don't let anyone look over your shoulder while you
enter your password.

4.

If you can set access permission for your files and

directories, set them to be as restrictive as possible.
5.

Don't install free or "shareware" software on County
computers. This software may contain viruses or

trapdoors that later allow intruders access. This also

applies to software that can be obtained over the
Internet.

6.

Be conscious of the physical security of your equipment,
especially if you work in an area visited often by persons
from outside your Department or form the public. Lock

doors to offices when not used or during off-hours.

Maintain physical security of any portable computer
equipment such as laptops or notebooks.
Rev. 8/9/95

Resolution 95/560 - Attachment #7 - Exhibit 2: EXCERPTS FROM
CALIF. PENAL CODE SECTION 502 ON COMPUTER CRIME

California Penal Code Section 502 states, in part, that any person
is guilty of a public offense who:
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1.

Knowingly accesses and without permission alters,

damages, deletes, destroys, or otherwise uses any data,
computer, computer system or computer network in
order to either A) devise or execute any scheme or
artifice to defraud, deceive, or extort, or B) wrongfully

control or obtain money, property, or data.
2.

Knowingly accesses and without permission takes,

copies, or makes use of any data from a computer,
computer system, computer network, or takes or copies

any supporting documentation, whether existing or
residing internal or external to a computer, computer
system, or computer network.

3.

Knowingly accesses and without permission adds, alters,

damages, deletes,, or destroys any data, computer
software, or computer programs which reside or exist
internal or external to a computer, computer system, or

computer network.
4.

Knowingly and without permission disrupts or causes the
disruption of computer services or denies or causes the

denial of computer services to an authorized user of a
computer, computer system, or computer network.
5.

Knowingly introduces any computer contaminant into
any computer, computer system, or computer network.

Resolution 95/560 - Attachment #2

Contra Costa County
LAN/WAN Committee

Security Sub-Committee

July 20, 1995
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To: LAN/WAN Committee Members

From: CCC W.A.N. Security Sub-Committee

Subject: W.A.N. Access Standard
In order to be granted access to the County W.A.N., individual
departments must conform to the following minimum standards

for security. If the requesting department does not meet these
standards, their case will be reviewed by the County W.A.N.

committee, and their access may be granted or denied by that

committee. Departments that are on the WAN must meet these

requirements by June 30, 1996. If they have requirements that
they cannot meet, their WAN access must be reviewed by the

WAN committee.
Physical Security:

•

All servers, hubs, routers, and network switches must be

housed in locked or entry restricted rooms.

•

All user machines in non-secure work areas must be

turned off overnight. Users must be logged off. This does
not apply to systems that are in use 24 hours/day.
•

All machines with public access must have the floppy (or

other user inserted) drives removed or locked.
•

At least one copy of systems backup media must be

stored off site.
Password Security:

•

All network including home machines must be password

protected.
All network user accounts must be password protected.
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•

Each network user must have a unique user id., or if
there are group id's, they must have limited access.

•

All passwords must be formulated based on strong

password rules.

•

All passwords stored on the system must be in encrypted

format.

•

All passwords must be changed without repetition at
least every 3 months.

•

All users must be directed to not share their passwords

•

All users must be directed to not keep their passwords
written down using a non-secure method.

Administrative Procedures:

•

Full L.A.N. backups must be performed locally at least

every two weeks.

•

Incremental L.A.N. backups must be performed locally at
least every two days.

•

Administrator / Supervisor, Super user access must be

limited to a few knowledgeable individuals, who actively
engage in administrative activities.

•

Regular users must not have file "write" permission in
systems directories where executable files are stored

unless necessary.
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•

Users attempting network/system logins must be locked

out after three sequential unsuccessful logins.

•

Guest, demo, or other anonymous accounts without

passwords are not allowed.

•

Systems rights and privileges should be conservatively

assigned.

•

All network servers must have anti-virus software
installed and operational at all points of entry if the

software is commercially available.

•

Inactive user accounts must be disabled after 3 months
and removed after 6 months.

•

Terminated users must be removed immediately.

Modems:

•

All modems must be inventoried.

•

All dial-in modems must have call-back, have supervised
access, or other approved (by the WAN Committee)
security device(s) implemented.

•

All modem dial-ins must be restricted to real need users.

•

Modem usage must be logged where possible, and usage
should be audited and reviewed regularly.

•

Modem phone line numbers must be treated as

confidential.
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New Device Implementation Policies:
Before any new servers, routers, dial-in/out, Async servers, hubs

or non-standard devices are attached to the WAN, the department

wishing to attach the device(s) must first notify the Network

Support Group at county DP, describing what the equipment is,
and if it is a server, the server name and network address, and the

data and time that the device(s) will be connected to the network.

The data and time, and other pertinent information will be made
available to all other WAN members via a publicly accessible
bulletin board or some other electronic form of communication.
New Process Implementation Policies:
Before any new process is run across the WAN, the department

wishing to run this process must first notify the Network Support
Group at County DP, describing what the process is, the extent

and type of data to be sent across the network, the source server
name and network address, and the date and time that the

process will be run across the network. The data and time, and

other pertinent information will be made available to all other
WAN members via publicly accessible bulletin board or some

other electronic form of communication, so that the effects on

other users can be monitored. Based on monitoring results, the
process may be approved for standard operation across the WAN.

County of Contra Costa

Computer Security Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)

Purpose of This MOA:

This MOA signifies that County Agency/Department Heads are
cognizant of their responsibilities for the maintenance of strong

computer security within their Agencies/Departments.
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Importance of Computer Security:

Increasingly, important and sensitive data is processed and stored

on County computers. The advent of local area networks (LAN's)
and wide area networks (WAN's), and of improved capabilities

for all types of computers to communicate with each other,
increases the risk that County data can be inappropriately
accessed and used. These developments also make one

Agency/Department's data vulnerable to security lapses by other
agencies/Departments. Adherence to good computer security

County-wide reduces these risks.
Essence of This Agreement:

This MOA is an agreement between an Agency/Department Head
and the County Administrator whereby the Agency/Department

Head agrees to the provisions of this MOA and of other computer
security policies developed for the County. In particular, the
signing Agency/Department Head agrees that employees and

contractors of the Agency/Department who use County

computers will be notified of the need for good computer security
practices, and have received the County's Employee/Contractor

Responsibility Statement (Attachment 1). The Agency/Department
Head also agrees to comply with the guidelines expressed in the

Contra Costa County WAN Access Standards document
(Attachment 2) and to enforce good computer security by

applying appropriate sanctions against persons who knowingly

breach computer security or who repeatedly create inadvertent
security risks.

Agency/Department Computer Security and Disaster Recovery
Plans:

Each Agency/Department agrees to develop a computer security
plan and a disaster recovery plan, each of which will be
reviewed by a group designated by the County-Wide Information

Technology Steering Committee (ITSC), and to update these plans
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on an annual basis. Any disagreements on compliance with

County security policies will be reviewed by the County-Wide

Information Technology Steering Committee.

Acceptance:
Agency/Department:____________________________________

Signature:Date Signed:

Rev. 10/9/95
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Hermann Hospital Information Security Policy Draft
I.

Purpose
A. To provide guidelines for ensuring that authorized
persons have timely and appropriate access to

computerized information, while safeguarding the
information's confidentiality, security, and integrity.

II.

Policy

A.

Definitions
1.

Security Protection of information resources from
unauthorized change, destruction, or disclosure,
whether intentional or accidental.

2.

Such information resources include, but are not

limited to, all Hermann-owned or managed
computer and telecommunications : hardware,
software, storage media, computer signon codes,

information transmitted, stored, printed, and/or

processed by a computer system
3.

Confidential Information Requires special safeguards

due to private nature. Examples Patient care

information, including all information regarding a

patient's identity, treatment, and diagnosis Personnel

information regarding employees' salaries, benefits,

performance reviews, and disciplinary action.
B.

Development and support of information security

processes
1.

Hermann will implement processes to ensure

sufficient security and confidentiality for its
information. These processes will address the

following issues:
a.

Who has access to information
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b.

The information to which each individual has

access
c.

The obligation of the individual who has access
to information to keep it confidential

d.

The release of information

e.

The mechanisms to secure information against
loss, destruction, tampering, and unauthorized

access or use
2.

Hermann will address security issues during the
purchase and implementation of new information
systems

3.

Management staff in each department will develop

and maintain information security policies specific to

their department, if appropriate, which are consistent
with this policy.

4.

The orientation program for new employees will
address Hermann's information security policies. At

the time of orientation, each new employee will sign

a confidentiality agreement that summarizes
Hermann's information security policies and the

individual's responsibilities regarding these policies.

This agreement will be filed in the employee's
records in Human Resources.
5.

Management staff in each department will inform

their staff of institutional and departmental

information security policies. Management will
ensure that these policies are addressed at

departmental staff meetings annually.
C.

Authorization to Access information resources

1.

Only persons who have valid business reasons for

accessing Hermann's information resources will be
granted access. Individuals will be given access to

information resources in keeping with their job
requirements. Management in each department is
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responsible for determining what information

resources its employees need to access in order to
complete their job functions Hermann department
heads are responsible for determining which

information resources will be made accessible to

physicians, students, and third parties having
business relationships with Hermann

2.

No one may access Hermann's information resources
or applications without prior written authorization

and approval. It is illegal to use a Hermann computer
or access information stored or maintained by a

Hermann computer without the consent of Hermann
(Texas Penal Code, Section 33.02).
3.

All passwords to Hermann's computer systems are

confidential and are the property of Hermann

Hospital. These include, but are not limited to,
passwords to network systems, mainframe systems,
PCs, voice mail, and long distance telephone codes.
It is a crime, punishable by fine and imprisonment,

to reveal passwords to anyone without Hermann's

permission (Texas Penal Code, Section 33.02).

4.

Computer equipment security

a.

Terminals, network devices, and personal

computers in unsecured areas will be secured

against theft and use by unauthorized persons.
b.

Personal computers in unsecured areas will be
set up to use power-on passwords and keyboard

passwords, to prevent unauthorized persons from

using the device without providing the
appropriate password.

c.

Anyone who signs on to a computer system must

sign off and/or physically secure the terminal or
PC when leaving it unattended
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d.

Where possible, computer systems wil be set up

to automatically sign off or password-protect
terminals and PCs after a specified period of
inactivity
e.

Access to data centers will be secured by means

of locked entryways. Only persons authorized to
operate or maintain the computer systems will

be issued keys, passcards, or other means for
unlocking the entryway. Authorized visitors to
the Data Center will be escorted by authorized
staff.
5.

Security of computer-related media
a.

Printed reports containing confidential or
sensitive information will be stored in a secure

area, inaccessible to unauthorized persons.

Confidential reports will be rendered unreadable

before being discarded.
b.

Diskettes, tapes, and other media containing

confidential information will be labeled
"confidential" and will be protected
appropriately.

c.

Diskettes, tapes and other medial containing

computer files will be stored in areas accessible

only to authorized persons.
6.

Protection of computerized files
a.

Departments and indivduals must establish
regular schedules for making backup copies of

data files stored on personal computers, network
file servers, and other computer systems.
b.

Backup copies will be stored in a safe location

(not exposed to heat or magnetic fields). Backup
copies for network file servers and mainframe

computer systems will not be stored in the same

room as the servers or data storage devices.
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c.

Virus protection programs will be installed and
executed regularly on each PC and computer

system.
d.

Software will not be copied from public access

bulletin boards or other non-Hermann computer
systems without first being scanned by a virus

protection program.
7.

Dial up access to information resources
a.

Authorized employees, physicians, and other
authorized parties will be permitted to use

telephone lines to access Hermann information

resources, with proper safeguards.
b.

All dial-up connections to Hermann computer
systems will be routed through devices that
provide for password verification, call-back
security, or other similar security features.

c.

Modems or personal computers that do not have
dial-up access security features will not be
connected to direc-inward-dial telephone lines.

8.

Violations of information security policy
a.

Failure to comply with these information security

policies and procedures may result in Level III
disciplinary action, termination of access

privileges to Hermann information systems, and
civil or criminal legal penalties, at the discretion
of Hermann management.
b.

Management staff in each department will
monitor and counsel their staff in matters of

information security.

Sample Security Policies 171

III. Procedure

A. Security administration

1.

A system security administrator will be designated for
each network system and each mainframe

application
a.

System security administrators will be
responsible for issuing signon codes for the

system(s) for which they are responsible. System

security administrators are responsible for
ensuring that all persons who receive signon

codes have proper authorization to access the
system.
b.

The Information Systems Department will
maintain a list of all designated system security
administrators and their backups.

B.

Obtaining authorization to access information resources
1.

Requests for access to Hermann's information

resources must be submitted in writing to the
appropriate system security administrator.
2.

Requests for access to information resources must be
approved by the appropriate Hermann management,

as follows:
a.

Hermann employees: Authorization by the
employee's supervisor.

b.

Physicians: Authorization by a Hermann Chief of
Service

c.

University of Texas Health Science Center
employees: Authorization by a UTHSC

department head and a Hermann department

head.
d.

Students: Authorization by the appropriate dean
of students and a Hermann department head

e.

Third parties having business relationships with

Hermann (such as payers, vendors, consultants,
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regulatory agencies, etc.): authorization by a

Hermann department head.
3.

All persons who request access to computer systems
will be required to sign a Confidentiality Agreement

that summarizes Hermann's information security

policies and the individual's responsibilities
regarding these policies.

C.

Issuance of computer signon codes

1.

Each person authorized to access a Hermann
computer system (mainframe, minicomputer, or
network) will be issued a unique, individual

identification code and password. The person must
supply this identification immediately after initial

contact with the computer, or further access will be
denied.
2.

Each authorized user of Herman computer systems
will have a unique personal password associated

with his or her user identification code. Each person
is responsible for changing this password periodically

(at least every 90 days) on systems where this can be
done.
D. Termination of access to information resources
1.

A person's access to Hermann's information

resources will be revoked upon termination of
employment or contract with Hermann; upon

transfer to a different department; or at the request of
the person's supervisor or department head.

Author: Alan S. Tonnesen, MD

Last Update: 5/15/95
Copyright 1995
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User Security Policies
Introduction and Enforcement
Every user of ARSC systems can rightfully expect his or her e-

mail, programs, data, documents, etc., to be inaccessible to

others, secure against arbitrary loss or alteration, and available for
appropriate use, at all times.
To help achieve this goal of protecting system security, ARSC

system administrators reserve the right to routinely examine
certain features of user accounts, such as the permissions set on

environment files, the contents of specific environment files, and
encrypted passwords. ARSC also reserves the right, in cases of

suspected security incidents, to inactivate and examine the

general contents of user accounts, without prior notification.
ARSC employs several mechanisms to enforce its user security

policies, including:

•

Contacting the user and asking him or her to correct the
problem;

•

Changing the permissions on the user's home directory to

700;

•

Inactivating the account;

•

Resetting the user's password.

By accepting your account at ARSC, you accept these policies.
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Policies
1.

Security Level
ARSC operates an unclassified system. Don't do classified

work on ARSC systems.

2.

Security Awareness
Report your suspicions. For instance, if a file in your

directory seems to have changed, but you don't

remember having changed it, contact User Services

(phone: 907-474-5102 or e-mail: consult@arsc.edu).

3.

Passwords
You must maintain a secure, unbreakable password.

Please read our password protection policy for hints on

choosing and remembering passwords.
To enforce this policy, ARSC analysts periodically run

password cracking programs, and if your password is
cracked, we will attempt to contact you to change it. If
you are unreachable, we will reset it and/or inactivate
your account. This protects your account as well as
ARSC systems.

When ARSC resets your password, it uses your "default"

password. At any time, if you feel that your default

password letter (which was either issued with your new
account or, if you were an early ARSC account holder,

mailed to you in January, 1997) may have been
compromised or misplaced, contact us immediately and
we will issue you a new one. ARSC will not

communicate passwords via phone or email.

On its Cray platforms, ARSC runs a program which
"locks" an account if five consecutive attempts to log on
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fail. Thus, if you mistype your password five times, your
account will be locked, and, even if you type correctly
the sixth time, you will not be able to log in (contact us

to have the lock removed). The purpose of this measure
is to prevent others from making multiple guesses of your

password.
4.

Account Sharing

You may not share your account with anyone under any
circumstances.

This requirement makes every user solely accountable for
all actions extending from his or her account. Two ways

to share your account are listed here, either one is
considered a violation:

•

Password sharing-Don't give anyone your password.

•

.rhosts file-Don't give anyone, other than yourself,
rlogin permissions via your .rhosts file. (Please review

the .rhosts files policies for details.)

5.

Home Directory Permissions
Your home directory must never be group-writeable or

world-writeable.

Home Directory
6.

Recommended Permissions
700, 710, or 750

Environment (or "Dot") Files
Your environment files must never be group-writeable or

world-writeable. Additional restrictions apply to metre,
.rhosts, and .Xauthority files, as described in detail.
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Environment files are executed automatically as a

consequence of some normal, frequent activity on your
part (like logging on) and thus, they are a prime target for

anyone trying to compromise your account.

Dot File

Description

Recommended
Permissions

.cshrc

csh file, executed

400, 440, 600, or 640

only on login

.forward
.kshrc

mail forwarding file

400, 440, 600, or 640

ksh file, executed each

400, 440, 600, or 640

time ksh is executed

.login

csh file, executed each

400, 440, 600, or 640

time csh is executed
.netrc

file with configuration

400, 440, 600, or 640

information for ftp
access to a

remote machine.
.profile

ksh file, executed

400, 440, 600, or 640

only on login

.rhosts

file of remote hosts

400 or 440

and account names

.Xauthority

contains xauth

600 only

magic cookie

.xinitrc,
.xsession,

X Window System

400, 440, 600, or 640

environment files

.Xdefaults,
.Xresources
Other

files used by less

Environment

common shells

Files

and programs

400, 440, 600, or 640

Sample Security Policies 177

netrc_policy
.netrc files contain login information and configuration

data for ftp access to remote machines. When ftp is
opening a connection to a specified remote machine, it

checks for this file in the user's home directory on the
machine initiating the file transfer.

ARSC policies on .netrc files are:
1.

no passwords are permitted in .netrc files unless the

username is "ftp" or "anonymous."
2.

users may not maintain passwords for ARSC systems
in .netrc files stored on other computers

rhosts_policy

.rhosts files specify a list of trusted remote hosts and
account names. The .rhosts file allows a user to log in to
the account free of the normal user validation. Hence if

present it must be between two or more secure systems.
ARSC can only ensure a secure system among ARSC

machines and cannot enforce its security policies on

other remote hosts. As a result, use of the .rhosts file
between ARSC computers and remote hosts presents a
security risk for all ARSC users.

ARSC policies on .rhosts files are:
1.

rhosts files may give access only between ARSC

systems. However, the host, fosters.arsc.edu (the
ARSC www/ftp server), is an exception to this policy,

and may not appear in a .rhosts file.
2.

Host names must be fully qualified domain names,

e.g., "onyx3.arsc.edu"

3.

The userid in the .rhosts file must match the login id

of the home directory that contains the .rhosts file.
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4.

rhosts files must not be writeable by anyone: not

even the owner.
Xauthority_policy

An .Xauthority file contain a key (magic cookie) used by

xauth to authenticate X Window System requests to
initiate processes on remote systems. If someone could

read this file, they could obtain the key and circumvent
the security provided by xauth.

ARSC policies on .Xauthority files are:
1.

The file permission for the .Xauthority file MUST be
600 only

7.

Java and Related Languages
Background

Java and JavaScript enable web page developers to

include within a web page snippets of code (e.g., Java

'applets') which, when executed by the web browser,
dynamically generate content for that web page. As more

web pages make use of this feature, more web browsers
appear with the ability to accomodate them. Netscape

3.OS, the version of Netscape provided by ARSC under
IRIX 6.2, handles both Java and JavaScript.

With these options enabled, when you download a web

page containing such code, that code is automatically
executed by your browser, and it is not in general

possible to know in advance the presence or purpose of
such code. The dangers involved in this automatic
execution of unknown code downloaded from the

Internet are such that these languages and their
interpreters were carefully designed to disallow certain
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types of actions, such as the modification or deletion of

files.

Nevertheless, reports regularly reach ARSC of newly
discovered exploitable security holes and bugs found in
both Java and JavaScript. Some of these security holes

enable hostile applets to execute arbitrary commands
that can modify or delete important system or user files.
Java and related languages are relatively new and are

undergoing rapid development. It is to be hoped that as

they mature these security holes will be firmly plugged,

and ARSC is monitoring their development.

ARSC Policies Concerning Java and Related Languages
Due to the security considerations discussed above, and
until further notice, ARSC is disallowing the execution of

Java and related code downloaded from the Internet.

Such code includes:

•

Java applets

•

standalone Java applications

•

web pages containing JavaScript

With respect to the system copy of Netscape 3.OS, the
associated Java interpreter has had world execute

permissions removed. Use of JavaScript, however, cannot

be globally disabled, and since it is not possible to know
in advance whether a requested web page contains

JavaScript, when using Netscape you are required to

disable JavaScript locally:
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•

select 'options' from the menu bar

•

select 'network preferences' from the options

•

select 'languages' from the network preferences

•

uncheck the 'Enable JavaScript' box

Use of other Java-enabled browsers for the viewing of

downloaded Java related code is similarly disallowed.

With respect to the system copy of appletviewer, world
execute permissions have also been removed.
If you wish to use Netscape and/or appletviewer to view

locally developed code, you may apply to be added to
the SGI 'java' group, which has execute permissions for
the system copies of the Netscape Java interpreter and

appletviewer. To apply for admission to this group, you
will need to complete a brief application form.

8.

Tampering
Don't try to break passwords, tamper with system files,
look into anyone else's directories, or otherwise abuse
the trust implicit in your account. Your privileges do not

extend beyond the directories, files, and volumes which
you rightfully own or to which you have been given
permission.

9.

Sabbaticals
You may not let your account sit idle for extended

periods of time. At the minimum, please log on every
two weeks, and do basic user maintenance, particularly,

changing your password and checking for suspicious
activity.
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ARSC enforces this policy by inactivating all accounts
after six months without user activity, and disabling them
after six more months without user activity.

An inactive account is unchanged except that the owner
will not be able to access it. When you try to log onto an

inactive account, you will be given a message to contact
User Services and will then be logged out. To reactivate

your account, contact ARSC User Services (phone: 907474-5102 or e-mail: consult@arsc.edu). A disabled

account is actually removed, and the disk space it

occupied is returned to the system.
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Appendix B
InterNIC Site Security
Handbook RFC 1244, FYI 8
Status of this Memo
This handbook is the product of the Site Security Policy
Handbook Working Group (SSPHWG), a combined effort of the

Security Area and User Services Area of the Internet Engineering

Task Force (IETF). This FYI RFC provides information for the

Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Contributing Authors
The following are the authors of the Site Security Handbook.
Without their dedication, this handbook would not have been
possible.
Dave Curry (Purdue University), Sean Kirkpatrick (Unisys), Tom

Longstaff (LLNL), Greg Hollingsworth (Johns Hopkins University),

Jeffrey Carpenter (University of Pittsburgh), Barbara Fraser (CERT),
Fred Ostapik (SRI NISC), Allen Sturtevant (LLNL), Dan Long

(BBN), Jim Duncan (Pennsylvania State University), and Frank
Byrum (DEC).
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Editors’ Note
This FYI RFC is a first attempt at providing Internet users guidance
on how to deal with security issues in the Internet. As such, this
document is necessarily incomplete. There are some clear

shortfalls; for example, this document focuses mostly on

resources available in the United States. In the spirit of the

Internet's "Request for Comments" series of notes, we encourage
feedback from users of this handbook. In particular, those who
utilize this document to craft their own policies and procedures.

This handbook is meant to be a starting place for further research
and should be viewed as a useful resource, but not the final
authority. Different organizations and jurisdictions will have

different resources and rules. Talk to your local organizations,

consult an informed lawyer, or consult with local and national

law enforcement. These groups can help fill in the gaps that this
document cannot hope to cover.
Finally, we intend for this FYI RFC to grow and evolve. Please

send comments and suggestions to: ssphwg@cert.sei.cmu.edu.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose of this Work
This handbook is a guide to setting computer security
policies and procedures for sites that have systems on the
Internet. This guide lists issues and factors that a site must
consider when setting their own policies. It makes some
recommendations and gives discussions of relevant areas.

This guide is only a framework for setting security policies

and procedures. In order to have an effective set of policies
and procedures, a site will have to make many decisions,

gain agreement, and then communicate and implement the

policies.

1.2 Audience
The audience for this work are system administrators and
decision makers (who are more traditionally called
"administrators" or "middle management") at sites. This

document is not directed at programmers or those trying to
create secure programs or systems. The focus of this
document is on the policies and procedures that need to be
in place to support any technical security features that a site

may be implementing.
The primary audience for this work are sites that are

members of the Internet community. However, this document

should be useful to any site that allows communication with
other sites. As a general guide to security policies, this
document may also be useful to sites with isolated systems.
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1.3 Definitions
For the purposes of this guide, a "site" is any organization
that owns computers or network-related resources. These

resources may include host computers that users use, routers,
terminal servers, PC's or other devices that have access to the
Internet. A site may be a end user of Internet services or a
service provider such as a regional network. However, most

of the focus of this guide is on those end users of Internet

services. We assume that the site has the ability to set
policies and procedures for itself with the concurrence and
support from those who actually own the resources.

The "Internet" is those set of networks and machines that use
the TCP/IP protocol suite, connected through gateways, and

sharing a common name and address spaces [1].

The term "system administrator" is used to cover all those
who are responsible for the day-to-day operation of
resources. This may be a number of individuals or an

organization.

The term "decision maker" refers to those people at a site
who set or approve policy. These are often (but not always)
the people who own the resources.

1.4 Related Work
The IETF Security Policy Working Group (SPWG) is working

on a set of recommended security policy guidelines for the

Internet [23]. These guidelines may be adopted as policy by

regional networks or owners of other resources. This
handbook should be a useful tool to help sites implement
those policies as desired or required. However, even

Site Security Handbook 187

implementing the proposed policies isn't enough to secure a
site. The proposed Internet policies deal only with network

access security. It says nothing about how sites should deal

with local security issues.

1.5 Scope
This document covers issues about what a computer security
policy should contain, what kinds of procedures are need to
enforce security, and some recommendations about how to
deal with the problem. When developing a security policy,

close attention should be made not only on the security

needs and requirements of the local network, but also the
security needs and requirements of the other interconnected
networks.

This is not a cookbook for computer security. Each site has
different needs; the security needs of a corporation might

well be different than the security needs of an academic
institution. Any security plan has to conform to the needs and

culture of the site.
This handbook does not cover details of how to do risk

assessment, contingency planning, or physical security. These

things are essential in setting and implementing effective
security policy, but this document leaves treatment of those
issues to other documents. We will try to provide some
pointers in that direction.

This document also doesn't talk about how to design or
implement secure systems or programs.
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1.6 Why Do We Need Security Policies and Procedures?
For most sites, the interest in computer security is
proportional to the perception of risk and threats.

The world of computers has changed dramatically over the
past twenty-five years. Twenty-five years ago, most computers
were centralized and managed by data centers. Computers
were kept in locked rooms and staffs of people made sure
they were carefully managed and physically secured. Links

outside a site were unusual. Computer security threats were
rare, and were basically concerned with insiders: authorized

users misusing accounts, theft and vandalism, and so forth.

These threats were well understood and dealt with using
standard techniques: computers behind locked doors, and
accounting for all resources.
Computing in the 1990's is radically different. Many systems
are in private offices and labs, often managed by individuals
or persons employed outside a computer center. Many

systems are connected into the Internet, and from there
around the world: the United States, Europe, Asia, and

Australia are all connected together.

Security threats are different today. The time honored advice
says "don't write your password down and put it in your
desk" lest someone find it. With world-wide Internet

connections, someone could get into your system from the
other side of the world and steal your password in the middle

of the night when your building is locked up. Viruses and

worms can be passed from machine to machine. The Internet
allows the electronic equivalent of the thief who looks for

open windows and doors; now a person can check hundreds
of machines for vulnerabilities in a few hours.
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System administrators and decision makers have to
understand the security threats that exist, what the risk and
cost of a problem would be, and what kind of action they

want to take (if any) to prevent and respond to security

threats.
As an illustration of some of the issues that need to be dealt

with in security problems, consider the following scenarios
(thanks to Russell Brand [2, BRAND] for these):

A system programmer gets a call reporting that a

major underground cracker newsletter is being
distributed from the administrative machine at his

center to five thousand sites in the US and Western
Europe.

Eight weeks later, the authorities call to inform you

the information in one of these newsletters was used

to disable "911" in a major city for five hours.
A user calls in to report that he can't login to his

account at 3 o'clock in the morning on a Saturday.

The system staffer can't login either. After rebooting
to single user mode, he finds that password file is
empty. By Monday morning, your staff determines
that a number of privileged file transfers took place

between this machine and a local university.
Tuesday morning a copy of the deleted password file
is found on the university machine along with

password files for a dozen other machines.
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A week later you find that your system initialization

files had been altered in a hostile fashion.
You receive a call saying that a breakin to a
government lab occurred from one of your center's

machines. You are requested to provide accounting
files to help trackdown the attacker.

A week later you are given a list of machines at your
site that have been broken into.
A reporter calls up asking about the breakin at your

center. You haven't heard of any such breakin.
Three days later, you learn that there was a breakin.

The center director had his wife's name as a
password.

A change in system binaries is detected.

The day that it is corrected, they again are changed.
This repeats itself for some weeks.

If an intruder is found on your system, should you
leave the system open to monitor the situation or
should you close down the holes and open them up

again later?
If an intruder is using your site, should you call law
enforcement? Who makes that decision? If law

enforcement asks you to leave your site open, who

makes that decision?
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What steps should be taken if another site calls you
and says they see activity coming from an account

on your system? What if the account is owned by a

local manager?

1.7 Basic Approach
Setting security policies and procedures really means
developing a plan for how to deal with computer security.

One way to approach this task is suggested by Fites, et. al. [3,

FITES]:
•

Look at what you are trying to protect.

•

Look at what you need to protect it from.

•

Determine how likely the threats are.

•

Implement measures which will protect your assets
in a cost-effective manner.

•

Review the process continuously, and improve things
every time a weakness is found.

This handbook will concentrate mostly on the last two steps,

but the first three are critically important to making effective
decisions about security. One old truism in security is that the

cost of protecting yourself against a threat should be less than
the cost recovering if the threat were to strike you. Without
reasonable knowledge of what you are protecting and what

the likely threats are, following this rule could be difficult.

1.8 Organization of this Document
This document is organized into seven parts in addition to
this introduction.
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The basic form of each section is to discuss issues that a site
might want to consider in creating a computer security policy

and setting procedures to implement that policy. In some

cases, possible options are discussed along with the some of
the ramifications of those choices. As far as possible, this
document tries not to dictate thechoices a site should make,

since these depend on localcircumstances. Some of the issues
brought up may not apply to all sites. Nonetheless, all sites
should at least consider the issues brought up here to ensure

that they do not miss some important area.

The overall flow of the document is to discuss policy issues
followed by the issues that come up in creating procedures to

implement the policies.

Section 2 discusses setting official site policies for access to
computing resources. It also goes into the issue of what
happens when the policy is violated. The policies will drive

the procedures that need to be created, so decision makers

will need to make choices about policies before many of the
procedural issues in following sections can be dealt with. A

key part of creating policies is doing some kind of risk

assessment to decide what really needs to be protected and
the level of resources that should be applied to protect them.

Once policies are in place, procedures to prevent future
security problems should be established. Section 3 defines

and suggests actions to take when unauthorized activity is
suspected. Resources to prevent security breaches are also

discussed.

Section 4 discusses types of procedures to prevent security
problems. Prevention is a key to security; as an example, the

Site Security Handbook 193

Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center

(CERT/CC) at Carnegie-Mellon University (CMU) estimates
that 80% or more of the problems they see have to do with
poorly chosen passwords.

Section 5 discusses incident handling: what kinds of issues
does a site face when someone violates the security policy.

Many decisions will have to made on the spot as the incident

occurs, but many of the options and issues can be discussed
in advance. At very least, responsibilities and methods of

communication can be established before an incident. Again,
the choices here are influenced by the policies discussed in

section 2.

Section 6 deals with what happens after a security violation
has been dealt with. Security planning is an on-going cycle;

just after an incident has occurred is an excellent opportunity

to improve policies and procedures.

The rest of the document provides references and an
annotated bibliography.

2. Establishing Official Site Polity on Computer Security
2.1 Brief Overview
2.1.1 Organization Issues

The goal in developing an official site policy on computer
security is to define the organization's expectations of proper

computer and network use and to define procedures to
prevent and respond to security incidents. In order to do this,

aspects of the particular organization must be considered.
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First, the goals and direction of the organization should be
considered. For example, a military base may have very

different security concerns from a those of a university.

Second, the site security policy developed must conform to
existing policies, rules, regulations and laws that the
organization is subject to. Therefore it will be necessary to

identify these and take them into consideration while
developing the policy.

Third, unless the local network is completely isolated and
standalone, it is necessary to consider security implications in

a more global context. The policy should address the issues
when local security problems develop as a result of a remote
site as well as when problems occur on remote systems as a
result of a local host or user.

2.1.2 Who Makes the Policy?
Policy creation must be a joint effort by technical personnel,
who understand the full ramifications of the proposed policy

and the implementation of the policy, and by decision

makers who have the power to enforce the policy. A policy
which is neither implementable nor enforceable is useless.

Since a computer security policy can affect everyone in an
organization, it is worth taking some care to make sure you

have the right level of authority in on the policy decisions.
Though a particular group (such as a campus information

services group) may have responsibility for enforcing a policy,
an even higher group may have to support and approve the

policy.

2.1.3 Who is Involved?
Establishing a site policy has the potential for involving every
computer user at the site in a variety of ways. Computer users
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may be responsible for personal password administration.
Systems managers are obligated to fix security holes and to
oversee the system.

It is critical to get the right set of people involved at the start

of the process. There may already be groups concerned with

security who would consider a computer security policy to
be their area. Some of the types of groups that might be

involved include auditing/control, organizations that deal
with physical security, campus information systems groups,

and so forth. Asking these types of groups to "buy in" from
the start can help facilitate the acceptance of the policy.

2.1.4 Responsibilities

A key element of a computer security policy is making sure

everyone knows their own responsibility for maintaining
security. A computer security policy cannot anticipate all
possibilities; however, it can ensure that each kind of

problem does have someone assigned to deal with it.

There may be levels of responsibility associated with a policy

on computer security. At one level, each user of a computing
resource may have a responsibility to protect his account. A
user who allows his account to be compromised increases
the chances of compromising other accounts or resources.
System managers may form another responsibility level: they

must help to ensure the security of the computer system.

Network managers may reside at yet another level.
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2.2 Risk Assessment
2.2.1

General Discussion

One of the most important reasons for creating a computer

security policy is to ensure that efforts spent on security yield

cost effective benefits. Although this may seem obvious, it is

possible to be mislead about where the effort is needed. As
an example, there is a great deal of publicity about intruders

on computers systems; yet most surveys of computer security

show that for most organizations, the actual loss from
"insiders" is much greater.

Risk analysis involves determining what you need to protect,
what you need to protect it from, and how to protect it. Is is

the process of examining all of your risks, and ranking those

risks by level of severity. This process involves making costeffective decisions on what you want to protect. The old
security adage says that you should not spend more to

protect something than it is actually worth.
A full treatment of risk analysis is outside the scope of this
document. [3, FITES] and [16, PFLEEGER] provide

introductions to this topic. However, there are two elements
of a risk analysis that will be briefly covered in the next two
sections:

1.

Identifying the assets

2.

Identifying the threats

For each asset, the basic goals of security are availability,

confidentiality, and integrity. Each threat should be examined

with an eye to how the threat could affect these areas.
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2.2.2 Identifying the Assets
One step in a risk analysis is to identify all the things that

need to be protected. Some things are obvious, like all the
various pieces of hardware, but some are overlooked, such as

the people who actually use the systems. The essential point
is to list all things that could be affected by a security

problem.

One list of categories is suggested by Pfleeger [16,
PFLEEGER, page 459]; this list is adapted from that source:

1.

Hardware: cpus, boards, keyboards, terminals,
workstations, personal computers, printers, disk

drives, communication lines, terminal servers,

routers.
2.

Software: source programs, object programs, utilities,
diagnostic programs, operating systems,

communication programs.

3.

Data: during execution, stored on-line, archived off

line, backups, audit logs, databases, in transit over

communication media.

4.

People: users, people needed to run systems.

5.

Documentation: on programs, hardware, systems,

6.

Supplies: paper, forms, ribbons, magnetic media.

local administrative procedures.

2.2.3 Identifying the Threats

Once the assets requiring protection are identified, it is

necessary to identify threats to those assets. The threats can
then be examined to determine what potential for loss exists.

It helps to consider from what threats you are trying to

protect your assets.

The following sections describe a few of the possible threats.
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2.2.3.1 Unauthorized Access
A common threat that concerns many sites is unauthorized

access to computing facilities. Unauthorized access takes
many forms. One means of unauthorized access is the use of

another user's account to gain access to a system. The use of

any computer resource without prior permission may be
considered unauthorized access to computing facilities.

The seriousness of an unauthorized access will vary from site
to site. For some sites, the mere act of granting access to an
unauthorized user may cause irreparable harm by negative
media coverage. For other sites, an unauthorized access

opens the door to other security threats. In addition, some
sites may be more frequent targets than others; hence the risk
from unauthorized access will vary from site to site. The

Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT - see section

3.9.7.3.1) has observed that well-known universities,
government sites, and military sites seem to attract more
intruders.

2.2.3.2 Disclosure of Information
Another common threat is disclosure of information.

Determine the value or sensitivity of the information stored

on your computers. Disclosure of a password file might allow

for future unauthorized accesses. A glimpse of a proposal
may give a competitor an unfair advantage. A technical paper

may contain years of valuable research.

2.2.3.3 Denial of Service
Computers and networks provide valuable services to their

users. Many people rely on these services in order to perform
their jobs efficiently. When these services are not available

when called upon, a loss in productivity results.
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Denial of service comes in many forms and might affect users
in a number of ways. A network may be rendered unusable

by a rogue packet, jamming, or by a disabled network
component. A virus might slow down or cripple a computer

system. Each site should determine which services are
essential, and for each of these services determine the affect
to the site if that service were to become disabled.

2.3 Policy Issues
There are a number of issues that must be addressed when
developing a security policy. These are:

1.

Who is allowed to use the resources?

2.

What is the proper use of the resources?

3.

Who is authorized to grant access and approve

usage?
4. Who may have system administration privileges?
5.

What are the user's rights and responsibilities?

6.

What are the rights and responsibilities of the system
administrator vs. those of the user?

7.

What do you do with sensitive information?

These issues will be discussed below. In addition you may
wish to include a section in your policy concerning ethical

use of computing resources. Parker, Swope and Baker [17,
PARKER90] and Forester and Morrison [18, FORESTER] are

two useful references that address ethical issues.

2.3.1 Who is Allowed to use the Resources?
One step you must take in developing your security policy is
defining who is allowed to use your system and services. The

policy should explicitly state who is authorized to use what

resources.

200 Site Security Handbook

2.3.2 What is the Proper Use of the Resources?
After determining who is allowed access to system resources

it is necessary to provide guidelines for the acceptable use of
the resources. You may have different guidelines for different
types of users (i.e., students, faculty, external users). The

policy should state what is acceptable use as well as

unacceptable use. It should also include types of use that

may be restricted.
Define limits to access and authority. You will need to

consider the level of access various users will have and what

resources will be available or restricted to various groups of
people.

Your acceptable use policy should clearly state that
individual users are responsible for their actions. Their

responsibility exists regardless of the security mechanisms
that are in place. It should be clearly stated that breaking into

accounts or bypassing security is not permitted.

The following points should be covered when developing an
acceptable use policy:
•

Is breaking into accounts permitted? o Is cracking

passwords permitted? o Is disrupting service
permitted?

•

Should users assume that a file being world-readable

grants them the authorization to read it?

•

Should users be permitted to modify files that are not
their own even if they happen to have write
permission?

•

Should users share accounts?

The answer to most of these questions will be "no".
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You may wish to incorporate a statement in your policies
concerning copyrighted and licensed software. Licensing

agreements with vendors may require some sort of effort on
your part to ensure that the license is not violated. In

addition, you may wish to inform users that the copying of

copyrighted software may be a violation of the copyright

laws, and is not permitted.
Specifically concerning copyrighted and/or licensed software,
you may wish to include the following information:

•

Copyrighted and licensed software may not be
duplicated unless it is explicitly stated that you may
do so.

•

Methods of conveying information on the

copyright/licensed status of software.
•

When in doubt, DON'T COPY.

Your acceptable use policy is very important. A policy which

does not clearly state what is not permitted may leave you
unable to prove that a user violated policy.

There are exception cases like tiger teams and users or

administrators wishing for "licenses to hack" — you may face
the situation where users will want to "hack" on your

services for security research purposes. You should develop a
policy that will determine whether you will permit this type
of research on your services and if so, what your guidelines

for such research will be.

Points you may wish to cover in this area:

•

Whether it is permitted at all. o What type of activity
is permitted: breaking in, releasing worms, releasing

viruses, etc..
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•

What type of controls must be in place to ensure that
it does not get out of control (e.g., separate a
segment of your network for these tests).

•

How you will protect other users from being victims

of these activities, including external users and
networks.

•

The process for obtaining permission to conduct
these tests.

In cases where you do permit these activities, you should
isolate the portions of the network that are being tested from

your main network. Worms and viruses should never be
released on a live network.

You may also wish to employ, contract, or otherwise solicit

one or more people or organizations to evaluate the security
of your services, of which may include "hacking". You may
wish to provide for this in your policy.

2.3.3 Who Is Authorized to Grant Access and Approve Usage?

Your policy should state who is authorized to grant access to

your services. Further, it must be determined what type of

access they are permitted to give. If you do not have control
over who is granted access to your system, you will not have
control over who is using your system. Controlling who has

the authorization to grant access will also enable you to
know who was or was not granting access if problems

develop later.
There are many schemes that can be developed to control
the distribution of access to your services. The following are
the factors that you must consider when determining who

will distribute access to your services:
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•

Will you be distributing access from a centralized

point or at various points?

You can have a centralized distribution point to a distributed
system where various sites or departments independently

authorize access. The trade off is between security and
convenience. The more centralized, the easier to secure.
•

What methods will you use for creating accounts and
terminating access?

From a security standpoint, you need to examine the
mechanism that you will be using to create accounts. In the

least restrictive case, the people who are authorized to grant

access would be able to go into the system directly and
create an account by hand or through vendor supplied

mechanisms. Generally, these mechanisms place a great deal
of trust in the person running them, and the person running

them usually has a large amount of privileges. If this is the
choice you make, you need to select someone who is

trustworthy to perform this task. The opposite solution is to
have an integrated system that the people authorized to

create accounts run, or the users themselves may actually

run. Be aware that even in the restrictive case of having a
mechanized facility to create accounts does not remove the
potential for abuse.

You should have specific procedures developed for the

creation of accounts. These procedures should be well

documented to prevent confusion and reduce mistakes. A
security vulnerability in the account authorization process is

not only possible through abuse, but is also possible if a
mistake is made. Having clear and well documented

procedure will help ensure that these mistakes won't happen.
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You should also be sure that the people who will be
following these procedures understand them.

The granting of access to users is one of the most vulnerable
of times. You should ensure that the selection of an initial

password cannot be easily guessed. You should avoid using
an initial password that is a function of the username, is part

of the user's name, or some algorithmically generated

password that can easily be guessed. In addition, you should
not permit users to continue to use the initial password

indefinitely. If possible, you should force users to change the

initial password the first time they login. Consider that some

users may never even login, leaving their password

vulnerable indefinitely. Some sites choose to disable accounts
that have never been accessed, and force the owner to
reauthorize opening the account.

2.3.4 Who May Have System Administration Privileges?

One security decision that needs to be made very carefully is
who will have access to system administrator privileges and
passwords for your services. Obviously, the system

administrators will need access, but inevitably other users
will request special privileges. The policy should address this

issue. Restricting privileges is one way to deal with threats

from local users. The challenge is to balance restricting
access to these to protect security with giving people who
need these privileges access so that they can perform their

tasks. One approach that can be taken is to grant only
enough privilege to accomplish the necessary tasks.
Additionally, people holding special privileges should be

accountable to some authority and this should also be
identified within the site's security policy. If the people you

grant privileges to are not accountable, you run the risk of
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losing control of your system and will have difficulty
managing a compromise in security.

2.3.5 What Are The Users' Rights and Responsibilities?
The policy should incorporate a statement on the users' rights

and responsibilities concerning the use of the site's computer
systems and services. It should be clearly stated that users are

responsible for understanding and respecting the security

rules of the systems they are using. The following is a list of
topics that you may wish to cover in this area of the policy:

•

What guidelines you have regarding resource
consumption (whether users are restricted, and if so,

what the restrictions are).
•

What might constitute abuse in terms of system

performance.

•

Whether users are permitted to share accounts or let
others use their accounts.

•

How "secret" users should keep their passwords.

•

How often users should change their passwords and

any other password restrictions or requirements.
•

Whether you provide backups or expect the users to
create their own.

•

Disclosure of information that may be proprietary.

•

Statement on Electronic Mail Privacy (Electronic

Communications Privacy Act).
•

Your policy concerning controversial mail or postings
to mailing lists or discussion groups (obscenity,
harassment, etc.).

•

Policy on electronic communications: mail forging,
etc.

The Electronic Mail Association sponsored a white paper on

the privacy of electronic mail in companies [4]. Their basic
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recommendation is that every site should have a policy on
the protection of employee privacy. They also recommend
that organizations establish privacy policies that deal with all

media, rather than singling out electronic mail.
They suggest five criteria for evaluating any policy:
1.

Does the policy comply with law and with duties to

third parties?
2.

Does the policy unnecessarily compromise the
interest of the employee, the employer or third

parties?
3.

Is the policy workable as a practical matter and likely

to be enforced?
4.

Does the policy deal appropriately with all different
forms of communications and record keeping with
the office?

5.

Has the policy been announced in advance and

agreed to by all concerned?
2.3.6 What Are The Rights and Responsibilities of System

Administrators Versus Rights of Users
There is a tradeoff between a user's right to absolute privacy
and the need of system administrators to gather sufficient

information to diagnose problems. There is also a distinction
between a system administrator's need to gather information

to diagnose problems and investigating security violations.

The policy should specify to what degree system

administrators can examine user files to diagnose problems or
for other purposes, and what rights you grant to the users.
You may also wish to make a statement concerning system
administrators' obligation to maintaining the privacy of

information viewed under these circumstances. A few
questions that should be answered are:
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•

Can an administrator monitor or read a user's files for

any reason?

•

What are the liabilities?

•

Do network administrators have the right to examine

network or host traffic?
2.3.7 What To Do With Sensitive Information
Before granting users access to your services, you need to

determine at what level you will provide for the security of

data on your systems. By determining this, you are
determining the level of sensitivity of data that users should

store on your systems. You do not want users to store very
sensitive information on a system that you are not going to

secure very well. You need to tell users who might store
sensitive information what services, if any, are appropriate for
the storage of sensitive information. This part should include

storing of data in different ways (disk, magnetic tape, file
servers, etc.). Your policy in this area needs to be coordinated
with the policy concerning the rights of system administrators
versus users (see section 2.3.6).

2.4 What Happens When the Policy is Violated
It is obvious that when any type of official policy is defined,

be it related to computer security or not, it will eventually be
broken. The violation may occur due to an individual's
negligence, accidental mistake, having not been properly

informed of the current policy, or not understanding the
current policy. It is equally possible that an individual (or

group of individuals) may knowingly perform an act that is in
direct violation of the defined policy.

When a policy violation has been detected, the immediate
course of action should be pre-defined to ensure prompt and
proper enforcement. An investigation should be performed to

determine how and why the violation occurred. Then the
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appropriate corrective action should be executed. The type
and severity of action taken varies depending on the type of

violation that occurred.

2.4.1 Determining the Response to Policy Violations
Violations to policy may be committed by a wide variety of

users. Some may be local users and others may be from
outside the local environment. Sites may find it helpful to
define what it considers "insiders" and "outsiders" based

upon administrative, legal or political boundaries. These

boundaries imply what type of action must be taken to
correct the offending party; from a written reprimand to
pressing legal charges. So, not only do you need to define

actions based on the type of violation, you also need to have

a clearly defined series of actions based on the kind of user
violating your computer security policy. This all seems rather
complicated, but should be addressed long before it becomes
necessary as the result of a violation.

One point to remember about your policy is that proper

education is your best defense. For the outsiders who are

using your computer legally, it is your responsibility to verify
that these individuals are aware of the policies that you have
set forth. Having this proof may assist you in the future if

legal action becomes necessary.
As for users who are using your computer illegally, the

problem is basically the same. What type of user violated the
policy and how and why did they do it? Depending on the
results of your investigation, you may just prefer to "plug" the

hole in your computer security and chalk it up to experience.

Or if a significant amount of loss was incurred, you may wish

to take more drastic action.
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2.4.2 What to do When Local Users Violate the
Policy of a Remote Site

In the event that a local user violates the security policy of a

remote site, the local site should have a clearly defined set of

administrative actions to take concerning that local user. The
site should also be prepared to protect itself against possible

actions by the remote site. These situations involve legal
issues which should be addressed when forming the security

policy.

2.4.3 Defining Contacts and Responsibilities to
Outside Organizations

The local security policy should include procedures for
interaction with outside organizations. These include law

enforcement agencies, other sites, external response team
organizations (e.g., the CERT, CIAC) and various press

agencies. The procedure should state who is authorized to
make such contact and how it should be handled. Some

questions to be answered include:
•

Who may talk to the press?

•

When do you contact law enforcement and
investigative agencies?

•

If a connection is made from a remote site, is the

system manager authorized to contact that site?

•

Can data be released? What kind?

Detailed contact information should be readily available

along with clearly defined procedures to follow.

2.4.4 What are the Responsibilities to our Neighbors
and Other Internet Sites?

The Security Policy Working Group within the IETF is
working on a document entitled, "Policy Guidelines for the
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Secure Operation of the Internet" [23]. It addresses the issue
that the Internet is a cooperative venture and that sites are

expected to provide mutual security assistance. This should

be addressed when developing a site's policy. The major
issue to be determined is how much information should be
released. This will vary from site to site according to the type

of site (e.g., military, education, commercial) as well as the

type of security violation that occurred.

2.4.5 Issues for Incident Handling Procedures
Along with statements of policy, the document being
prepared should include procedures for incident handling.

This is covered in detail in the next chapter. There should be
procedures available that cover all facets of policy violation.

2.5 Locking In or Out
Whenever a site suffers an incident which may compromise
computer security, the strategies for reacting may be
influenced by two opposing pressures.

If management fears that the site is sufficiently vulnerable, it
may choose a "Protect and Proceed" strategy. This approach
will have as its primary goal the protection and preservation

of the site facilities and to provide for normalcy for its users

as quickly as possible. Attempts will be made to actively

interfere with the intruder's processes, prevent further access
and begin immediate damage assessment and recovery. This

process may involve shutting down the facilities, closing off

access to the network, or other drastic measures. The
drawback is that unless the intruder is identified directly, they
may come back into the site via a different path, or may

attack another site.
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The alternate approach, "Pursue and Prosecute", adopts the

opposite philosophy and goals. The primary goal is to allow
intruders to continue their activities at the site until the site

can identify the responsible persons. This approach is
endorsed by law enforcement agencies and prosecutors. The

drawback is that the agencies cannot exempt a site from

possible user lawsuits if damage is done to their systems and
data.

Prosecution is not the only outcome possible if the intruder is
identified. If the culprit is an employee or a student, the

organization may choose to take disciplinary actions. The
computer security policy needs to spell out the choices and
how they will be selected if an intruder is caught.

Careful consideration must be made by site management
regarding their approach to this issue before the problem

occurs. The strategy adopted might depend upon each
circumstance. Or there may be a global policy which
mandates one approach in all circumstances. The pros and

cons must be examined thoroughly and the users of the

facilities must be made aware of the policy so that they
understand their vulnerabilities no matter which approach is
taken.

The following are checklists to help a site determine which
strategy to adopt: "Protect and Proceed" or "Pursue and
Prosecute".

Protect and Proceed
1.

If assets are not well protected.

2.

If continued penetration could result in great
financial risk.
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3.

If the possibility or willingness to prosecute is not
present.

4.

If user base is unknown.

5.

If users are unsophisticated and their work is
vulnerable.

6.

If the site is vulnerable to lawsuits from users, e.g., if

their resources are undermined.
Pursue and Prosecute

1.

If assets and systems are well protected.

2.

If good backups are available.

3.

If the risk to the assets is outweighed by the

disruption caused by the present and possibly future

penetrations.

4.

If this is a concentrated attack occurring with great

frequency and intensity.
5.

If the site has a natural attraction to intruders, and

consequently regularly attracts intruders.
6.

If the site is willing to incur the financial (or other)

risk to assets by allowing the penetrator continue.
7.

If intruder access can be controlled.

8.

If the monitoring tools are sufficiently well-developed

9.

If the support staff is sufficiently clever and

to make the pursuit worthwhile.
knowledge
able about the operating system, related
utilities, and systems to make the pursuit worthwhile.

10. If there is willingness on the part of management to

prosecute.
11. If the system administrators know in general what kind

of evidence would lead to prosecution.
12. If there is established contact with knowledgeable

law enforcement.
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13. If there is a site representative versed in the relevant
legal issues.

14. If the site is prepared for possible legal action from
its own users if their data or systems become
compromised during the pursuit.

2.6 Interpreting the Policy
It is important to define who will interpret the policy. This
could be an individual or a committee. No matter how well

written, the policy will require interpretation from time to

time and this body would serve to review, interpret, and
revise the policy as needed.

2.7 Publicizing the Policy
Once the site security policy has been written and
established, a vigorous process should be engaged to ensure
that the policy statement is widely and thoroughly

disseminated and discussed. A mailing of the policy should

not be considered sufficient. A period for comments should
be allowed before the policy becomes effective to ensure that
all affected users have a chance to state their reactions and

discuss any unforeseen ramifications. Ideally, the policy

should strike a balance between protection and productivity.
Meetings should be held to elicit these comments, and also
to ensure that the policy is correctly understood. (Policy
promulgators are not necessarily noted for their skill with the

language.) These meetings should involve higher management

as well as line employees. Security is a collective effort.
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In addition to the initial efforts to publicize the policy, it is

essential for the site to maintain a continual awareness of its
computer security policy. Current users may need periodic
reminders New users should have the policy included as part
of their site introduction packet. As a condition for using the

site facilities, it may be advisable to have them sign a
statement that they have read and understood the policy.

Should any of these users require legal action for serious
policy violations, this signed statement might prove to be a

valuable aid.

3. Establishing Procedures to Prevent
Security Problems
The security policy defines what needs to be protected. This
section discusses security procedures which specify what

steps will be used to carry out the security policy.

3.1 Security Policy Defines What Needs to be Protected
The security policy defines the WHAT's: what needs to be
protected, what is most important, what the priorities are,
and what the general approach to dealing with security

problems should be.

The security policy by itself doesn't say HOW things are
protected. That is the role of security procedures, which this

section discusses. The security policy should be a high level
document, giving general strategy. The security procedures

need to set out, in detail, the precise steps your site will take
to protect itself.
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The security policy should include a general risk assessment

of the types of threats a site is mostly likely to face and the
consequences of those threats (see section 2.2). Part of doing

a risk assessment will include creating a general list of assets
that should be protected (section 2.2.2). This information is

critical in devising cost-effective procedures.

It is often tempting to start creating security procedures by
deciding on different mechanisms first: "our site should have

logging on all hosts, call-back modems, and smart cards for
all users." This approach could lead to some areas that have

too much protection for the risk they face, and other areas
that aren't protected enough. Starting with the security policy
and the risks it outlines should ensure that the procedures
provide the right level of protect for all assets.

3.2 Identify
ing Possible Problems
To determine risk, vulnerabilities must be identified. Part of

the purpose of the policy is to aid in shoring up the

vulnerabilities and thus to decrease the risk in as many areas
as possible. Several of the more popular problem areas are
presented in sections below. This list is by no means

complete. In addition, each site is likely to have a few unique
vulnerabilities.

3.2.1 Access Points
Access points are typically used for entry by unauthorized

users. Having many access points increases the risk of access
to an organization's computer and network facilities.
Network links to networks outside the organization allow

access into the organization for all others connected to that

external network. A network link typically provides access to
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a large number of network services, and each service has a
potential to be compromised.
Dialup lines, depending on their configuration, may provide

access merely to a login port of a single system. If connected
to a terminal server, the dialup line may give access to the

entire network.
Terminal servers themselves can be a source of problem.
Many terminal servers do not require any kind of

authentication. Intruders often use terminal servers to disguise
their actions, dialing in on a local phone and then using the

terminal server to go out to the local network. Some terminal
servers are configured so that intruders can TELNET [19] in

from outside the network, and then TELNET back out again,

again serving to make it difficult to trace them.
3.2.2 Misconfigured Systems
Misconfigured systems form a large percentage of security
holes. Today's operating systems and their associated
software have become so complex that understanding how
the system works has become a full-time job. Often, systems
managers will be non- specialists chosen from the current

organization's staff.

Vendors are also partly responsible for misconfigured
systems. To make the system installation process easier,

vendors occasionally choose initial configurations that are
not secure in all environments.

3.2.3 Software Bugs
Software will never be bug free. Publicly known security

bugs are common methods of unauthorized entry. Part of the
solution to this problem is to be aware of the security

Site Security Handbook 217

problems and to update the software when problems are
detected. When bugs are found, they should be reported to
the vendor so that a solution to the problem can be

implemented and distributed.
3.2.4 "Insider" Threats

An insider to the organization may be a considerable threat

to the security of the computer systems. Insiders often have
direct access to the computer and network hardware

components. The ability to access the components of a
system makes most systems easier to compromise. Most

desktop workstations can be easily manipulated so that they

grant privileged access. Access to a local area network
provides the ability to view possibly sensitive data traversing
the network.

3.3 Choose Controls to Protect Assets in a Cost-Effective Way
After establishing what is to be protected, and assessing the
risks these assets face, it is necessary to decide how to

implement the controls which protect these assets. The
controls and protection mechanisms should be selected in a

way so as to adequately counter the threats found during risk

assessment, and to implement those controls in a cost
effective manner. It makes little sense to spend an exorbitant
sum of money and overly constrict the user base if the risk of

exposure is very small.
3.3.1 Choose the Right Set of Controls

The controls that are selected represent the physical
embodiment of your security policy. They are the first and

primary line of defense in the protection of your assets. It is

therefore most important to ensure that the controls that you
select are the right set of controls. If the major threat to your
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system is outside penetrators, it probably doesn't make much
sense to use biometric devices to authenticate your regular

system users. On the other hand, if the major threat is
unauthorized use of computing resources by regular system

users, you'll probably want to establish very rigorous
automated accounting procedures.

3.3.2 Use Common Sense
Common sense is the most appropriate tool that can be used

to establish your security policy. Elaborate security schemes

and mechanisms are impressive, and they do have their
place, yet there is little point in investing money and time on
an elaborate implementation scheme if the simple controls

are forgotten. For example, no matter how elaborate a system

you put into place on top of existing security controls, a
single user with a poor password can still leave your system
open to attack.

3.4 Use Multiple Strategies to Protect Assets
Another method of protecting assets is to use multiple

strategies. In this way, if one strategy fails or is circumvented,
another strategy comes into play to continue protecting the

asset. By using several simpler strategies, a system can often

be made more secure than if one very sophisticated method
were used in its place. For example, dial-back modems can

be used in conjunction with traditional logon mechanisms.
Many similar approaches could be devised that provide

several levels of protection for assets. However, it's very easy

to go overboard with extra mechanisms. One must keep in

mind exactly what it is that needs to be protected.
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3.5 Physical Security
It is a given in computer security if the system itself is not

physically secure, nothing else about the system can be

considered secure. With physical access to a machine, an
intruder can halt the machine, bring it back up in privileged
mode, replace or alter the disk, plant Trojan horse programs
(see section 2.13.9.2), or take any number of other

undesirable (and hard to prevent) actions.
Critical communications links, important servers, and other

key machines should be located in physically secure areas.
Some security systems (such as Kerberos) require that the
machine be physically secure.

If you cannot physically secure machines, care should be
taken about trusting those machines. Sites should consider

limiting access from non-secure machines to more secure

machines. In particular, allowing trusted access (e.g., the BSD
Unix remote commands such as rsh) from these kinds of
hosts is particularly risky.
For machines that seem or are intended to be physically

secure, care should be taken about who has access to the

machines. Remember that custodial and maintenance staff

often have keys to rooms.

3.6 Procedures to Recognize Unauthorized Activity
Several simple procedures can be used to detect most

unauthorized uses of a computer system. These procedures
use tools provided with the operating system by the vendor,

or tools publicly available from other sources.
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3.6.1 Monitoring System Use
System monitoring can be done either by a system

administrator, or by software written for the purpose.

Monitoring a system involves looking at several parts of the

system and searching for anything unusual. Some of the
easier ways to do this are described in this section.

The most important thing about monitoring system use is that
it be done on a regular basis. Picking one day out of the
month to monitor the system is pointless, since a security

breach can be isolated to a matter of hours. Only by

maintaining a constant vigil can you expect to detect security

violations in time to react to them.
3.6.2 Tools for Monitoring the System
This section describes tools and methods for monitoring a
system against unauthorized access and use.

3.6.2.1 Logging

Most operating systems store numerous bits of information in
log files. Examination of these log files on a regular basis is
often the first line of defense in detecting unauthorized use of

the system.

Compare lists of currently logged in users and past

login histories. Most users typically log in and out at
roughly the same time each day. An account logged
in outside the "normal" time for the account may be
in use by an intruder.

Many systems maintain accounting records for billing

purposes. These records can also be used to
determine usage patterns for the system; unusual

Site Security Handbook 221

accounting records may indicate unauthorized use of
the system.

System logging facilities, such as the UNIX "syslog"
utility, should be checked for unusual error messages
from system software. For example, a large number

of failed login attempts in a short period of time may

indicate someone trying to guess passwords.

Operating system commands which list currently
executing processes can be used to detect users

running programs they are not authorized to use, as
well as to detect unauthorized programs which have
been started by an intruder.

3.6.2.2 Monitoring Software

Other monitoring tools can easily be constructed using
standard operating system software, by using several, often

unrelated, programs together. For example, checklists of file
ownerships and permission settings can be constructed (for
example, with "Is" and "find" on UNIX) and stored off-line.

These lists can then be reconstructed periodically and
compared against the master checklist (on UNIX, by using
the "diff" utility). Differences may indicate that unauthorized
modifications have been made to the system.

Still other tools are available from third-party vendors and
public software distribution sites. Section 3.9.9 lists several

sources from which you can learn what tools are available

and how to get them.

3.6.2.3 Other Tools
Other tools can also be used to monitor systems for security
violations, although this is not their primary purpose. For
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example, network monitors can be used to detect and log
connections from unknown sites.

3.6.3 Vary the Monitoring Schedule
The task of system monitoring is not as daunting as it may

seem. System administrators can execute many of the

commands used for monitoring periodically throughout the

day during idle moments (e.g., while talking on the
telephone), rather than spending fixed periods of each day
monitoring the system. By executing the commands

frequently, you will rapidly become used to seeing "normal"

output, and will easily spot things which are out of the

ordinary. In addition, by running various monitoring
commands at different times throughout the day, you make it
hard for an intruder to predict your actions. For example, if
an intruder knows that each day at 5:00 p.m. the system is

checked to see that everyone has logged off, he will simply

wait until after the check has completed before logging in.

But the intruder cannot guess when a system administrator
might type a command to display all logged-in users, and

thus he runs a much greater risk of detection.
Despite the advantages that regular system monitoring
provides, some intruders will be aware of the standard

logging mechanisms in use on systems they are attacking.

They will actively pursue and attempt to disable monitoring

mechanisms. Regular monitoring therefore is useful in
detecting intruders, but does not provide any guarantee that

your system is secure, nor should monitoring be considered
an infallible method of detecting unauthorized use.
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3.7 Define Actions to Take When
Unauthorized Activity is Suspected
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discussed the course of action a site

should take when it suspects its systems are being abused.

The computer security policy should state the general
approach towards dealing with these problems.

The procedures for dealing with these types of problems
should be written down. Who has authority to decide what

actions will be taken? Should law enforcement be involved?
Should your organization cooperate with other sites in trying

to track down an intruder? Answers to all the questions in

section 2.4 should be part of the incident handling
procedures.

Whether you decide to lock out or pursue intruders, you
should have tools and procedures ready to apply. It is best to
work up these tools and procedures before you need them.

Don't wait until an intruder is on your system to figure out
how to track the intruder's actions; you will be busy enough

if an intruder strikes.

3.8 Communicating Security Policy
Security policies, in order to be effective, must be
communicated to both the users of the system and the system

maintainers. This section describes what these people should

be told, and how to tell them.

3.8.1 Educating the Users

Users should be made aware of how the computer systems
are expected to be used, and how to protect themselves from

unauthorized users.
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3.8.1.1 Proper Account/Workstation Use

All users should be informed about what is considered the
"proper" use of their account or workstation ("proper" use is

discussed in section 2.3.2). This can most easily be done at

the time a user receives their account, by giving them a
policy statement. Proper use policies typically dictate things

such as whether or not the account or workstation may be

used for personal activities (such as checkbook balancing or
letter writing), whether profit-making activities are allowed,

whether game playing is permitted, and so on. These policy

statements may also be used to summarize how the computer

facility is licensed and what software licenses are held by the
institution; for example, many universities have educational
licenses which explicitly prohibit commercial uses of the
system. A more complete list of items to consider when

writing a policy statement is given in section 2.3.
3.8.1.2 Account/Workstation Management Procedures
Each user should be told how to properly manage their

account and workstation. This includes explaining how to

protect files stored on the system, how to log out or lock the

terminal or workstation, and so on. Much of this information

is typically covered in the "beginning user" documentation
provided by the operating system vendor, although many
sites elect to supplement this material with local information.

If your site offers dial-up modem access to the computer

systems, special care must be taken to inform users of the
security problems inherent in providing this access. Issues

such as making sure to log out before hanging up the modem
should be covered when the user is initially given dial-up

access.
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Likewise, access to the systems via local and wide-area

networks presents its own set of security problems which
users should be made aware of. Files which grant "trusted

host" or "trusted user" status to remote systems and users
should be carefully explained.
3.8.1.3 Determining Account Misuse

Users should be told how to detect unauthorized access to
their account. If the system prints the last login time when a

user logs in, he or she should be told to check that time and
note whether or not it agrees with the last time he or she
actually logged in.
Command interpreters on some systems (e.g., the UNIX C

shell) maintain histories of the last several commands
executed. Users should check these histories to be sure

someone has not executed other commands with their
account.
3.8.1.4 Problem Reporting Procedures

A procedure should be developed to enable users to report

suspected misuse of their accounts or other misuse they may

have noticed. This can be done either by providing the name
and telephone number of a system administrator who
manages security of the computer system, or by creating an

electronic mail address (e.g., "security") to which users can
address their problems.

3.8.2 Educating the Host Administrators
In many organizations, computer systems are administered by

a wide variety of people. These administrators must know
how to protect their own systems from attack and

unauthorized use, as well as how to communicate successful
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penetration of their systems to other administrators as a
warning.

3.8.2.1 Account Management Procedures

Care must be taken when installing accounts on the system in
order to make them secure. When installing a system from
distribution media, the password file should be examined for

"standard" accounts provided by the vendor. Many vendors
provide accounts for use by system services or field service

personnel. These accounts typically have either no password
or one which is common knowledge. These accounts should

be given new passwords if they are needed, or disabled or
deleted from the system if they are not.

Accounts without passwords are generally very dangerous

since they allow anyone to access the system. Even accounts

which do not execute a command interpreter (e.g., accounts
which exist only to see who is logged in to the system) can
be compromised if set up incorrectly. A related concept, that
of "anonymous" file transfer (FTP) [20], allows users from all

over the network to access your system to retrieve files from
(usually) a protected disk area. You should carefully weigh
the benefits that an account without a password provides

against the security risks of providing such access to your

system.
If the operating system provides a "shadow" password facility
which stores passwords in a separate file accessible only to

privileged users, this facility should be used. System V UNIX,
SunOS 4.0 and above, and versions of Berkeley UNIX after
4.3BSD Tahoe, as well as others, provide this feature. It

protects passwords by hiding their encrypted values from

unprivileged users. This prevents an attacker from copying
your password file to his or her machine and then attempting

to break the passwords at his or her leisure.
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Keep track of who has access to privileged user accounts

(e.g., "root" on UNIX or "MAINT" on VMS). Whenever a
privileged user leaves the organization or no longer has need

of the privileged account, the passwords on all privileged

accounts should be changed.

3.8.2.2 Configuration Management Procedures

When installing a system from the distribution media or

when installing third-party software, it is important to check
the installation carefully. Many installation procedures

assume a "trusted" site, and hence will install files with world
write permission enabled, or otherwise compromise the
security of files.

Network services should also be examined carefully when
first installed. Many vendors provide default network

permission files which imply that all outside hosts are to be
"trusted", which is rarely the case when connected to wide-

area networks such as the Internet.
Many intruders collect information on the vulnerabilities of
particular system versions. The older a system, the more

likely it is that there are security problems in that version
which have since been fixed by the vendor in a later release.
For this reason, it is important to weigh the risks of not
upgrading to a new operating system release (thus leaving

security holes unplugged) against the cost of upgrading to the

new software (possibly breaking third-party software, etc.).

Bug fixes from the vendor should be weighed in a similar
fashion, with the added note that "security" fixes from a
vendor usually address fairly serious security problems.

Other bug fixes, received via network mailing lists and the
like, should usually be installed, but not without careful
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examination. Never install a bug fix unless you're sure you

know what the consequences of the fix are - there's always
the possibility that an intruder has suggested a "fix" which

actually gives him or her access to your system.
3.8.2.3 Recovery Procedures - Backups

It is impossible to overemphasize the need for a good backup
strategy. File system backups not only protect you in the

event of hardware failure or accidental deletions, but they

also protect you against unauthorized changes made by an
intruder. Without a copy of your data the way it's "supposed"

to be, it can be difficult to undo something an attacker has

done.
Backups, especially if run daily, can also be useful in
providing a history of an intruder's activities. Looking through

old backups can establish when your system was first

penetrated. Intruders may leave files around which, although
deleted later, are captured on the backup tapes. Backups can
also be used to document an intruder's activities to law
enforcement agencies if necessary.

A good backup strategy will dump the entire system to tape

at least once a month. Partial (or "incremental") dumps
should be done at least twice a week, and ideally they
should be done daily. Commands specifically designed for

performing file system backups (e.g., UNIX "dump" or VMS

"BACKUP") should be used in preference to other file
copying commands, since these tools are designed with the
express intent of restoring a system to a known state.

3.8.2.4 Problem Reporting Procedures

As with users, system administrators should have a defined
procedure for reporting security problems. In large

installations, this is often done by creating an electronic mail
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alias which contains the names of all system administrators in

the organization. Other methods include setting up some sort
of response team similar to the CERT, or establishing a
"hotline" serviced by an existing support group.

3.9 Resources to Prevent Security Breaches
This section discusses software, hardware, and procedural
resources that can be used to support your site security
policy.

3.9.1 Network Connections and Firewalls
A "firewall" is put in place in a building to provide a point of
resistance to the entry of flames into another area. Similarly, a

secretary's desk and reception area provides a point of

controlling access to other office spaces. This same technique
can be applied to a computer site, particularly as it pertains

to network connections.

Some sites will be connected only to other sites within the
same organization and will not have the ability to connect to

other networks. Sites such as these are less susceptible to
threats from outside their own organization, although

intrusions may still occur via paths such as dial-up modems.

On the other hand, many other organizations will be

connected to other sites via much larger networks, such as
the Internet. These sites are susceptible to the entire range of
threats associated with a networked environment.

The risks of connecting to outside networks must be weighed
against the benefits. It may be desirable to limit connection to
outside networks to those hosts which do not store sensitive

material, keeping "vital" machines (such as those which
maintain company payroll or inventory systems) isolated. If
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there is a need to participate in a Wide Area Network (WAN),
consider restricting all access to your local network through a

single system. That is, all access to or from your own local

network must be made through a single host computer that
acts as a firewall between you and the outside world. This
firewall system should be rigorously controlled and password

protected, and external users accessing it should also be

constrained by restricting the functionality available to

remote users. By using this approach, your site could relax
some of the internal security controls on your local net, but
still be afforded the protection of a rigorously controlled host
front end.
Note that even with a firewall system, compromise of the

firewall could result in compromise of the network behind

the firewall. Work has been done in some areas to construct

a firewall which even when compromised, still protects the
local network [6, CHESWICK].
3.9.2 Confidentiality
Confidentiality, the act of keeping things hidden or secret, is
one of the primary goals of computer security practitioners.

Several mechanisms are provided by most modern operating
systems to enable users to control the dissemination of
information. Depending upon where you work, you may
have a site where everything is protected, or a site where all

information is usually regarded as public, or something in
between. Most sites lean toward the in-between, at least until

some penetration has occurred.

Generally, there are three instances in which information is
vulnerable to disclosure: when the information is stored on a

computer system, when the information is in transit to
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another system (on the network), and when the information is

stored on backup tapes.

The first of these cases is controlled by file permissions,
access control lists, and other similar mechanisms. The last

can be controlled by restricting access to the backup tapes

(by locking them in a safe, for example). All three cases can
be helped by using encryption mechanisms.
3.9.2.1 Encryption (hardware and software)

Encryption is the process of taking information that exists in

some readable form and converting it into a non-readable

form. There are several types of commercially available
encryption packages in both hardware and software forms.
Hardware encryption engines have the advantage that they
are much faster than the software equivalent, yet because
they are faster, they are of greater potential benefit to an

attacker who wants to execute a brute-force attack on your
encrypted information.

The advantage of using encryption is that, even if other
access control mechanisms (passwords, file permissions, etc.)
are compromised by an intruder, the data is still unusable.

Naturally, encryption keys and the like should be protected at
least as well as account passwords.

Information in transit (over a network) may be vulnerable to

interception as well. Several solutions to this exist, ranging
from simply encrypting files before transferring them (end-to-

end encryption) to special network hardware which encrypts
everything it sends without user intervention (secure links).

The Internet as a whole does not use secure links, thus endto-end encryption must be used if encryption is desired

across the Internet.
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3.9.2.1.1 Data Encryption Standard (DES)

DES is perhaps the most widely used data encryption
mechanism today. Many hardware and software

implementations exist, and some commercial computers are
provided with a software version. DES transforms plain text

information into encrypted data (or ciphertext) by means of a
special algorithm and "seed" value called a key. So long as

the key is retained (or remembered) by the original user, the

ciphertext can be restored to the original plain text.
One of the pitfalls of all encryption systems is the need to

remember the key under which a thing was encrypted (this is
not unlike the password problem discussed elsewhere in this

document). If the key is written down, it becomes less secure.
If forgotten, there is little (if any) hope of recovering the

original data.
Most UNIX systems provide a DES command that enables a
user to encrypt data using the DES algorithm.
3.9.2.1.2 Crypt
Similar to the DES command, the UNIX "crypt" command

allows a user to encrypt data. Unfortunately, the algorithm

used by "crypt" is very insecure (based on the World War II
"Enigma" device), and files encrypted with this command can
be decrypted easily in a matter of a few hours. Generally, use

of the "crypt" command should be avoided for any but the

most trivial encryption tasks.
3.9.2.2 Privacy Enhanced Mail
Electronic mail normally transits the network in the clear (i.e.,

anyone can read it). This is obviously not the optimal
solution. Privacy enhanced mail provides a means to

automatically encrypt electronic mail messages so that a
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person eavesdropping at a mail distribution node is not
(easily) capable of reading them. Several privacy enhanced

mail packages are currently being developed and deployed

on the Internet.

The Internet Activities Board Privacy Task Force has defined a
draft standard, elective protocol for use in implementing
privacy enhanced mail. This protocol is defined in RFCs
1113, 1114, and 1115 [7,8,9]. Please refer to the current

edition of the "IAB Official Protocol Standards" (currently,

RFC 1200 [21]) for the standardization state and status of
these protocols.
3.9.3 Origin Authentication

We mostly take it on faith that the header of an electronic
mail message truly indicates the originator of a message.

However, it iseasy to "spoof", or forge the source of a mail
message. Origin authentication provides a means to be

certain of the originator of a message or other object in the
same way that a Notary Public assures a signature on a legal

document. This is done by means of a "Public Key"
cryptosystem.

A public key cryptosystem differs from a private key

cryptosystem in several ways. First, a public key system uses
two keys, a Public Key that anyone can use (hence the name)

and a Private Key that only the originator of a message uses.

The originator uses the private key to encrypt the message (as
in DES). The receiver, who has obtained the public key for

the originator, may then decrypt the message.
In this scheme, the public key is used to authenticate the

originator's use of his or her private key, and hence the
identity of the originator is more rigorously proven. The most
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widely known implementation of a public key cryptosystem

is the RSA system [26]. The Internet standard for privacy

enhanced mail makes use of the RSA system.
3.9.4 Information Integrity

Information integrity refers to the state of information such
that it is complete, correct, and unchanged from the last time
in which it was verified to be in an "integral" state. The value

of information integrity to a site will vary. For example, it is

more important for military and government installations to
prevent the "disclosure" of classified information, whether it
is right or wrong. A bank, on the other hand, is far more

concerned with whether the account information maintained

for its customers is complete and accurate.

Numerous computer system mechanisms, as well as
procedural controls, have an influence on the integrity of

system information. Traditional access control mechanisms
maintain controls over who can access system information.

These mechanisms alone are not sufficient in some cases to
provide the degree of integrity required. Some other
mechanisms are briefly discussed below.
It should be noted that there are other aspects to maintaining

system integrity besides these mechanisms, such as twoperson controls, and integrity validation procedures. These
are beyond the scope of this document.

3.9.4.1 Checksums
Easily the simplest mechanism, a simple checksum routine

can compute a value for a system file and compare it with
the last known value. If the two are equal, the file is probably
unchanged. If not, the file has been changed by some

unknown means.
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Though it is the easiest to implement, the checksum scheme

suffers from a serious failing in that it is not very sophisticated
and a determined attacker could easily add enough
characters to the file to eventually obtain the correct value.

A specific type of checksum, called a CRC checksum, is
considerably more robust than a simple checksum. It is only

slightly more difficult to implement and provides a better

degree of catching errors. It too, however, suffers from the
possibility of compromise by an attacker.

Checksums may be used to detect the altering of information.
However, they do not actively guard against changes being

made. For this, other mechanisms such as access controls
and encryption should be used.

3.9.4.2 Cryptographic Checksums

Cryptographic checksums (also called cryptosealing) involve
breaking a file up into smaller chunks, calculating a (CRC)
checksum for each chunk, and adding the CRCs together.

Depending upon the exact algorithm used, this can result in a
nearly unbreakable method of determining whether a file has

been changed. This mechanism suffers from the fact that it is
sometimes computationally intensive and may be prohibitive

except in cases where the utmost integrity protection is

desired.
Another related mechanism, called a one-way hash function
(or a Manipulation Detection Code (MDC)) can also be used

to uniquely identify a file. The idea behind these functions is
that no two inputs can produce the same output, thus a

modified file will not have the same hash value. One-way

hash functions can be implemented efficiently on a wide

variety of systems, making unbreakable integrity checks
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possible. (Snefru, a one-way hash function available via

USENET as well as the Internet is just one example of an

efficient one-way hash function.) [10]
3.9.5 Limiting Network Access

The dominant network protocols in use on the Internet, IP
(RFC 791) [11], TCP (RFC 793) [12], and UDP (RFC 768)
[13], carry certain control information which can be used to

restrict access to certain hosts or networks within an
organization.

The IP packet header contains the network addresses of both
the sender and recipient of the packet. Further, the TCP and

UDP protocols provide the notion of a "port", which
identifies the endpoint (usually a network server) of a

communications path. In some instances, it may be desirable

to deny access to a specific TCP or UDP port, or even to

certain hosts and networks altogether.
3.9.5.1 Gateway Routing Tables
One of the simplest approaches to preventing unwanted

network connections is to simply remove certain networks
from a gateway's routing tables. This makes it "impossible"

for a host to send packets to these networks. (Most protocols
require bidirectional packet flow even for unidirectional data

flow, thus breaking one side of the route is usually sufficient.)
This approach is commonly taken in "firewall" systems by
preventing the firewall from advertising local routes to the

outside world. The approach is deficient in that it often
prevents "too much" (e.g., in order to prevent access to one

system on the network, access to all systems on the network
is disabled).
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3.9.5.2 Router Packet Filtering
Many commercially available gateway systems (more
correctly called routers) provide the ability to filter packets

based not only on sources or destinations, but also on

source-destination combinations. This mechanism can be

used to deny access to a specific host, network, or subnet
from any other host, network, or subnet.

Gateway systems from some vendors (e.g., cisco Systems)

support an even more complex scheme, allowing finer
control over source and destination addresses. Via the use of
address masks, one can deny access to all but one host on a

particular network. The cisco Systems also allow packet
screening based on IP protocol type and TCP or UDP port
numbers [14].

This can also be circumvented by "source routing" packets
destined for the "secret" network. Source routed packets may

be filtered out by gateways, but this may restrict other
legitimate activities, such as diagnosing routing problems.
3.9.6 Authentication Systems

Authentication refers to the process of proving a claimed
identity to the satisfaction of some permission-granting

authority. Authentication systems are hardware, software, or
procedural mechanisms that enable a user to obtain access to
computing resources. At the simplest level, the system

administrator who adds new user accounts to the system is

part of the system authentication mechanism. At the other
end of the spectrum, fingerprint readers or retinal scanners
provide a very high-tech solution to establishing a potential

user's identity. Without establishing and proving a user's
identity prior to establishing a session, your site's computers
are vulnerable to any sort of attack.
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Typically, a user authenticates himself or herself to the system
by entering a password in response to a prompt.

Challenge/Response mechanisms improve upon passwords
by prompting the user for some piece of information shared
by both the computer and the user (such as mother's maiden

name, etc.).
3.9.6.1 Kerberos
Kerberos, named after the dog who in mythology is said to

stand at the gates of Hades, is a collection of software used in

a large network to establish a user's claimed identity.

Developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), it uses a combination of encryption and distributed
databases so that a user at a campus facility can login and

start a session from any computer located on the campus.

This has clear advantages in certain environments where
there are a large number of potential users who may establish

a connection from any one of a large number of
workstations. Some vendors are now incorporating Kerberos

into their systems.

It should be noted that while Kerberos makes several
advances in the area of authentication, some security

weaknesses in the protocol still remain [15].
3.9.6.2 Smart Cards
Several systems use "smart cards" (a small calculator-like

device) to help authenticate users. These systems depend on
the user having an object in their possession. One such

system involves a new password procedure that require a
user to enter a value obtained from a "smart card" when
asked for a password by the computer. Typically, the host

machine will give the user some piece of information that is

entered into the keyboard of the smart card. The smart card
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will display a response which must then be entered into the
computer before the session will be established. Another
such system involves a smart card which displays a number

which changes over time, but which is synchronized with the

authentication software on the computer.
This is a better way of dealing with authentication than with
the traditional password approach. On the other hand, some

say it's inconvenient to carry the smart card. Start-up costs
are likely to be high as well.
3.9.7 Books, Lists, and Informational Sources

There are many good sources for information regarding
computer security. The annotated bibliography at the end of
this document can provide you with a good start. In addition,
information can be obtained from a variety of other sources,

some of which are described in this section.
3.9.7.1 Security Mailing Lists

The UNIX Security mailing list exists to notify system
administrators of security problems before they become
common knowledge, and to provide security enhancement
information. It is a restricted-access list, open only to people

who can be verified as being principal systems people at a
site. Requests to join the list must be sent by either the site

contact listed in the Defense Data Network's Network
Information Center's (DDN NIC) WHOIS database, or from
the "root" account on one of the major site machines. You

must include the destination address you want on the list, an
indication of whether you want to be on the mail reflector list

or receive weekly digests, the electronic mail address and

voice telephone number of the site contact if it isn't you, and
the name, address, and telephone number of your
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organization. This information should be sent to SECURITYREQUEST@CPD.COM.

The RISKS digest is a component of the ACM Committee on
Computers and Public Policy, moderated by Peter G.
Neumann. It is a discussion forum on risks to the public in

computers and related systems, and along with discussing
computer security and privacy issues, has discussed such
subjects as the Stark incident, the shooting down of the

Iranian airliner in the Persian Gulf (as it relates to the
computerized weapons systems), problems in air and railroad
traffic control systems, software engineering, and so on. To
join the mailing list, send a message to RISKS-

REQUEST@CSL.SRI.COM. This list is also available in the
USENET newsgroup "comp.risks".

The VIRUS-L list is a forum for the discussion of computer
virus experiences, protection software, and related topics.
The list is open to the public, and is implemented as a

moderated digest. Most of the information is related to
personal computers, although some of it may be applicable

to larger systems. To subscribe, send the line:

SUB VIRUS-L your full name
to the address LISTSERV%LEHIIBM1 .BITNET@MITVMA.
MIT.EDU. This list is also available via the USENET

newsgroup "comp.virus".

The Computer Underground Digest "is an open forum
dedicated to sharing information among computerists and to

the presentation and debate of diverse views." While not

directly a security list, it does contain discussions about
privacy and other security related topics. The list can be read
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on USENET as alt.society.cu-digest, or to join the mailing list,

send mail to Gordon Myer (TK0JUT2%NIU.bitnet@mitvma.
mit.edu). Submissions may be mailed to: cud@chinacat.

unicom.com.
3.9.7.2 Networking Mailing Lists

The TCP-IP mailing list is intended to act as a discussion
forum for developers and maintainers of implementations of
the TCP/IP protocol suite. It also discusses network-related

security problems when they involve programs providing
network services, such as "Sendmail". To join the TCP-IP list,

send a message to TCP-IP-REQUEST@NISC.SRI.COM. This
list is also available in the USENET newsgroup
"comp.protocols.tcp-ip".

SUN-NETS is a discussion list for items pertaining to
networking on Sun systems. Much of the discussion is related

to NFS, NIS (formally Yellow Pages), and name servers. To
subscribe, send a message to SUN-NETS-

REQUEST@UMIACS.UMD.EDU.

The USENET groups misc.security and alt.security also
discuss security issues, misc.security is a moderated group
and also includes discussions of physical security and locks.
alt.security is unmoderated.
3.9.7.3 Response Teams

Several organizations have formed special groups of people

to deal with computer security problems. These teams collect
information about possible security holes and disseminate it

to the proper people, track intruders, and assist in recovery
from security violations. The teams typically have both

electronic mail distribution lists as well as a special

telephone number which can be called for information or to
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report a problem. Many of these teams are members of the
CERT System, which is coordinated by the National Institute

of Standards and Technology (NIST), and exists to facilitate
the exchange of information between the various teams.

3.9.7.3.1 DARPA Computer Emergency Response Team

The Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination
Center (CERT/CC) was established in December 1988 by the

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to
address computer security concerns of research users of the

Internet. It is operated by the Software Engineering Institute

(SEI) at Carnegie-Mellon University (CMU). The CERT can
immediately confer with experts to diagnose and solve

security problems, and also establish and maintain

communications with the affected computer users and
government authorities as appropriate.

The CERT/CC serves as a clearing house for the identification
and repair of security vulnerabilities, informal assessments of

existing systems, improvement of emergency response
capability, and both vendor and user security awareness. In
addition, the team works with vendors of various systems in

order to coordinate the fixes for security problems.
The CERT/CC sends out security advisories to the CERT

ADVISORY mailing list whenever appropriate. They also

operate a 24-hour hotline that can be called to report security

problems (e.g., someone breaking into your system), as well
as to obtain current (and accurate) information about
rumored security problems.
To join the CERT-ADVISORY mailing list, send a message to

CERT@CERT.SEI.CMU.EDU and ask to be added to the

mailing list. The material sent to this list also appears in the
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USENET newsgroup "comp.security.announce". Past
advisories are available for anonymous FTP from the host

CERT.SEI.CMU.EDU. The 24-hour hotline number is (412)
268- 7090.

The CERT/CC also maintains a CERT-TOOLS list to encourage
the exchange of information on tools and techniques that
increase the secure operation of Internet systems. The

CERT/CC does not review or endorse the tools described on

the list. To subscribe, send a message to CERT-TOOLSREQUEST@CERT.SEI.CMU.EDU and ask to be added to the

mailing list.
The CERT/CC maintains other generally useful security

information for anonymous FTP from CERT.SEI.CMU.EDU.
Get the README file for a list of what is available.
For more information, contact:

CERT Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon
University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890

(412) 268-7090 cert@cert.sei.cmu.edu.
3.9.7.3.2 DDN Security Coordination Center

For DDN users, the Security Coordination Center (SCC)
serves a function similar to CERT. The SCC is the DDN's

clearing- house for host/user security problems and fixes, and
works with the DDN Network Security Officer. The SCC also

distributes the DDN Security Bulletin, which communicates

information on network and host security exposures, fixes,
and concerns to security and management personnel at DDN

facilities. It is available online, via kermit or anonymous FTP,
from the host NIC.DDN.MIL, in SCC:DDN-SECURITY-yy-

nn.TXT (where "yy" is the year and "nn" is the bulletin
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number). The SCC provides immediate assistance with DDNrelated host security problems; call (800) 235-3155 (6:00
a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Pacific Time) or send email to

SCC@NIC.DDN.MIL. For 24 hour coverage, call the MILNET

Trouble Desk (800) 451-7413 or AUTOVON 231-1713.
3.9.7.3.3 NIST Computer Security Resource and Response Center

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
has responsibility within the U.S. Federal Government for

computer science and technology activities. NIST has played

a strong role in organizing the CERT System and is now
serving as the CERT System Secretariat. NIST also operates a

Computer Security Resource and Response Center (CSRC) to
provide help and information regarding computer security

events and incidents, as well as to raise awareness about
computer security vulnerabilities.

The CSRC team operates a 24-hour hotline, at (301) 9755200. For individuals with access to the Internet, on-line

publications and computer security information can be
obtained via anonymous FTP from the host

CSRC.NCSL.NIST.GOV (129.6.48.87). NIST also operates a
personal computer bulletin board that contains information

regarding computer viruses as well as other aspects of

computer security. To access this board, set your modem to

300/1200/2400 BPS, 1 stop bit, no parity, and 8-bit
characters, and call (301) 948-5717. All users are given full

access to the board immediately upon registering.

NIST has produced several special publications related to
computer security and computer viruses in particular; some

of these publications are downloadable. For further
information, contact NIST at the following address:
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Computer Security Resource and Response Center A-216
Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Telephone: (301)

975-3359 Electronic Mail: CSRC@nist.gov
3.9.73.4 DOE Computer Incident Advisory Capability (ClAC)

CIAC is the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Computer

Incident Advisory Capability. CIAC is a four-person team of

computer scientists from Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory (LLNL) charged with the primary responsibility of
assisting DOE sites faced with computer security incidents

(e.g., intruder attacks, virus infections, worm attacks, etc.).

This capability is available to DOE sites on a 24-hour-a-day
basis.
CIAC was formed to provide a centralized response

capability (including technical assistance), to keep sites
informed of current events, to deal proactively with computer

security issues, and to maintain liaisons with other response

teams and agencies. CIAC's charter is to assist sites (through
direct technical assistance, providing information, or referring

inquiries to other technical experts), serve as a clearinghouse
for information about threats/known incidents/vulnerabilities,

develop guidelines for incident handling, develop software
for responding to events/incidents, analyze events and trends,
conduct training and awareness activities, and alert and
advise sites about vulnerabilities and potential attacks.
CIAC's business hours phone number is (415) 422-8193 or

FTS 532-8193. CIAC's e-mail address is CIAC@TIGER.LLNL.
GOV.
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3.9.7.3.5 NASA Ames Computer Network Security Response

Team
The Computer Network Security Response Team (CNSRT) is

NASA Ames Research Center's local version of the DARPA
CERT. Formed in August of 1989, the team has a constituency
that is primarily Ames users, but it is also involved in assisting

other NASA Centers and federal agencies. CNSRT maintains
liaisons with the DOE's ClAC team and the DARPA CERT. It is

also a charter member of the CERT System. The team may be
reached by 24 hour pager at (415) 694-0571, or by electronic

mail to CNSRT@AMES.ARC.NASA.GOV.
3.9.7.4 DDN Management Bulletins

The DDN Management Bulletin is distributed electronically
by the DDN NIC under contract to the Defense

Communications Agency (DCA). It is a means of
communicating official policy, procedures, and other

information of concern to management personnel at DDN
facilities.

The DDN Security Bulletin is distributed electronically by the
DDN SCC, also under contract to DCA, as a means of

communicating information on network and host security
exposures, fixes, and concerns to security and management
personnel at DDN facilities.
Anyone may join the mailing lists for these two bulletins by

sending a message to NIC@NIC.DDN.MIL and asking to be
placed on the mailing lists. These messages are also posted to
the USENET newsgroup "ddn.mgt-bulletin". For additional
information, see section 8.7.
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3.9.7.5 System Administration List

The SYSADM-LIST is a list pertaining exclusively to UNIX
system administration. Mail requests to be added to the list to

SYSADM-LIST-REQUEST@SYSADMIN.COM.
3.9.7.6 Vendor Specific System Lists

The SUN-SPOTS and SUN-MANAGERS lists are discussion
groups for users and administrators of systems supplied by

Sun Microsystems. SUN-SPOTS is a fairly general list,
discussing everything from hardware configurations to simple

UNIX questions. To subscribe, send a message to SUNSPOTS- REQUEST@RICE.EDU. This list is also available in
the USENET newsgroup "comp.sys.sun". SUN-MANAGERS is

a discussion list for Sun system administrators and covers all

aspects of Sun system administration. To subscribe, send a
message to SUN- MANAGERS-REQUEST@EECS.NWU.EDU.

The APOLLO list discusses the HP/Apollo system and its
software. To subscribe, send a message to APOLLOREQUEST@UMIX.CC.UMICH.EDU. APOLLO-L is a similar

list which can be subscribed to by sending

SUB APOLLO-L your full name
to LISTSERV%UMRVMB.BITNET@VM1 .NODAK.EDU.
HPMINI-L pertains to the Hewlett-Packard 9000 series and

HP/UX operating system. To subscribe, send
SUB HPMINI-L your full name
to LISTSERV%UAFSYSB.BITNET@VM1 .NODAK.EDU.
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INFO-IBMPC discusses IBM PCs and compatibles, as well as
MS- DOS. To subscribe, send a note to INFO-IBMPCREQUEST@WSMR- SIMTEL20.ARMY.MIL.

There are numerous other mailing lists for nearly every

popular computer or workstation in use today. For a
complete list, obtain the file "netinfo/interest-groups" via

anonymous FTP from the host FTP.NISC.SRI.COM.
3.9.7.7 Professional Societies and Journals

The IEEE Technical Committee on Security & Privacy
publishes a quarterly magazine, "CIPHER".

IEEE Computer Society, 1730 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.

Washington, DC 2036-1903

The ACM SigSAC (Special Interest Group on Security, Audit,
and Controls) publishes a quarterly magazine, "SIGSAC
Review".

Association for Computing Machinery 11 West 42nd St. New
York, N.Y. 10036

The Information Systems Security Association publishes a
quarterly magazine called "ISSA Access".
Information Systems Security Association P.O. Box 9457

Newport Beach, CA 92658
"Computers and Security" is an "international journal for the
professional involved with computer security, audit and
control, and data integrity."

$266/year, 8 issues (1990)
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Elsevier Advanced Technology Journal Information Center
655 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10010

The "Data Security Letter" is published "to help data security
professionals by providing inside information and

knowledgeable analysis of developments in computer and
communications security."

$690/year, 9 issues (1990)
Data Security Letter P.O. Box 1593 Palo Alto, CA 94302
3.9.8 Problem Reporting Tools

3.9.8.1 Auditing
Auditing is an important tool that can be used to enhance the

security of your installation. Not only does it give you a
means of identifying who has accessed your system (and may

have done something to it) but it also gives you an indication

of how your system is being used (or abused) by authorized
users and attackers alike. In addition, the audit trail
traditionally kept by computer systems can become an
invaluable piece of evidence should your system be

penetrated.
3.9.8.1.1 Verify Security

An audit trail shows how the system is being used from day

to day. Depending upon how your site audit log is
configured, your log files should show a range of access
attempts that can show what normal system usage should

look like. Deviation from that normal usage could be the
result of penetration from an outside source using an old or
stale user account. Observing a deviation in logins, for

example, could be your first indication that something
unusual is happening.
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3.9.8.1.2 Verify Software Configurations
One of the ruses used by attackers to gain access to a system
is by the insertion of a so-called Trojan Horse program. A

Trojan Horse program can be a program that does something

useful, or merely something interesting. It always does

something unexpected, like steal passwords or copy files
without your knowledge [25]. Imagine a Trojan login

program that prompts for username and password in the

usual way, but also writes that information to a special file
that the attacker can come back and read at will. Imagine a

Trojan Editor program that, despite the file permissions you
have given your files, makes copies of everything in your

directory space without you knowing about it.

This points out the need for configuration management of the
software that runs on a system, not as it is being developed,

but as it is in actual operation. Techniques for doing this
range from checking each command every time it is executed

against some criterion (such as a cryptoseal, described above)
or merely checking the date and time stamp of the
executable. Another technique might be to check each

command in batch mode at midnight.

3.9.8.2 Tools
COPS is a security tool for system administrators that checks

for numerous common security problems on UNIX systems
[27]. COPS is a collection of shell scripts and C programs
that can easily be run on almost any UNIX variant. Among

other things, it checks the following items and sends the
results to the system administrator:
Checks "/dev/kmem" and other devices for world
read/writability.

Checks special or important files and directories for
"bad" modes (world writable, etc.).
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Checks for easily-guessed passwords.
Checks for duplicate user ids, invalid fields in the
password file, etc..
Checks for duplicate group ids, invalid fields in the
group file, etc..
Checks all users' home directories and their ".cshrc",
".login", ".profile", and ".rhosts" files for security
problems.
Checks all commands in the "/etc/rc" files and
"cron" files for world writability.

Checks for bad "root" paths, NFS file systems
exported to the world, etc..
Includes an expert system that checks to see if a
given user (usually "root") can be compromised,
given that certain rules are true.

Checks for changes in the setuid status of programs
on the system.

The COPS package is available from the "comp.sources.unix"
archive on "ftp.uu.net", and also from the UNIX-SW

repository on the MILNET host "wsmr-simtel20.army.mil".

3.9.9 Communication Among Administrators
3.9.9.1 Secure Operating Systems

The following list of products and vendors is adapted from
the National Computer Security Center's (NCSC) Evaluated
Products List. They represent those companies who have

either received an evaluation from the NCSC or are in the
process of a product evaluation. This list is not complete, but

it is representative of those operating systems and add on
components available in the commercial marketplace.
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For a more detailed listing of the current products appearing

in the NCSC EPL, contact the NCSC at:

National Computer Security Center
9800 Savage Road

Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
(301) 859-4458
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Evaluated Product

Vendor

Version
Evaluated

Evaluation
Class

Secure Communications
Processor (SCOMP)

Honeywell Information
Systems, Inc.

2.1

A1

Multics

Honeywell Information
Systems, Inc.

MR11.0

B2

System V/MLS 1.1.2 on UNIX
System V 3.1.1 on AT&T
3B2/500 and 3B2/600

AT&T

1.1.2

B1

OS 1100

Unisys Corp.

Security
Release 1

B1

MPE V/E

Hewlett-Packard Computer G.03.04
Systems Division

C2

AOS/VS on MV/ECLIPSE series

Data General Corp.

7.60

C2

VM/SP or VM/SP HPO with CMS,
RACF, DIRMAINT, VMTAPE-MS,
ISPF

IBM Corp.

5

C2

MVS/XA with RACF

IBM Corp.

2.2,2.3

C2

AX/VMS

Digital Equipment Corp.

4.3

C2

NOS

Control Data Corp.

NOS Security
Eval Product

C2

TOP SECRET

CGA Software Products
Group, Inc.

3.0/163

C2

Access Control Facility 2

SKK, Inc.

3.1.3

C2

UTX/32S

Gould, Inc. Computer
Systems Division

1.0

C2

A Series MCP/AS with InfoGuard
Security Enhancements

Unisys Corp.

3.7

C2

Primos

Prime Computer, Inc.

21.0.1DODC2A

C2

Resource Access Control
Facility (RACF)

IBM Corp.

1.5

C1
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Candidate Product

Vendor

Boeing MLS LAN

Boeing Aerospace

A1 M1

Trusted XENIX

Trusted Information
Systems, Inc.

B2

VSLAN

VERDIX Corp.

B2

System V/MLS

AT&T

B1

VM/SP with RACF

IBM Corp.

5/1.8.2

C2

Wang SVS/OS with CAP

Wang Laboratories, Inc.

1.0

C2

Version
Evaluated

Candidate
Class

3.9.9.2 Obtaining Fixes for Known Problems
It goes without saying that computer systems have bugs. Even

operating systems, upon which we depend for protection of
our data, have bugs. And since there are bugs, things can be
broken, both maliciously and accidentally. It is important that

whenever bugs are discovered, a should fix be identified and

implemented as soon as possible. This should minimize any
exposure caused by the bug in the first place.
A corollary to the bug problem is: from whom do I obtain the

fixes? Most systems have some support from the manufacturer
or supplier. Fixes coming from that source tend to be

implemented quickly after receipt. Fixes for some problems
are often posted on the network and are left to the system

administrators to incorporate as they can. The problem is that

one wants to have faith that the fix will close the hole and
not introduce any others. We will tend to trust that the

manufacturer's fixes are better than those that are posted on
the net.
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3.9.9.3 Sun Customer Warning System

Sun Microsystems has established a Customer Warning
System (CWS) for handling security incidents. This is a formal
process which includes:
Having a well advertised point of contact in Sun for
reporting security problems.
Pro-actively alerting customers of worms, viruses, or

other security holes that could affect their systems.
Distributing the patch (or work-around) as quickly as
possible.

They have created an electronic mail address, SECURITYALERT@SUN.COM, which will enable customers to report

security problems. A voice-mail backup is available at (415)
688-9081. A "Security Contact" can be designated by each

customer site; this person will be contacted by Sun in case of

any new security problems. For more information, contact
your Sun representative.
3.9.9.4 Trusted Archive Servers

Several sites on the Internet maintain large repositories of
public-domain and freely distributable software, and make

this material available for anonymous FTP. This section
describes some of the larger repositories. Note that none of

these servers implements secure checksums or anything else

guaranteeing the integrity of their data. Thus, the notion of
"trust" should be taken as a somewhat limited definition.

3.9.9.4.1 Sun Fixes on UUNET
Sun Microsystems has contracted with UUNET
Communications Services, Inc., to make fixes for bugs in Sun
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software available via anonymous FTP. You can access these
fixes by using the "ftp" command to connect to the host

FTP.UU.NET. Then change into the directory "sun-

dist/security", and obtain a directory listing. The file
"README" contains a brief description of what each file in

this directory contains, and what is required to install the fix.
3.9.9.4.2 Berkeley Fixes

The University of California at Berkeley also makes fixes
available via anonymous FTP; these fixes pertain primarily to
the current release of BSD UNIX (currently, release 4.3).
However, even if you are not running their software, these

fixes are still important, since many vendors (Sun, DEC,
Sequent, etc.) base their software on the Berkeley releases.

The Berkeley fixes are available for anonymous FTP from the
host UCBARPA.BERKELEY.EDU in the directory "4.3/ucbfixes". The file "INDEX" in this directory describes what each

file contains. They are also available from UUNET (see
section 3.9.9.4.3).

Berkeley also distributes new versions of "sendmail" and

"named" from this machine. New versions of these
commands are stored in the "4.3" directory, usually in the
files "sendmail.tar.Z" and "bind.tar.Z", respectively.

3.9.9.4.3 Simtel-20 and UUNET

The two largest general-purpose software repositories on the
Internet are the hosts WSMR-SIMTEL20.ARMY.MIL and
FTP.UU.NET.
WSMR-SIMTEL20.ARMY.MIL is a TOPS-20 machine operated

by the U.S. Army at White Sands Missile Range (WSMR),
New Mexico. The directory "pd2:<unix-c>" contains a large
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amount of UNIX software, primarily taken from the
"comp.sources" newsgroups. The directories "pd1 :<msdos>"
and "pd2:<msdos2>" contains software for IBM PC systems,
and "pd3:<macintosh>" contains software for the Apple
Macintosh.

FTP.UU.NET is operated by UUNET Communications

Services, Inc. in Falls Church, Virginia. This company sells
Internet and USENET access to sites all over the country (and
internationally). The software posted to the following
USENET source newsgroups is stored here, in directories of

the same name:

comp.sources.games

comp.sources.misc

comp.sources.sun

comp.sources.unix

comp.sources.x
Numerous other distributions, such as all the freely

distributable Berkeley UNIX source code, Internet Request for
Comments (RFCs), and so on are also stored on this system.
3.9.9.4.4 Vendors
Many vendors make fixes for bugs in their software available

electronically, either via mailing lists or via anonymous FTP.

You should contact your vendor to find out if they offer this
service, and if so, how to access it. Some vendors that offer

these services include Sun Microsystems (see above), Digital
Equipment Corporation (DEC), the University of California at

Berkeley (see above), and Apple Computer [5, CURRY].
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4. Types of Security Procedures
4.1 System Security Audits
Most businesses undergo some sort of annual financial
auditing as a regular part of their business life. Security audits
are an important part of running any computing environment.
Part of the security audit should be a review of any policies

that concern system security, as well as the mechanisms that
are put in place to enforce them.

4.1.1 Organize Scheduled Drills

Although not something that would be done each day or
week, scheduled drills may be conducted to determine if the
procedures defined are adequate for the threat to be
countered. If your major threat is one of natural disaster, then

a drill would be conducted to verify your backup and
recovery mechanisms. On the other hand, if your greatest

threat is from external intruders attempting to penetrate your

system, a drill might be conducted to actually try a
penetration to observe the effect of the policies.
Drills are a valuable way to test that your policies and

procedures are effective. On the other hand, drills can be
time- consuming and disruptive to normal operations. It is
important to weigh the benefits of the drills against the

possible time loss which may be associated with them.
4.1.2 Test Procedures

If the choice is made to not to use scheduled drills to
examine your entire security procedure at one time, it is
important to test individual procedures frequently. Examine

your backup procedure to make sure you can recover data

from the tapes. Check log files to be sure that information
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which is supposed to be logged to them is being logged to

them, etc..

When a security audit is mandated, great care should be used
in devising tests of the security policy. It is important to

clearly identify what is being tested, how the test will be
conducted, and results expected from the test. This should all

be documented and included in or as an adjunct to the
security policy document itself.

It is important to test all aspects of the security policy, both
procedural and automated, with a particular emphasis on the

automated mechanisms used to enforce the policy. Tests
should be defined to ensure a comprehensive examination of

policy features, that is, if a test is defined to examine the user
logon process, it should be explicitly stated that both valid
and invalid user names and passwords will be used to

demonstrate proper operation of the logon program.

Keep in mind that there is a limit to the reasonableness of

tests. The purpose of testing is to ensure confidence that the
security policy is being correctly enforced, and not to "prove"
the absoluteness of the system or policy. The goal should be

to obtain some assurance that the reasonable and credible

controls imposed by your security policy are adequate.

4.2 Account Management Procedures
Procedures to manage accounts are important in preventing

unauthorized access to your system. It is necessary to decide

several things: Who may have an account on the system?

How long may someone have an account without renewing
his or her request? How do old accounts get removed from
the system? The answers to all these questions should be
explicitly set out in the policy.
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In addition to deciding who may use a system, it may be
important to determine what each user may use the system

for (is personal use allowed, for example). If you are

connected to an outside network, your site or the network
management may have rules about what the network may be
used for. Therefore, it is important for any security policy to

define an adequate account management procedure for both
administrators and users. Typically, the system administrator
would be responsible for creating and deleting user accounts

and generally maintaining overall control of system use. To

some degree, account management is also the responsibility
of each system user in the sense that the user should observe

any system messages and events that may be indicative of a
policy violation. For example, a message at logon that

indicates the date and time of the last logon should be

reported by the user if it indicates an unreasonable time of
last logon.

4.3 Password Management Procedures
A policy on password management may be important if your

site wishes to enforce secure passwords. These procedures

may range from asking or forcing users to change their

passwords occasionally to actively attempting to break users'
passwords and then informing the user of how easy it was to

do. Another part of password management policy covers who
may distribute passwords - can users give their passwords to

other users?

Section 2.3 discusses some of the policy issues that need to
be decided for proper password management. Regardless of
the policies, password management procedures need to be
carefully setup to avoid disclosing passwords. The choice of

initial passwords for accounts is critical. In some cases, users
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may never login to activate an account; thus, the choice of
the initial password should not be easily guessed. Default
passwords should never be assigned to accounts: always

create new passwords for each user. If there are any printed
lists of passwords, these should be kept off-line in secure

locations; better yet, don't list passwords.

4.3.1 Password Selection
Perhaps the most vulnerable part of any computer system is
the account password. Any computer system, no matter how

secure it is from network or dial-up attack, Trojan horse

programs, and so on, can be fully exploited by an intruder if
he or she can gain access via a poorly chosen password. It is

important to define a good set of rules for password selection,
and distribute these rules to all users. If possible, the software

which sets user passwords should be modified to enforce as
many of the rules as possible.

A sample set of guidelines for password selection is shown
below:

DON'T use your login name in any form (as-is,

reversed, capitalized, doubled, etc.).
DON'T use your first, middle, or last name in any
form.
DON'T use your spouse's or child's name.
DON'T use other information easily obtained about

you. This includes license plate numbers, telephone

numbers, social security numbers, the make of your

automobile, the name of the street you live on, etc..
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DON'T use a password of all digits, or all the same

letter.
DON'T use a word contained in English or foreign
language dictionaries, spelling lists, or other lists of
words.

DON'T use a password shorter than six characters.
DO use a password with mixed-case alphabetics.
DO use a password with non-alphabetic characters
(digits or punctuation).

DO use a password that is easy to remember, so you

don't have to write it down.
DO use a password that you can type quickly,

without having to look at the keyboard.
Methods of selecting a password which adheres to these

guidelines include:

Choose a line or two from a song or poem, and use
the first letter of each word.

Alternate between one consonant and one or two

vowels, up to seven or eight characters. This
provides nonsense words which are usually
pronounceable, and thus easily remembered.

Choose two short words and concatenate them

together with a punctuation character between them.
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Users should also be told to change their password
periodically, usually every three to six months. This makes

sure that an intruder who has guessed a password will
eventually lose access, as well as invalidating any list of

passwords he/she may have obtained. Many systems enable
the system administrator to force users to change their
passwords after an expiration period; this software should be

enabled if your system supports it [5, CURRY].

Some systems provide software which forces users to change
their passwords on a regular basis. Many of these systems

also include password generators which provide the user
with a set of passwords to choose from. The user is not
permitted to make up his or her own password. There are
arguments both for and against systems such as these. On the
one hand, by using generated passwords, users are prevented

from selecting insecure passwords. On the other hand, unless
the generator is good at making up easy to remember

passwords, users will begin writing them down in order to
remember them.

4.3.2 Procedures for Changing Passwords

How password changes are handled is important to keeping
passwords secure. Ideally, users should be able to change

their own passwords on-line. (Note that password changing
programs are a favorite target of intruders. See section 4.4 on

configuration management for further information.)

However, there are exception cases which must be handled

carefully. Users may forget passwords and not be able to get
onto the system. The standard procedure is to assign the user

a new password. Care should be taken to make sure that the
real person is requesting the change and gets the new
password. One common trick used by intruders is to call or
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message to a system administrator and request a new
password. Some external form of verification should be used

before the password is assigned. At some sites, users are

required to show up in person with ID.
There may also be times when many passwords need to be

changed. If a system is compromised by an intruder, the
intruder may be able to steal a password file and take it off
the system. Under these circumstances, one course of action
is to change all passwords on the system. Your site should

have procedures for how this can be done quickly and

efficiently. What course you choose may depend on the

urgency of the problem. In the case of a known attack with
damage, you may choose to forcibly disable all accounts and

assign users new passwords before they come back onto the
system. In some places, users are sent a message telling them
that they should change their passwords, perhaps within a

certain time period. If the password isn't changed before the
time period expires, the account is locked.

Users should be aware of what the standard procedure is for
passwords when a security event has occurred. One wellknown spoof reported by the Computer Emergency Response

Team (CERT) involved messages sent to users, supposedly
from local system administrators, requesting them to

immediately change their password to a new value provided
in the message [24]. These messages were not from the

administrators, but from intruders trying to steal accounts.

Users should be warned to immediately report any suspicious
requests such as this to site administrators.
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4.4 Configuration Management Procedures
Configuration management is generally applied to the

software development process. However, it is certainly
applicable in a operational sense as well. Consider that the

since many of the system level programs are intended to
enforce the security policy, it is important that these be
"known" as correct. That is, one should not allow system

level programs (such as the operating system, etc.) to be

changed arbitrarily. At very least, the procedures should state

who is authorized to make changes to systems, under what
circumstances, and how the changes should be documented.
In some environments, configuration management is also

desirable as applied to physical configuration of equipment.
Maintaining valid and authorized hardware configuration

should be given due consideration in your security policy.

4.4.1 Non-Standard Configurations
Occasionally, it may be beneficial to have a slightly non
standard configuration in order to thwart the "standard"
attacks used by some intruders. The non-standard parts of the

configuration might include different password encryption

algorithms, different configuration file locations, and
rewritten or functionally limited system commands.
Non-standard configurations, however, also have their
drawbacks. By changing the "standard" system, these
modifications make software maintenance more difficult by

requiring extra documentation to be written, software

modification after operating system upgrades, and, usually,

someone with special knowledge of the changes.
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Because of the drawbacks of non-standard configurations,
they are often only used in environments with a "firewall"

machine (see section 3.9.1). The firewall machine is modified
in non-standard ways since it is susceptible to attack, while

internal systems behind the firewall are left in their standard

configurations.

5. Incident Handling
5.1 Overview
This section of the document will supply some guidance to
be applied when a computer security event is in progress on
a machine, network, site, or multi-site environment. The
operative philosophy in the event of a breach of computer
security, whether it be an external intruder attack or a

disgruntled employee, is to plan for adverse events in

advance. There is no substitute for creating contingency plans
for the types of events described above.
Traditional computer security, while quite important in the

overall site security plan, usually falls heavily on protecting

systems from attack, and perhaps monitoring systems to
detect attacks. Little attention is usually paid for how to
actually handle the attack when it occurs. The result is that

when an attack is in progress, many decisions are made in
haste and can be damaging to tracking down the source of

the incident, collecting evidence to be used in prosecution

efforts, preparing for the recovery of the system, and
protecting the valuable data contained on the system.
5.1.1 Have a Plan to Follow in Case of an Incident
Part of handling an incident is being prepared to respond

before the incident occurs. This includes establishing a
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suitable level of protections, so that if the incident becomes
severe, the damage which can occur is limited. Protection
includes preparing incident handling guidelines or a

contingency response plan for your organization or site.

Having written plans eliminates much of the ambiguity which
occurs during an incident, and will lead to a more
appropriate and thorough set of responses. Second, part of

protection is preparing a method of notification, so you will

know who to call and the relevant phone numbers. It is
important, for example, to conduct "dry runs," in which your

computer security personnel, system administrators, and
managers simulate handling an incident.

Learning to respond efficiently to an incident is important for
numerous reasons. The most important benefit is directly to
human beings—preventing loss of human life. Some
computing systems are life critical systems, systems on which

human life depends (e.g., by controlling some aspect of life
support in a hospital or assisting air traffic controllers).

An important but often overlooked benefit is an economic

one. Having both technical and managerial personnel
respond to an incident requires considerable resources,
resources which could be utilized more profitably if an

incident did not require their services. If these personnel are
trained to handle an incident efficiently, less of their time is

required to deal with that incident.
A third benefit is protecting classified, sensitive, or proprietary

information. One of the major dangers of a computer security

incident is that information may be irrecoverable. Efficient
incident handling minimizes this danger. When classified
information is involved, other government regulations may
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apply and must be integrated into any plan for incident

handling.
A fourth benefit is related to public relations. News about

computer security incidents tends to be damaging to an
organization's stature among current or potential clients.
Efficient incident handling minimizes the potential for

negative exposure.
A final benefit of efficient incident handling is related to legal
issues. It is possible that in the near future organizations may

be sued because one of their nodes was used to launch a

network attack. In a similar vein, people who develop
patches or workarounds may be sued if the patches or
workarounds are ineffective, resulting in damage to systems,

or if the patches or workarounds themselves damage systems.

Knowing about operating system vulnerabilities and patterns
of attacks and then taking appropriate measures is critical to

circumventing possible legal problems.

5.1.2 Order of Discussion in this Session
Suggests an Order for a Plan

This chapter is arranged such that a list may be generated
from the Table of Contents to provide a starting point for

creating a policy for handling ongoing incidents. The main
points to be included in a policy for handling incidents are:

•

Overview (what are the goals and objectives in

handling the incident).

•

Evaluation (how serious is the incident).

•

Notification (who should be notified about the

incident).

•

Response (what should the response to the incident
be).
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•

Legal/lnvestigative (what are the legal and

prosecutorial implications of the incident).

•

Documentation Logs (what records should be kept
from before, during, and after the incident).

Each of these points is important in an overall plan for
handling incidents. The remainder of this chapter will detail
the issues involved in each of these topics, and provide some

guidance as to what should be included in a site policy for

handling incidents.
5.1.3 Possible Goals and Incentives for

Efficient Incident Handling
As in any set of pre-planned procedures, attention must be
placed on a set of goals to be obtained in handling an

incident. These goals will be placed in order of importance

depending on the site, but one such set of goals might be:
Assure integrity of (life) critical systems. Maintain and restore

data. Maintain and restore service. Figure out how it
happened. Avoid escalation and further incidents. Avoid
negative publicity. Find out who did it. Punish the attackers.

It is important to prioritize actions to be taken during an

incident well in advance of the time an incident occurs.
Sometimes an incident may be so complex that it is

impossible to do everything at once to respond to it; priorities
are essential. Although priorities will vary from institution-toinstitution, the following suggested priorities serve as a

starting point for defining an organization's response:
•

Priority one — protect human life and people's

safety; human life always has precedence over all

other considerations.

270 Site Security Handbook

•

Priority two — protect classified and/or sensitive data

(as regulated by your site or by government
regulations).
•

Priority three — protect other data,
includingproprietary, scientific, managerial and other
data, because loss of data is costly in terms of
resources.

•

Priority four — prevent damage to systems (e.g., loss
or alteration of system files, damage to disk drives,

etc.); damage to systems can result in costly down
time and recovery.
•

Priority five — minimize disruption of computing
resources; it is better in many cases to shut a system

down or disconnect from a network than to risk
damage to data or systems.

An important implication for defining priorities is that once

human life and national security considerations have been
addressed, it is generally more important to save data than

system software and hardware. Although it is undesirable to

have any damage or loss during an incident, systems can be
replaced; the loss or compromise of data (especially classified

data), however, is usually not an acceptable outcome under
any circumstances.
Part of handling an incident is being prepared to respond

before the incident occurs. This includes establishing a

suitable level of protections so that if the incident becomes

severe, the damage which can occur is limited. Protection
includes preparing incident handling guidelines or a
contingency response plan for your organization or site.

Written plans eliminate much of the ambiguity which occurs

during an incident, and will lead to a more appropriate and

thorough set of responses. Second, part of protection is
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preparing a method of notification so you will know who to
call and how to contact them. For example, every member of
the Department of Energy's CIAC Team carries a card with

every other team member's work and home phone numbers,

as well as pager numbers. Third, your organization or site

should establish backup procedures for every machine and
system. Having backups eliminates much of the threat of

even a severe incident, since backups preclude serious data
loss. Fourth, you should set up secure systems. This involves
eliminating vulnerabilities, establishing an effective password
policy, and other procedures, all of which will be explained

later in this document. Finally, conducting training activities
is part of protection. It is important, for example, to conduct

"dry runs," in which your computer security personnel,

system administrators, and managers simulate handling an

incident.
5.1.4 Local Policies and Regulations Providing Guidance

Any plan for responding to security incidents should be

guided by local policies and regulations. Government and
private sites that deal with classified material have specific
rules that they must follow.

The policies your site makes about how it responds to
incidents (as discussed in sections 2.4 and 2.5) will shape
your response. For example, it may make little sense to create
mechanisms to monitor and trace intruders if your site does

not plan to take action against the intruders if they are
caught. Other organizations may have policies that affect

your plans. Telephone companies often release information
about telephone traces only to law enforcement agencies.
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Section 5.5 also notes that if any legal action is planned,
there are specific guidelines that must be followed to make

sure that any information collected can be used as evidence.

5.2 Evaluation
5.2.1 Is It Real?

This stage involves determining the exact problem. Of course
many, if not most, signs often associated with virus infections,

system intrusions, etc., are simply anomalies such as
hardware failures. To assist in identifying whether there really
is an incident, it is usually helpful to obtain and use any

detection software which may be available. For example,

widely available software packages can greatly assist
someone who thinks there may be a virus in a Macintosh
computer. Audit information is also extremely useful,
especially in determining whether there is a network attack. It
is extremely important to obtain a system snapshot as soon as

one suspects that something is wrong. Many incidents cause
a dynamic chain of events to occur, and an initial system
snapshot may do more good in identifying the problem and

any source of attack than most other actions which can be
taken at this stage. Finally, it is important to start a log book.

Recording system events, telephone conversations, time

stamps, etc., can lead to a more rapid and systematic
identification of the problem, and is the basis for subsequent
stages of incident handling.
There are certain indications or "symptoms" of an incident
which deserve special attention:

•

System crashes.

•

New user accounts (e.g., the account

RUMPLESTILTSKIN has unexplainedly been created),
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or high activity on an account that has had virtually

no activity for months.

•

New files (usually with novel or strange file names,

such as data.xx or k).

•

Accounting discrepancies (e.g., in a UNIX system
you might notice that the accounting file called

/usr/admin/lastlog has shrunk, something that should

make you very suspicious that there may be an

intruder).

•

Changes in file lengths or dates (e.g., a user should
be suspicious if he/she observes that the .EXE files in
an MS DOS computer have unexplainedly grown by

over 1800 bytes).

•

Attempts to write to system (e.g., a system manager
notices that a privileged user in a VMS system is

attempting to alter RIGHTSLIST.DAT).
•

Data modification or deletion (e.g., files start to

disappear).
•

Denial of service (e.g., a system manager and all

other users become locked out of a UNIX system,
which has been changed to single user mode).

•

Unexplained, poor system performance (e.g., system

•

Anomalies (e.g., "GOTCHA" is displayed on a

response time becomes unusually slow).

display terminal or there are frequent unexplained
"beeps").

•

Suspicious probes (e.g., there are numerous

unsuccessful login attempts from another node).

•

Suspicious browsing (e.g., someone becomes a root

user on a UNIX system and accesses file after file in

one user's account, then another's).
None of these indications is absolute "proof" that an incident
is occurring, nor are all of these indications normally
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observed when an incident occurs. If you observe any of
these indications, however, it is important to suspect that an

incident might be occurring, and act accordingly. There is no

formula for determining with 100 percent accuracy that an

incident is occurring (possible exception: when a virus
detection package indicates that your machine has the nVIR

virus and you confirm this by examining contents of the nVIR

resource in your Macintosh computer, you can be very

certain that your machine is infected). It is best at this point
to collaborate with other technical and computer security

personnel to make a decision as a group about whether an
incident is occurring.

5.2.2 Scope
Along with the identification of the incident is the evaluation
of the scope and impact of the problem. It is important to

correctly identify the boundaries of the incident in order to
effectively deal with it. In addition, the impact of an incident
will determine its priority in allocating resources to deal with

the event. Without an indication of the scope and impact of
the event, it is difficult to determine a correct response.
In order to identify the scope and impact, a set of criteria

should be defined which is appropriate to the site and to the

type of connections available. Some of the issues are:

•

Is this a multi-site incident?

•

Are many computers at your site effected by this
incident?

•
•

Is sensitive information involved?

What is the entry point of the incident (network,

phone line, local terminal, etc.)?
•

Is the press involved?

•

What is the potential damage of the incident?
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•

What is the estimated time to close out the incident?

•

What resources could be required to handle the
incident?

5.3 Possible Types of Notification
When you have confirmed that an incident is occurring, the
appropriate personnel must be notified. Who and how this

notification is achieved is very important in keeping the event
under control both from a technical and emotional
standpoint.

5.3.1 Explicit
First of all, any notification to either local or off-site

personnel must be explicit. This requires that any statement

(be it an electronic mail message, phone call, or fax) provides
information about the incident that is clear, concise, and fully

qualified. When you are notifying others that will help you to

handle an event, a "smoke screen" will only divide the effort
and create confusion. If a division of labor is suggested, it is
helpful to provide information to each section about what is

being accomplished in other efforts. This will not only reduce

duplication of effort, but allow people working on parts of
the problem to know where to obtain other information that

would help them resolve a part of the incident.

5.3.2 Factual
Another important consideration when communicating about

the incident is to be factual. Attempting to hide aspects of the

incident by providing false or incomplete information may
not only prevent a successful resolution to the incident, but

may even worsen the situation. This is especially true when
the press is involved. When an incident severe enough to

gain press attention is ongoing, it is likely that any false
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information you provide will not be substantiated by other
sources. This will reflect badly on the site and may create

enough ill-will between the site and the press to damage the

site's public relations.

5.3.3 Choice of Language
The choice of language used when notifying people about

the incident can have a profound effect on the way that

information is received. When you use emotional or
inflammatory terms, you raise the expectations of damage
and negative outcomes of the incident. It is important to

remain calm both in written and spoken notifications.
Another issue associated with the choice of language is the

notification to non-technical or off-site personnel. It is
important to accurately describe the incident without undue

alarm or confusing messages. While it is more difficult to
describe the incident to a non-technical audience, it is often
more important. A non-technical description may be required

for upper-level management, the press, or law enforcement
liaisons. The importance of these notifications cannot be
underestimated and may make the difference between

handling the incident properly and escalating to some higher
level of damage.
5.3.4 Notification of Individuals
•

Point of Contact (POC) people (Technical,
Administrative, Response Teams, Investigative, Legal,

Vendors, Service providers), and which POCs are
visible to whom.
•

Wider community (users).

•

Other sites that might be affected.
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Finally, there is the question of who should be notified during

and after the incident. There are several classes of individuals
that need to be considered for notification. These are the

technical personnel, administration, appropriate response
teams (such as CERT or CIAC), law enforcement, vendors,
and other service providers. These issues are important for
the central point of contact, since that is the person
responsible for the actual notification of others (see section

5.3.6 for further information). A list of people in each of these
categories is an important time saver for the POC during an
incident. It is much more difficult to find an appropriate

person during an incident when many urgent events are
ongoing.
In addition to the people responsible for handling part of the

incident, there may be other sites affected by the incident (or
perhaps simply at risk from the incident). A wider community

of users may also benefit from knowledge of the incident.
Often, a report of the incident once it is closed out is

appropriate for publication to the wider user community.

5.3.5 Public Relations - Press Releases
One of the most important issues to consider is when, who,
and how much to release to the general public through the
press. There are many issues to consider when deciding this

particular issue. First and foremost, if a public relations office
exists for the site, it is important to use this office as liaison to
the press. The public relations office is trained in the type

and wording of information released, and will help to assure

that the image of the site is protected during and after the

incident (if possible). A public relations office has the
advantage that you can communicate candidly with them,
and provide a buffer between the constant press attention
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and the need of the POC to maintain control over the

incident.

If a public relations office is not available, the information
released to the press must be carefully considered. If the

information is sensitive, it may be advantageous to provide
only minimal or overview information to the press. It is quite

possible that any information provided to the press will be

quickly reviewed by the perpetrator of the incident. As a

contrast to this consideration, it was discussed above that
misleading the press can often backfire and cause more
damage than releasing sensitive information.
While it is difficult to determine in advance what level of

detail to provide to the press, some guidelines to keep in

mind are:
•

Keep the technical level of detail low. Detailed
information about the incident may provide enough
information for copy-cat events or even damage the

site's ability to prosecute once the event is over.
•

Keep the speculation out of press statements.

Speculation of who is causing the incident or the
motives are very likely to be in error and may cause
an inflamed view of the incident.
•

Work with law enforcement professionals to assure
that evidence is protected. If prosecution is involved,
assure that the evidence collected is not divulged to
the press.

•

Try not to be forced into a press interview before you
are prepared. The popular press is famous for the
"2am" interview, where the hope is to catch the

interviewee off guard and obtain information
otherwise not available.
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•

Do not allow the press attention to detract from the

handling of the event. Always remember that the
successful closure of an incident is of primary

importance.

5.3.6 Who Needs to Get Involved?
There now exists a number of incident response teams (IRTs)

such as the CERT and the CIAC. (See sections 3.9.7.3.1 and
3.9.7.3.4.) Teams exists for many major government agencies

and large corporations. If such a team is available for your
site, the notification of this team should be of primary

importance during the early stages of an incident. These
teams are responsible for coordinating computer security
incidents over a range of sites and larger entities. Even if the

incident is believed to be contained to a single site, it is
possible that the information available through a response
team could help in closing out the incident.

In setting up a site policy for incident handling, it may be

desirable to create an incident handling team (IHT), much
like those teams that already exist, that will be responsible for
handling computer security incidents for the site (or
organization). If such a team is created, it is essential that

communication lines be opened between this team and other

IHTs. Once an incident is under way, it is difficult to open a
trusted dialogue between other IHTs if none has existed
before.

5.4 Response
A major topic still untouched here is how to actually respond

to an event. The response to an event will fall into the
general categories of containment, eradication, recovery, and

follow-up.

280 Site Security Handbook

Containment

The purpose of containment is to limit the extent of an attack.
For example, it is important to limit the spread of a worm

attack on a network as quickly as possible. An essential part
of containment is decision making (i.e., determining whether

to shut a system down, to disconnect from a network, to
monitor system or network activity, to set traps, to disable

functions such as remote file transfer on a UNIX system, etc.).
Sometimes this decision is trivial; shut the system down if the

system is classified or sensitive, or if proprietary information
is at risk! In other cases, it is worthwhile to risk having some
damage to the system if keeping the system up might enable

you to identify an intruder.

The third stage, containment, should involve carrying out
predetermined procedures. Your organization or site should,

for example, define acceptable risks in dealing with an

incident, and should prescribe specific actions and strategies

accordingly. Finally, notification of cognizant authorities
should occur during this stage.
Eradication

Once an incident has been detected, it is important to first

think about containing the incident. Once the incident has
been contained, it is now time to eradicate the cause.
Software may be available to help you in this effort. For
example, eradication software is available to eliminate most

viruses which infect small systems. If any bogus files have

been created, it is time to delete them at this point. In the
case of virus infections, it is important to clean and reformat

any disks containing infected files. Finally, ensure that all
backups are clean. Many systems infected with viruses
become periodically reinfected simply because people do not
systematically eradicate the virus from backups.
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Recovery

Once the cause of an incident has been eradicated, the
recovery phase defines the next stage of action. The goal of
recovery is to return the system to normal. In the case of a

network-based attack, it is important to install patches for any

operating system vulnerability which was exploited.
Follow-up

One of the most important stages of responding to incidents
is also the most often omitted—the follow-up stage. This

stage is important because it helps those involved in handling
the incident develop a set of "lessons learned" (see section

6.3) to improve future performance in such situations. This
stage also provides information which justifies an
organization's computer security effort to management, and

yields information which may be essential in legal
proceedings.

The most important element of the follow-up stage is
performing a postmortem analysis. Exactly what happened,
and at what times? How well did the staff involved with the

incident perform? What kind of information did the staff need
quickly, and how could they have gotten that information as

soon as possible? What would the staff do differently next

time? A follow-up report is valuable because it provides a
reference to be used in case of other similar incidents.

Creating a formal chronology of events (including time
stamps) is also important for legal reasons. Similarly, it is also

important to as quickly obtain a monetary estimate of the
amount of damage the incident caused in terms of any loss of
software and files, hardware damage, and manpower costs to

restore altered files, reconfigure affected systems, and so

forth. This estimate may become the basis for subsequent
prosecution activity by the FBI, the U.S. Attorney General's

Office, etc..
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5.4.1 What Will You Do?

•

Restore control.

•

Relation to policy.

•

Which level of service is needed?

•

Monitor activity.

•

Constrain or shut down system.

5.4.2 Consider Designating a "Single Point of Contact"
When an incident is under way, a major issue is deciding

who is in charge of coordinating the activity of the multitude
of players. A major mistake that can be made is to have a
number of "points of contact" (POC) that are not pulling their

efforts together. This will only add to the confusion of the
event, and will probably lead to additional confusion and

wasted or ineffective effort.
The single point of contact may or may not be the person "in

charge" of the incident. There are two distinct rolls to fill

when deciding who shall be the point of contact and the
person in charge of the incident. The person in charge will

make decisions as to the interpretation of policy applied to
the event. The responsibility for the handling of the event
falls onto this person. In contrast, the point of contact must

coordinate the effort of all the parties involved with handling

the event.

The point of contact must be a person with the technical
expertise to successfully coordinate the effort of the system
managers and users involved in monitoring and reacting to

the attack. Often the management structure of a site is such

that the administrator of a set of resources is not a technically
competent person with regard to handling the details of the
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operations of the computers, but is ultimately responsible for
the use of these resources.

Another important function of the POC is to maintain contact

with law enforcement and other external agencies (such as
the CIA, DoD, U.S. Army, or others) to assure that multi

agency involvement occurs.
Finally, if legal action in the form of prosecution is involved,
the POC may be able to speak for the site in court. The
alternative is to have multiple witnesses that will be hard to

coordinate in a legal sense, and will weaken any case against
the attackers. A single POC may also be the single person in
charge of evidence collected, which will keep the number of

people accounting for evidence to a minimum. As a rule of
thumb, the more people that touch a potential piece of

evidence, the greater the possibility that it will be
inadmissible in court. The section below (Legal/lnvestigative)
will provide more details for consideration on this topic.

5.5 Legal/lnvestigative
5.5.1 Establishing Contacts with Investigative Agencies
It is important to establish contacts with personnel from

investigative agencies such as the FBI and Secret Service as

soon as possible, for several reasons. Local law enforcement
and local security offices or campus police organizations

should also be informed when appropriate. A primary reason
is that once a major attack is in progress, there is little time to
call various personnel in these agencies to determine exactly

who the correct point of contact is. Another reason is that it
is important to cooperate with these agencies in a manner

that will foster a good working relationship, and that will be

in accordance with the working procedures of these
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agencies. Knowing the working procedures in advance and
the expectations of your point of contact is a big step in this

direction. For example, it is important to gather evidence that
will be admissible in a court of law. If you don't know in

advance how to gather admissible evidence, your efforts to

collect evidence during an incident are likely to be of no

value to the investigative agency with which you deal. A final
reason for establishing contacts as soon as possible is that it
is impossible to know the particular agency that will assume

jurisdiction in any given incident. Making contacts and
finding the proper channels early will make responding to an

incident go considerably more smoothly.
If your organization or site has a legal counsel, you need to

notify this office soon after you learn that an incident is in

progress. At a minimum, your legal counsel needs to be
involved to protect the legal and financial interests of your

site or organization. There are many legal and practical
issues, a few of which are:

1.

Whether your site or organization is willing to risk

negative publicity or exposure to cooperate with
legal prosecution efforts.

2.

Downstream liability—if you leave a compromised

system as is so it can be monitored and another
computer is damaged because the attack originated

from your system, your site or organization may be
liable for damages incurred.
3.

Distribution of information—if your site or
organization distributes information about an attack
in which another site or organization may be

involved or the vulnerability in a product that may

affect ability to market that product, your site or
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organization may again be liable for any damages
(including damage of reputation).

4. Liabilities due to monitoring—your site or
organization may be sued if users at your site or

elsewhere discover that your site is monitoring

account activity without informing users.
Unfortunately, there are no clear precedents yet on the

liabilities or responsibilities of organizations involved in a
security incident or who might be involved in supporting an

investigative effort. Investigators will often encourage
organizations to help trace and monitor intruders — indeed,

most investigators cannot pursue computer intrusions without
extensive support from the organizations involved. However,

investigators cannot provide protection from liability claims,
and these kinds of efforts may drag out for months and may

take lots of effort.
On the other side, an organization's legal council may advise

extreme caution and suggest that tracing activities be halted
and an intruder shut out of the system. This in itself may not

provide protection from liability, and may prevent

investigators from identifying anyone.

The balance between supporting investigative activity and
limiting liability is tricky; you'll need to consider the advice

of your council and the damage the intruder is causing (if
any) in making your decision about what to do during any

particular incident.

Your legal counsel should also be involved in any decision to
contact investigative agencies when an incident occurs at
your site. The decision to coordinate efforts with investigative

agencies is most properly that of your site or organization.
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Involving your legal counsel will also foster the multi-level

coordination between your site and the particular
investigative agency involved which in turn results in an

efficient division of labor. Another result is that you are likely
to obtain guidance that will help you avoid future legal

mistakes.
Finally, your legal counsel should evaluate your site's written

procedures for responding to incidents. It is essential to
obtain a "clean bill of health" from a legal perspective before

you actually carry out these procedures.

5.5.2 Formal and Informal Legal Procedures
One of the most important considerations in dealing with
investigative agencies is verifying that the person who calls
asking for information is a legitimate representative from the

agency in question. Unfortunately, many well intentioned
people have unknowingly leaked sensitive information about

incidents, allowed unauthorized people into their systems,

etc., because a caller has masqueraded as an FBI or Secret
Service agent. A similar consideration is using a secure

means of communication. Because many network attackers
can easily reroute electronic mail, avoid using electronic mail
to communicate with other agencies (as well as others
dealing with the incident at hand). Non-secured phone lines

(e.g., the phones normally used in the business world) are

also frequent targets for tapping by network intruders, so be

careful!
There is no established set of rules for responding to an

incident when the U.S. Federal Government becomes
involved. Except by court order, no agency can force you to

monitor, to disconnect from the network, to avoid telephone

contact with the suspected attackers, etc.. As discussed in
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section 5.5.1, you should consult the matter with your legal
counsel, especially before taking an action that your
organization has never taken. The particular agency involved

may ask you to leave an attacked machine on and to monitor
activity on this machine, for example. Your complying with

this request will ensure continued cooperation of the

agency—usually the best route towards finding the source of
the network attacks and, ultimately, terminating these attacks.
Additionally, you may need some information or a favor from

the agency involved in the incident. You are likely to get

what you need only if you have been cooperative. Of
particular importance is avoiding unnecessary or

unauthorized disclosure of information about the incident,
including any information furnished by the agency involved.

The trust between your site and the agency hinges upon your
ability to avoid compromising the case the agency will build;

keeping "tight lipped" is imperative.
Sometimes your needs and the needs of an investigative

agency will differ. Your site may want to get back to normal

business by closing an attack route, but the investigative
agency may want you to keep this route open. Similarly, your
site may want to close a compromised system down to avoid

the possibility of negative publicity, but again the

investigative agency may want you to continue monitoring.

When there is such a conflict, there may be a complex set of

tradeoffs (e.g., interests of your site's management, amount of

resources you can devote to the problem, jurisdictional
boundaries, etc.). An important guiding principle is related to
what might be called "Internet citizenship" [22, IAB89, 23]
and its responsibilities. Your site can shut a system down, and

this will relieve you of the stress, resource demands, and

danger of negative exposure. The attacker, however, is likely

to simply move on to another system, temporarily leaving
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others blind to the attacker's intention and actions until
another path of attack can be detected. Providing that there is
no damage to your systems and others, the most responsible

course of action is to cooperate with the participating agency

by leaving your compromised system on. This will allow
monitoring (and, ultimately, the possibility of terminating the
source of the threat to systems just like yours). On the other

hand, if there is damage to computers illegally accessed
through your system, the choice is more complicated:
shutting down the intruder may prevent further damage to

systems, but might make it impossible to track down the

intruder. If there has been damage, the decision about

whether it is important to leave systems up to catch the
intruder should involve all the organizations effected. Further

complicating the issue of network responsibility is the
consideration that if you do not cooperate with the agency

involved, you will be less likely to receive help from that

agency in the future.

5.6 Documentation Logs
When you respond to an incident, document all details
related to the incident. This will provide valuable information

to yourself and others as you try to unravel the course of
events. Documenting all details will ultimately save you time.
If you don't document every relevant phone call, for

example, you are likely to forget a good portion of

information you obtain, requiring you to contact the source
of information once again. This wastes yours and others'

time, something you can ill afford. At the same time,
recording details will provide evidence for prosecution
efforts, providing the case moves in this direction.

Documenting an incident also will help you perform a final
assessment of damage (something your management as well
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as law enforcement officers will want to know), and will
provide the basis for a follow-up analysis in which you can

engage in a valuable "lessons learned" exercise.
During the initial stages of an incident, it is often infeasible to
determine whether prosecution is viable, so you should

document as if you are gathering evidence for a court case.
At a minimum, you should record:

•

All system events (audit records).

•

All actions you take (time tagged).

•

All phone conversations (including the person with

whom you talked, the date and time, and the content

of the conversation).

The most straightforward way to maintain documentation is
keeping a log book. This allows you to go to a centralized,
chronological source of information when you need it,
instead of requiring you to page through individual sheets of

paper. Much of this information is potential evidence in a

court of law. Thus, when you initially suspect that an incident

will result in prosecution or when an investigative agency
becomes involved, you need to regularly (e.g., every day)
turn in photocopied, signed copies of your logbook (as well

as media you use to record system events) to a document

custodian who can store these copied pages in a secure place

(e.g., a safe). When you submit information for storage, you
should in return receive a signed, dated receipt from the
document custodian. Failure to observe these procedures can

result in invalidation of any evidence you obtain in a court of

law.
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6. Establishing Post-Incident Procedures
6.1 Overview
In the wake of an incident, several actions should take place.

These actions can be summarized as follows:
1.

An inventory should be taken of the systems' assets,
i.e., a careful examination should determine how the

system was affected by the incident,

2.

The lessons learned as a result of the incident should

be included in revised security plan to prevent the
incident from re-occurring,
3.

A new risk analysis should be developed in light of

the incident,
4.

An investigation and prosecution of the individuals

who caused the incident should commence, if it is
deemed desirable.
All four steps should provide feedback to the site security
policy committee, leading to prompt re-evaluation and

amendment of the current policy.

6.2 Removing Vulnerabilities
Removing all vulnerabilities once an incident has occurred is

difficult. The key to removing vulnerabilities is knowledge
and understanding of the breach. In some cases, it is prudent

to remove all access or functionality as soon as possible, and

then restore normal operation in limited stages. Bear in mind
that removing all access while an incident is in progress will

obviously notify all users, including the alleged problem

users, that the administrators are aware of a problem; this
may have a deleterious effect on an investigation. However,
allowing an incident to continue may also open the
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likelihood of greater damage, loss, aggravation, or liability

(civil or criminal).
If it is determined that the breach occurred due to a flaw in
the systems' hardware or software, the vendor (or supplier)

and the CERT should be notified as soon as possible.
Including relevant telephone numbers (also electronic mail

addresses and fax numbers) in the site security policy is

strongly recommended. To aid prompt acknowledgment and
understanding of the problem, the flaw should be described
in as much detail as possible, including details about how to

exploit the flaw.
As soon as the breach has occurred, the entire system and all

its components should be considered suspect. System

software is the most probable target. Preparation is key to

recovering from a possibly tainted system. This includes
checksumming all tapes from the vendor using a checksum
algorithm which (hopefully) is resistant to tampering [10].
(See sections 3.9.4.1, 3.9.4.2.) Assuming original vendor

distribution tapes are available, an analysis of all system files
should commence, and any irregularities should be noted

and referred to all parties involved in handling the incident. It

can be very difficult, in some cases, to decide which backup
tapes to recover from; consider that the incident may have

continued for months or years before discovery, and that the

suspect may be an employee of the site, or otherwise have
intimate knowledge or access to the systems. In all cases, the

pre-incident preparation will determine what recovery is
possible. At worst-case, restoration from the original
manufactures' media and a re-installation of the systems will

be the most prudent solution.
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Review the lessons learned from the incident and always
update the policy and procedures to reflect changes

necessitated by the incident.

6.2.1 Assessing Damage
Before cleanup can begin, the actual system damage must be

discerned. This can be quite time consuming, but should lead

into some of the insight as to the nature of the incident, and
aid investigation and prosecution. It is best to compare

previous backups or original tapes when possible; advance
preparation is the key. If the system supports centralized
logging (most do), go back over the logs and look for

abnormalities. If process accounting and connect time
accounting is enabled, look for patterns of system usage. To a

lesser extent, disk usage may shed light on the incident.
Accounting can provide much helpful information in an
analysis of an incident and subsequent prosecution.

6.2.2 Cleanup

Once the damage has been assessed, it is necessary to

develop a plan for system cleanup. In general, bringing up
services in the order of demand to allow a minimum of user
inconvenience is the best practice. Understand that the

proper recovery procedures for the system are extremely
important and should be specific to the site.

It may be necessary to go back to the original distributed
tapes and recustomize the system. To facilitate this worst case

scenario, a record of the original systems setup and each
customization change should be kept current with each
change to the system.
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6.2.3 Follow up

Once you believe that a system has been restored to a "safe"
state, it is still possible that holes and even traps could be

lurking in the system. In the follow-up stage, the system

should be monitored for items that may have been missed
during the cleanup stage. It would be prudent to utilize some
of the tools mentioned in section 3.9.8.2 (e.g., COPS) as a

start. Remember, these tools don't replace continual system
monitoring and good systems administration procedures.

6.2.4 Keep a Security Log
As discussed in section 5.6, a security log can be most

valuable during this phase of removing vulnerabilities. There
are two considerations here; the first is to keep logs of the

procedures that have been used to make the system secure
again. This should include command procedures (e.g., shell

scripts) that can be run on a periodic basis to recheck the

security. Second, keep logs of important system events. These
can be referenced when trying to determine the extent of the
damage of a given incident.

6.3 Capturing Lessons Learned
6.3.1 Understand the Lesson

After an incident, it is prudent to write a report describing the

incident, method of discovery, correction procedure,
monitoring procedure, and a summary of lesson learned. This

will aid in the clear understanding of the problem.
Remember, it is difficult to learn from an incident if you don't
understand the source.
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6.3.2 Resources
6.3.2.1 Other Security Devices, Methods

Security is a dynamic, not static process. Sites are dependent
on the nature of security available at each site, and the array
of devices and methods that will help promote security.

Keeping up with the security area of the computer industry
and their methods will assure a security manager of taking

advantage of the latest technology.

6.3.2.2 Repository of Books, Lists, Information Sources
Keep an on site collection of books, lists, information
sources, etc., as guides and references for securing the

system. Keep this collection up to date. Remember, as
systems change, so do security methods and problems.
6.3.2.3 Form a Subgroup
Form a subgroup of system administration personnel that will

be the core security staff. This will allow discussions of
security problems and multiple views of the site's security
issues. This subgroup can also act to develop the site security
policy and make suggested changes as necessary to ensure

site security.

6.4 Upgrading Policies and Procedures
6.4.1 Establish Mechanisms for Updating
Policies, Procedures, and Tools

If an incident is based on poor policy, and unless the policy
is changed, then one is doomed to repeat the past. Once a

site has recovered from and incident, site policy and

procedures should be reviewed to encompass changes to
prevent similar incidents. Even without an incident, it would

be prudent to review policies and procedures on a regular
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basis. Reviews are imperative due to today's changing
computing environments.
6.4.2 Problem Reporting Procedures
A problem reporting procedure should be implemented to

describe, in detail, the incident and the solutions to the
incident. Each incident should be reviewed by the site

security subgroup to allow understanding of the incident with
possible suggestions to the site policy and procedures.
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Information Security Resources
Accounting
Academy of Accounting Historians
Site of a non-profit organization dedicated to the history of
accounting and auditing and its relation to past and current

business practices. Provides links to other accounting and
business history sites.
URL http://weatherhead.cwru.edu/Accounting/
ACCHANGE
Subscription mailing list for public accountants, industry

professionals, and academics on accounting education and
curriculum.

Subscribe through: listserv@mcmuse.mc.maricopa.edu
Accountant's Home Page

A collection of links to sites of interest to professionals in the
fields of accounting, finance, and business. Among the links

provided are Thomas, Internal Revenue Service, and Small
Business Administration.

URL http://www.computercpa.com/
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability (journal)
URL http://www.mcb.co.uk/liblink/aaaj/jourhome.htm
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Accounting Firms
Robert C. Alario, CPA

URL http://www.cyber-cpa.com/ma01 .html
Alder, Green & Hansson

URL http://www.aghcpa.com/

C.W. Amos & Company, LLC
URL http://www.cwamos.com
Arthur Andersen & Co., SC

URL http://www.arthurandersen.com/
Andersen Consulting

URL http://www.ac.com/
Michael M. Arons, CPA

URL http://www.olac.com/arons/
Aronson, Fetridge & Weigle, CPAs

URL http://www.afwcpa.com
Karen Hope Bachman, CPA
URL http://www.summitmedia.com/cpa/
Patricia Bagley, CPA, PC

URL http://www.digex.net/herndon/biz/bagley.html
Charles Bailly & Company, P.L.L.P.

URL http://www.cbailly.com
Baker Newman & Noyes

URL http://www.bnncpa.com/
Barnes, Welding, Cook & O'Connor, Inc., CPAs
URL http://www.multiverse.com/bwco/

Gregory Barsanti, CPA
URL http://www.sover. net/%7Epjarvis/barsanti.htmI
BDO Dunwoody (Canada)

URL http://www.bdo.ca/
Al Beane, CPA

URL http://community.net/community/solano/

business/albeane.html
Berenson & Co.

URL http://www.berenson.com
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Klaus Beyer
URL http://www.beyer-steuerberater.de/english.html

David M. Bialick, CPA
URL http://www.earthlink.net/dbialick

Big Apple CPA and Consulting Firm-Glickman, Rubin & Gaft
URL http://www.dewittplaza.com/Apple/main.htm

Blackman Kallick & Bartelstein, LLP
URL http://www.bkbcpa.com

Blanchet CPA

URL http://pbn.net:80/pbn/referalls/accountants/

blanchet.htm
Joshua A. Blau, CPA

URL http://www.tagsys.com/Ads/Accountant/

accountant.html
Fred Blauer and Associates, CPAs (Canada)

URL http://www.cam.org/%7Efblauer/serv_bus.htm

Bober, Markey & Company
URL http://www.bobermarkey.com

James Bones & Associates
URL http://calproptax.com/
Bonham & Co., CPAs

URL http://www.ice.net/private/bonham/bonham.htmI
Brief, Rotfarb, Wynbarg, Cappe

URL http://www.brwc.com

Karen Stevenson Brown, CPA
URL http://www.ice.net/~kstevens/
Jack D. Burson, CPA
URL http://www.olac.com/

John Butler, CPA

URL http://www.aros.net/~jbutler/
Paul Bryne & Co. (Ireland)

URL http://gate1.internet-eireann.ie/proll/byrne
Burkhardt & Co.

URL http://www.cinti.net/burkhardt
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Caldwell & Bodenheimer

URL http ://www. covesoft.com/caIdwell/
Chapski & Chapski, CPAs, LLP

URL http://www.umich.edu/%7Echapski/

Checkers, Simon & Rosner
URL http://www.checkers-llp.com/

Choquette & Co. (Canada)
URL http://www.income.com/

Clark, Schaefer, Hackett & Co.

URL http://www.cshco.com
Paul Clough, CPA
URL http://www.turbosales.com/~turbos/paulc/
Eric E. Cohen, CPA, CPIM

URL http://www.servtech.com/re/acct.htmI
Cohen & Co.

URL http://www.cohencpa.com/
Cohen, Greenstein and Company

URL http://world.std.com/~harvey
Coopers & Lybrand

URL http://www.CoLybrand.com/
Coopers & Lybrand (United Kingdom)

URL http://www.coopers.co.uk/welcome.html
Coughlin & Gomola, CPAs
URL http://www.connix.com/~garyg/
Kathy K. Cregan, CPA

URL http://www.av.qnet.com/%7Ekkc/
Hillary L. Crosby, CPA
URL http://www.hlca.com/hlca/
Dworetsky & Co., CPAs
URL http://www.vvmi.com/dworetsky.htmI

DeLellis & Co., CPA
URL http://www.vcnet.com/DeLelIis/
Deloitte & Touche

URL http://www.dttus.com/
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Deloitte & Touche (Bermuda)
URL http://turnpike.net//emporium/D/dtpage1/index.html
Elder & Associates

URL http://www.elder-assoc-cpa.com

English Miller & Co.
URL http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/

EnglishMiller

Ernst & Young
URL http://www.ey.com/

R.A. Fischler & Co.
URL http://www.rafcpa.com

Howard Fisherman, CPA

URL http://www.specdata.com/hfcpa/
Forsyth Financial Services, Management Accountants

URL http://www.sentex.net/~ffs/

Freed Maxick Sachs & Murphy, PC
URL http://www.fmsmpc.com
Friedman & Fuller, PC, CPAs
URL http://www.ffgroup.com/

Friedman Kannenberg & Associates, CPAs

URL http://www.csi-infinet.com/friedman.htm

GBQ/Nesser Consulting Group, Ltd.
URL http://www.iwaynet.net/~nesser
Paula Gilles Maurano & Com, CPAs
URL http://www.maurano.com/

Roxanne Goldberg, CPA
URL http://www.telesphere.com/ts/rgcpa/index.html

Goldstein Golub Kessler & Company, PC

URL http://www.ggk.com/

Grant Thornton LLP

URL http://www.gt-us.com/
Dan Gray, CPA

URL http://www.netquest.net/gary.adams
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Grobstein, Horwath and Company, LLP

URL http://www.horwathcal.com
Sallie A. Hagen, CPA, PC

URL http://www.netcpa.com
Earl Hall, CPA

URL http://www.wolfe.net/~earl/
Craig L. Hardison, CPA

URL http://www.iadfw.net/craig/index.html
Hargrave & Hargrave, CPA

URL http://taxwizard.com/
John K. Haslock, CPA

URL http://www.cyberzine.org/html/CPA/cpapage.html

Haugen, Springer & Co.
URL http://www.hsco.com
Hayes & Associates, CPAs

URL http://www.hayescpa.com
Hayes, Debeck, Stewart & Little, CAs (Canada)

URL http://www.islandnet.com/~hdsl/hdsl.html
Hungerford, Alrin, Nichols & Carter, P.C.

URL http://www.hanc.com
Integrated Business Services, Ltd.

URL http://www.geocities.com/WallStreet/5895
Johnson and Scarborough, CPAs

URL http://www.jscpa.com/

Roger A. Kahan, CPA
URL http://www.rak-1.com/
Katz Cassidy, CPAs

URL http://www.primenet.com/~laig/proserve/cpa/

cpa0001b.htm
Kidsons Impey (United Kingdom)
URL http://www.kidsons.co.uk/kidsons/hlb.html

Patrick Kissane, CA
URL http://www.taunet.net.au/pat/
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Kostin, Ruffkess & Company, LLC
URL http://www.kostin.com/
KPMG Peat Marwick

URL http://hp.rad.kpmg.com/WWW/SSC/home.html

KPMG Peat Marwick (Canada)

URL http://www.kpmg.ca/
Kurtz & Kurtz, CPAs

URL http://www.mcny.com/kurzkurz/
Kushner, La Graize, and Moore, CPAs
URL http://www.communique.net/~klmcpa/

LaFollette, Jansa, Brandt & Co., LLP

URL http://www.ljbco.com
Barbara L. Leary, CPA
URL http://www1 .magnus1.com/cta/b11/b11_home.html

Lindgren, Callihan, Van Osdol and Co., Ltd.

URL http://www.essex1.com/people/kappy/lcv.htm
Philip K. Lippincott, CPA

URL http://www.pkl-profit.com
Sherman L. Lubin, CPA

URL http://www.netrunner.net/-rhomer/slI.htm
V F Mather & Co.
URL http://www.personal.u-net.com/~mather/

Mathis, West, Huffines & Co., P.C.
URL http://www.mwhpc.com
Matthews, Reich, Perna & Rootermond, P.C.

URL http://www.mrpr.com

Ronnie C. McClure, CPA
URL http://rampages.onramp.net/~rmphdcpa/

McConnell Galloway Botteselle, CGAs (Canada)
URL http://www.helinet.com/MGB/
McGIadrey & Pullen - Renaissance Consulting Division

URL http://www.mcgladrey.com
McNulty & Co., CPAs

URL http://www.review.net/cpa/

308 Information Security Resources

Raymond Miner, CPA
URL http://www.onramp.net/%7Efneworld/

networking.html

Anne Mitchell, CPA
URL http://slv.net/taxprep/cpa1/mitchell.htm
Mithcell, Emert & Hill, P.C. (Knoxville, TN)

URL http://www.mehcpa.com
Alan Moore, CPA

URL http://www.infi.net/moore/
Moore Stephens North America, LLC

URL http://www.msnainc.com/
Morrison Brown Argiz & Company

URL http://www.shadow.net/mba/
Murphy Green & Co.

URL http://www.mcn.Org/A/MGCO/
Arthur Naman, CPA

URL http://www.ccsi.com/~anaman/
Jerry Newman, CPA

URL http://www.501 Ogeary.com/frisco/frisco.htm
Peter Norton, CPA

URL http://www.corpinfohub.com/norton.htm

Ormsby & Mackan (Toronto)
URL http://www.io.org/%7Efmackan/
Obara, Kidwell & Company
URL http://users.aol.com/okc250/homepage.htm

Charles J. Ozeck, CPA
URL http://www.dprint.com/cocpa/
Parks, Palmer, Turner & Yemenidjian, CPA

URL http://www.Iaig.com/proserve/ppty/
People-Friendly Business Solutions
(Penelope BM Hedges, CA, CSV) (Canada)

URL http://mindlink.net/Penelope_Hedges/pfbs-1.htm

Pester & Co.
URL http://www.taxcpa.com
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Pielech & Pielech, CPAs

URL http://www.pielech.com
Presnell Gage Accounting & Consulting

URL http://www.presnellgage.com
Price Waterhouse

URL http://www.pw.com/
Price Waterhouse - Montreal (French language)

URL http://services.bunyip.com:7101/default.html
Read & Bose, CPAs

URL http.7/www.oregontraiI.net/readbose/peer.html

Richman Associates, CPAs
URL http://www.websys.com/richman/home.html
Peter Jason Riley, CPA

URL http://www.pjrcpa.com
Rogers & Co., CPAs, PC

URL http://www.exempt5.com
Micheal A. Ross, CPA

URL http://rampages.onramp.net/~bizplan/
Rowrotham & Company, Inc., CPAs

URL http://www.slip.net/~cpas/

Edward Ryan and Co, CAs (England)
URL http://www.edward-ryan.co.uk
Andrew Sadowski, CPA

URL http://business.poland.net/sadowski/
Sareen & Associates

URL http://www.sareen-assoc.com

Hugo Schouten, CPA (Australia)
URL http://www.ozemail.com.au/~dutch/

Walter C. Schmidt, CPA
URL http://www.dorsai.org/%7Ewalts/index.html

Seager, Seager, Webb, Inc.
URL http://www.sswinc.com/
Carolyn Sechler, CPA

URL http://www.indirect.com/www/carolyn/
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Second Shift, Inc.

URL http://www.accounting.com/%7Ercahill/ssftcpa.htm
BDO Seidman, LLP (US member firm)
URL http://www.bdo.com

Simpson & Osborne, CPAs

URL http://www.sandocpas.com/
Bradford L. Smith, CPA
URL http://worldmall.com/msti/bsmith.htm
Donald A. Smith, CPA

URL http://ids.net/%7Edsmith/mtb.html
David Somers & Associates, CPAs

URL http://web2.airmaiI.com/%7Edsacpa/mainpage.htm
Spaeth & Batterberry, Ltd.

URL http://sabltd.com

Swarts & Co., CPA
URL http://www.internex.com/multipresence/swarts.html
Schwartz, Cohen & Co.
URL http://www.azcpa.com/

Tax Advice, Inc. - Virgil E. Knedlik, CPA
URL http://www.theworld.com/money/taxes/ta/ta.htm

The PC CPA (tm)
URL http://pages.prodigy.com/apc_cpa/
Thomas, Doll & Co., CPAs

URL http://www.ispot.com/TDC/

Thomas & Walters, CPAs

URL http://slv.net/taxprep/cpa1/thomas.htm
Thompson, Greenspon & Co.

URL http://www.tgccpa.com
Urbach Kahn & Werlin PC, CPAs

URL http://www.ukw.com
Varney, Mills, Rogers, Burnett & Associates

URL http://www.varney.com/

Kathleen Villard, CPA
URL http://www.teknetix.eom/v.html

Information Security Resources 311

Virchow, Krause, & Company, LLP

URL http://www.virchowkrause.com
James A. Volz, CPA
URL http://home.sprynet.com/sprynet/volzcpa
White & Associates, CPAs

URL http://www.whiteassoc.com/%7Eleewhite/
homepage.html

Wiener, Strickler & Perez, PC

URL http://members.aol.com/wsandp/
Accounting News Network

A databank for accountants and tax practitioners. Features

include the "Accountant's Calendar," a listing of industry
events and tax deadlines; "Issue of the Week," and
"Accountant's Productivity Tools," which offers demos of new

technologies. The site is a joint venture of Microsoft and
Faulkner & Gray.
URL http://www.microsoft.com/smallbiz/ann
AI/ES Section of AAA (Artificial Intelligence/Expert Systems

Section of the American Accounting Association)
Provides links to scholarly research in the accounting field
including teaching materials and the International Journal of

Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management.

URL http://www.bus.orst.edu:80/faculty/brownc/aies/
aieshome.htm
American Accounting Association Home Page
Provides general information about the Association as well as

useful links to Yahoo and other resources of particular interest
to accounting professionals.
URL http://www.rutgers.edu:80/Accounting/raw/aaa/

aaa.htm
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ANet
One of three complementary sites of the International

Accounting Network, which includes the Summa Project and

Rutgers University sites. Hosted by Southern Cross University,
ANet contains information on accounting and auditing

software and new technology, a bibliography of online
publications, and a listing of conferences.

URL http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/anet/

ANet mailing lists include:

ANews-L - News
AAAES-L - American Accounting Association AI/ES Section

Newsletter
AAATC-L - American Accounting Association Teaching and
Curriculum Section Newsletter

AAcrdn-L - Accounting Program Accreditation

AAccSys-L - Accounting Information Systems
AAudit-L - Auditing

ABooks-L - New Books
AEthics-L - Ethics

AEthnog-L - Accounting Ethnography
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AFinAcc-L - Financial Accounting

AGvNFP-L - Governmental and Not-for-Profit Accounting
AlntAcc-L - International Accounting

AlntSys-L - Intelligent and Expert Systems
AJobs-L - Academic Positions

AMgtAcc-L - Management Accounting
AOilAcc-L - Extractive Industries

AProfsn-L - Academic/Profession Interface

ASocial-L - Social Accounting

AStdnt-L - Accounting Student List
ATax-L - Taxation
ATeach-L - Teaching and Learning
ATechno-L - Accounting and Technology

ATwoYear-L - U.S. Two-Year College System

Subscribe through email to Listproc@scu.edu.au with

message: SUBSCRIBE listname yourname

Arthur Andersen
This site of the Big Six firm features "A Brief History of
Accounting," an animated review of the industry which takes

visitors from the first known transaction records in 3600 B.C.
to modern times. Visitors must have Netscape Navigator and

Macromedia Shockwave, both of which are available through
links at the site.

URL http://www.arthurandersen.com/firmwide/new/

Bisk Publishing Co.
This site provides information about the education resources
available for business law, accounting, and tax professionals.

The site includes a demo of their CPE program, a catalog,
state board of accountancy requirements, and other
professional information.

URL http://www.bisk.com
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California CPA's Education Foundation

A continuing education service for accountants. Contains

information on seminars and CPE events and provides links
to the "Electronic Accountant" Newswire service and CPE
Exchange articles.

URL http://www.calcpaed.org

CPENet
Nonprofit Internet continuing education service for financial
professionals, with course offerings that include Medicare
Cost Reimbursement, Risk Assessment, and Audit of

Advanced Systems among others.
URL http://uu-gna.mit.edu:8001/~compass/
Cyber-Accountant Forum

A discussion group for accountants who do business on the
Web. Topics include career opportunities on the Internet,
electronic marketing and consulting, and intranets.

URL http://www.lacher.com/cyber_accountant/

The Electronic Accountant
An e-zine published by Faulkner & Gray, this site is updated
three times per day to offer the most recent industry news,

features, and reviews of Web sites of interest to accountants.

Also provides a list of discussion groups.

URL http://www.electronicaccountant.com
Enterprise 2000 and Network Press home page

A management and network organization serving the
accounting profession. Users can order books and reports
published by the Network Press, receive a catalog of

Enterprise 2000 services, or participate in a discussion forum

for CPAs. For information, email network@sam.neosoft.com.

URL http://www.NeoSoft.com/neopolis/e2000/
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Financial Economics Network

Internet discussion group where subscribers exchange ideas
and information through email on banking, accounting,
stocks, bonds, corporate filings, etc.

Subscribe through email to Iistserv@wsuvm1.csc.wsu.edu

with message: subscribe fen yourname

General Accounting Office of Policy's BBS
Provides resources for government auditors and GAO's Policy

and Procedures Manual available for download.
Dial 202-512-4286 or access through FedWorld

Gleim Publications
This site provides information about CPA, CIA, and CMA
exams, how to pass the exams, and order forms for books

and software.
URL http://www.gleim.com

ICAEW

Site maintained by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
England and Wales for its members and the worldwide

accounting community. Includes links to many accountingrelated sites and is the graphic-intensive counterpart of the

Summa Project at the University of Exeter, which is primarily
text based.

URL http://www.icaew.co.uk/

316 Information Security Resources

Institute of Management Accountants (IMA) Bulletin Board

Lists employment opportunities, new publications
bibliographies, catalog of publications, CMA exam
information, continuing education information, news,

articles, and a research forum.
Dial 1-800-229-1268
K2 Enterprises

The K2 Enterprises home page is the contact point for

information about K2 Enterprises' CPE seminars and
conferences. The site also offers a list of Internet sites on

accounting and non-accounting topics.
URL http://www.K2E.com

Kent Information Services, Inc.

Provides links to sites of interest to accounting professionals
as well as information about the services and products

offered by Kent Information Services, Inc., including the
CPA's Internet Reference Guide. The site also provides

descriptive and ordering information about the CPE courses
offered by Kent Information Services, Inc., sample articles
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from the Internet Bulletin for CPAs, and the Site Seeker area

which includes an extensive list of resources for Accounting

Professionals.
URL http://www.kentis.com

McGraw-Hill

The publisher provides information about self-study courses
that fulfill CPE credit requirements.

URL http://www.mhcec.com/mkcec/mkcpe.htmI
Pacioli Center at Loyola College in Maryland
Hosts a mailing list called AECM-L (Accounting Education

using Computers and Multimedia) which discusses how
hardware and software can be used in accounting education.

Subscribe through email to MAILSERV@LOYOLA.EDU
Rutgers Accounting Web
The accounting department Internet site of Rutgers University

provides a list of Internet resources for accountants.

URL http//www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw.htm
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School Business Official's Internet Pathfinder

Includes links to technology information and an Accountants'

Resources center. Provided by the Florida Information
Resource Network.

URL http://www.firn.edu/~asbo
Software Publishers
A Bit Better Software Publishing

URL http://www.eskimo.com/~realtime/
AccuFile (electronic filing for tax professionals)

URL http://www.vans-inc.com
APPX Software, Inc.

URL http://www.appx.com:80/appxhome.html
Brentmark Software

URL http://www.brentmark.com
Business Logic Corporation

URL http://www.blcorp.com
CoolTax Canadian Tax Software

URL http://www.cooltax.com/
Creative Solutions
URL http://www.cbsolution.com/index.htm
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DacEasy, Inc., Small Business Center

URL http://www.daceasy.com
Financial Navigator International

URL http://www.finnav.com:80/
Great Plains Software

URL http://www.gps.com
Grifftax

URL http://www.grifftax.com

Heritage Software (CPELOG)
URL http://www.halcyon.com/cpelog/

Independent Systems and Programming, Inc.
URL http://www.taxsoft.com

Infomast, Inc.
URL http://singapore.com:80/products/infomast/

infomast.htm
Intuit, Inc.

URL http://www.intuit.com
Majengo Paperless Audit Software (UK)

URL http://www.majengo.com
Micro Information Products

(non-profit and governmental agencies)
URL http://www.mipinc.com
Monnet Financial Systems

URL http://www.monnet.com/
Navision Software

URL http://www.navision-us.com

Parsons Technology (an Intuit Company)
URL http://www.parsonstech.com
Peachtree Accounting

URL http://www.peachtree.com
Platinum Software

URL http://www.platsoft.com
Plus & Minus Accounting Software

URL http://talyon.com:80/talyon.html
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Pro Taxes, Inc. (Canada)

URL http://www.protaxes.com/tmplocx.htmI
Professional EDI Tax Return Software (Florida)

URL http://member.aol.com/proedi
Red Wing Business Systems

URL http://www.redwingsoftware.com

Rock Creek Technologies
URL http://www.rockcreek.com
Satori Software
URL http://www.satorisw.com/
SBT Accounting Systems, Inc.

URL http://www.sbtcorp.com/
SCS/Compute

URL http://www.scscom.com/
Seagate Software

URL http.7/www.img.seagatesoftware.com

Solomon Software
URL http://www.solomon.com/

STF Services Corporation

URL http://www.stfservices.com
State of the Art, Inc.
URL http://www.stateoftheart.com/

Tax Resources (specializes in audit defense)
URL http://www.uniqueds.com/taxaudit/

Taxbyte Canadian Software
URL http://www.taxbyte.com

TaxPrep Information Systems
URL http://www.taxprep.com/

Taxware International
URL http://www.taxware.com/
Timeslips Corporation

URL http://timeslips.com/
CaseWare International

URL http://www.caseware.com:80/

Information Security Resources 321

Summa Project at the University of Exeter, Exeter UK

Links to a number of UK and other sites of interest to
accountants in public practice, industry, and government, like

FINWeb, EDGAR, Security and Exchange Commission's
online database, Financial Executive Journal, and Global

Network Navigator.
URL http://www.icaew.org.uk/

Tax Accounting and Professional Network (TAPNet)
Bulletin board provides tax and accounting professionals a
means to obtain feedback and share information with

colleagues on tax accounting issues.

Dial (603)585-9170

University Accounting Departments

Aberdeen University Department of Accountancy
URL http://www.abdn.ac.uk/~acc025

University of Iowa Accounting Department
URL http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/acct/
Pacioli Center at Loyola College, Maryland

URL http://pacioli.loyola.edu/pub
Louisiana State University Accounting Department

URL http://www.lib.lsu.edu/bus/account.html
Oregon State University Accounting Department

URL http://www.bus.orst.edu/cob/acctng/acctng.htm

Rutgers Accounting Web at Rutgers University
URL http://www.rutgers.edu/accounting/raw.htm

Washington Accounting Network (Waccnet)
Maintains listing of accounting information and mailing lists

as well as the AuditNet Resource List. Lists are available
through anonymous ftp.

For information, email earl@eskimo.org
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Auditing
AAudit-L
Subscription discussion group on auditing issues.

Subscribe through email to LISTPROC@scu.edu.au with
the message: SUBSCRIBE AAudit-L yourname

ACL mailing list

Moderated discussion forum for issues related to using ACL
(Audit Command Language) software. (ACL is a PC-based
software program that allows users to read, analyze, and

report on data from mainframe, mini, and microcomputers.)
Subscribe through email to listserv@etsuadmn.etsu.edu

with message: SUB ACL-L yourname
ACAU-L

Listserve for college and university auditors.
Contact Chuck Jefferis through email at

cjefferi@moose.uvm.edu
Association for Computing Machinery

ACM is an organization dedicated to information technology.

They have a special interest group for Security, Audit and
Control that can be accessed from this site.

URL http://www.acm.org/sigs
Association of College and University Auditors (ACUA)

The ACUA has set up an ACUA Library that contains audit
programs, audit reports, questionnaires, guides, program
reviews and other resources about audits for institutions of

higher education. The file also has a index that lists and

describes all the available resources.
URL http://www.acua.org/acua.htm
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Association of Healthcare Internal Auditors (AHIA)
The only international organization dedicated to the

advancement of the healthcare internal auditing profession.

Email AHIA's Executive Vice President at Charlie
Dal@aol.com
Audit-L

A general audit discussion list open to auditors from all

industries and companies with emphasis on auditing issues
that cross industry/organizational lines.

Subscribe through email to listserv@etsuadmn.etsu.edu

with message: SUB AUDIT-L yourname
AuditNet Accounting, Audit, and Financial Management Email

Directory

Lists contact information for accounting, auditing, and
financial management professionals as well as related mailing

lists.
URL http://www.cowan.edu.au/mra/home.htm
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AuditNet Email Listing

Email address listing for auditors in government, industry, and

academic institutions. Listing in AEL is by request.
Email request to Jim Kaplan atjkaplan@capaccess.org

AuditNet Resource List
Listing of Internet resources pertaining to auditing compiled
by Jim Kaplan.

URL http://www.unf.edu/students/jmayer/arl.html

AuditNet Software Sharing
An FTP posting of audit programs shared through listservers.

URL ftp://ftp.unf.edu in directory pub/auditnet/programs
Auditor General of Canada

A report containing more than 1000 pages of information
organized by the results of studies and audits completed.
URL gopher://gopher.phoenix.ca:70/11/auditor
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Australian Universities Internal Audit mailing list
Available to all Internal Audit staff of Australian Universities
(and other interested auditors).

Subscribe through email to INTAUDIT-LREQUEST@Levels.UniSA.

Edu.Au with message: Subscribe INAUDIT-L

Columbia University Internal Audit
Section of the Columbia University Web site includes "A
Guide to Internal Controls," "Internal Control Issues," and
"Auditing at Columbia University: A Service to

Management."

URL http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ia/index.html
CPENet (under Accounting subject heading)
CTI-CCC-AUDIT mailing list
Sponsored by the Centre for Accounting, Finance, and

Management at the School of Information Systems, University

of East Anglia, UK.

Subscribe through email to mailbase@mailbase.ac.uk
with message: Join cti-acc-audit firstname lastname
FinanceNet Financial Audits mailing list.

See FinanceNet mailing lists under Government subject

heading.
Fin-audits

FinanceNet mailing list for discussions of auditing topics like
relations between CFO and audit communities, agency audit

findings, follow-up and validation procedures, and financial

audit resources.
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Flowcharting BBS

Online bulletin board assistance from Patton & Patton,
makers of Flowcharting software.

Dial 408-778-9697
Government Accounting/Auditing Units

Albuquerque, New Mexico, Internal Auditing Department
URL http://www.cabq.gov/aud/home.htmI

California State Controller's Office

URL http://www.sco.ca.gov/gragraph.htm
Columbia University Internal Audit

URL http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ia
Florida State Comptroller

URL htp://www.dbf.state.fl.us/
Indiana University Internal Audit

URL http://www.indiana.edu/~iuaudit/main.html
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts

URL http://www.window.texas.gov/comptrol/
compinfo.html

University of Florida Office of Inspector General
URL http://nervm.nerdc.ufl.edu/~ufoig

University of Massachusetts Controller
URL http://www.umassp.edu/html/controllers.htmI

University of Massachusetts Internal Audit

URL http://www.umassp.edu/html/auditors.html
IGNet

Internet-based electronic communications network that
collects and exchanges information of interest to the
Inspector General community in all levels of government.

URL gopher://www.sbaonIine.sba.gov:70/11 /ignet
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Information Security Discussion List

A non-moderated Internet mailing list for information security

and auditing professionals in government, industry, and
academic institutions.
Subscribe through email to listserv@etsuadmn.etsu.edu

with message: SUB INFSEC-L yourname
Internal Audit World Wide Web (IAWWW)

A production prototype demonstration project for
warehousing information related to the internal auditing

profession across lines of associations, countries, and
industries. Includes sections for electronic discussions, white
papers, various auditing specialty disciplines, and industry

specific information.

URL http://www.bitwise.net/iawww/

IAWWW-HOMEPAGE-CM.HTML
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JohnSon's Accounting/Auditing Page

Student page at University of North Florida with links to the

Office of Management and Budget, Governmental

Accounting and Standards Board, The Yellow Book, and
much more.

URL http://www.unf.edu/students/jmayer/account.html

Managerial Auditing (journal)
URL http://www.mcb.co.uk/liblink/maj/jourhome.htm

Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor

Provides history of the office, information about the Financial
Audit and Program Evaluation Divisions, copies of audit
reports including a report on Performance Budgeting, links to

the Minnesota legislature Gopher server, and Federal, state,

and Internet resources for auditors.

URL http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/

Multnomah County Auditor's Office Homepage (Oregon)
Includes summaries of recent auditor's reports, an index of

past reports, office profile, and an auditor's column.
URL http://www.multnomah.lib.or.us/aud/
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National Association of Local Government Auditors (NALGA)

Available through City of Albuquerque, New Mexico, posts
excerpts from the LGANewsletter including audit report

abstracts. Future postings will include office and committee

listings, NALGA mission and objectives, conference and
training information. There is also a mailing list for NALGA

members and other interested auditors.

Subscribe through email to jkaplan@capaccess.org
National Computer Security Association (NCSA) Forum Auditing

Section

Manages a CompuServe forum on computer security and
ethics with an auditing section that provides auditing
professionals with an online real-time international
communications forum for discussing auditing and audit-

related security issues. Participants share resources, technical
knowledge, professional standards, product information,
ideas, audit reports, audit programs, training and job

opportunities.
Email 75300.2557@compuserve.com

National Intergovernmental Audit Forum Electronic (NIAF)
Conference
Provides newsletters, bulletins, files, and message area for

government auditors. Access GAO Office of Policy's BBS and
join Conference 5.
The New South Wales Audit Office Site

This site provides information about the office, reports and
publications.

URL http://www.audit.nsw.gov.au/
Newsgroup
Alt.business.internal-audit
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WIU Internal Auditing Home Page
Site at Western Illinois University with information on
university auditing procedures and links to other internal
auditing sites.

URL http://www.ecnet. users/miaud/wiu/index.htm

Searching
ABC-A Business Compass

This engine provides links to more than 1000 business sites,
searchable by subject, industry, or geography.

URL http://www.abcompass.com/
Aliweb
A World Wide Web searching tool that queries the Aliweb

database. The database catalogs sites based on descriptions
of the services the sites provide.

URL http://web.nexor.co.uk/public/aliweb/search/doc/
form.html

All-in-One Search Page

This site is a directory of directories, providing a descriptive
listing of Internet search tools.
URL http://www.albany.net/allinone/
Alta Vista

This search engine searches WWW sites and newsgroups by
keyword(s).

URL http://www.altavista.digital.com

Archie
Searches titles and keywords of files on all known FTP sites.

Information Security Resources 331

Some access sites include:
archie.ac.il
archie.ans.net

archie.au
archie.doc.ic.ac.uk
archie.edvx.uni-linz.ac.at
archie.funet.fi

archie.hana.nm.kr
archie.internic.net

archie.kr
archie.luth.se

archie.ncu.edu.tw

archie.rediris.es
archie.rutgers.edu

archie.sogang.ac.kr

archie.sura.net
archie.switch.ch
archie.th-darmstadt.de

archie.unipi.it

archie.univie.ac.at
archie.unl.edu

archie.uqam.ca
archie.wide.ad.jp
Colorado Alliance of Research Libraries

CARL provides online library catalogs, article indexes, and

information databases.

URL telnet://pac.carl.org
Deja News Research Service
This site searches a Usenet news archive.

URL http://www.dejanews.com:80/
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Einet Galaxy

An Internet subject index that allows users to browse by
subject categories or search World Wide Web, Gopher, and

Telnet sites simultaneously using keyword(s).
URL http://www.einet.net/
Harvest Broker

Searches World Wide Web home pages by key words, author,
partial text, title, URL and URL references.

URL http://www.town.hall.org:80/Harvest/brokers/
WWW-home-pages/query.html
Information SuperLibrary "Search the Internet" Page

This site lists, describes, and links to a wide variety of
Internet search tools.

URL http://www.mcp.com/general/search/srcheng.html

Infoseek

This engine searches WWW sites, Usenet, public databases,
and commercial databases. The service charges for usage
after the first 100 hits.

URL http://www2.infoseek.com:80/
Library of Congress

Provides an extensive list of Web searching and index
resources

URL http://lcweb.loc.gov/global/metaindex.html
Lycos 250
An index of World Wide Web sites, Gopher files, and FTP
files that allows users to query by keywords or browse

subject categories.

URL http://www.lycos.com
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McKinley's Internet Directory
This search engine retrieves lists of sites that are fully

described, reviewed, and rated.
URL http://www.mckinley.com:80/

Ohio State University's FAQ index
Allows user to search for lists of frequently asked questions
(FAQs) related to keyword subjects.
URL http://www.cis.ohio-

state.edu:80/hypertext/faq/usenet/
Open Text
This engine searches Web pages, FTP directories, and Gopher
servers by keyword(s).

URL http://www.opentext.com:80

Resources Meta-lndex
Bibliography of search tools on the Internet.

URL http://www.ncsa.uiuc.edu/SDG/Software/Mosaic/
Metalndex.html

Ultra Infoseek
Infoseek's updated engine has advanced the size of the
database, as well as the way it handles queries. The service

features a "virtual real-time index of the Internet" with
continuous updates of the database.

URL http://ultra.infoseek.com/

University of Indiana's Mailing List Index
Allows users to find mailing lists related to keyword subjects.
URL http://scwww.ucs.indiana.edu/mlarchive/
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Veronica Home Menu
This Gopher menu provides access to Veronica servers, as

well as various documents about using Veronica.

URL gopher://veronica.scs.unr.edu:70/11 /veronica

WebCrawler
A large index of Internet sites and their contents that users
can search by keywords.

URL http://www.webcrawler.com

Whole Internet Catalog

A subject guide to the Internet that allows users to search by
general or specific subject categories.

URL http://nearnet.gnn.com/wic/
World Wide Web Search Tools

A list of known search engines with general descriptions and

links.

URL http://web.nexor.co.uk/mak/doc/robots/active.htmI
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World Wide Web Virtual Library

Provides links to Internet collections of resources on various

topics.

URL http://www.w3.org:80/hypertext/DataSources/
bySubject/Overview.htmI

World Wide Web Worm
A World Wide Web index that searches by keywords.

URL http://www.cs.colorado.edu/home/mcbryan/
wwww.html

Yahoo
An index of World Wide Web sites, Gopher files, FTP files,
and some newsgroups with content descriptions. Yahoo can

work like a Gopher menu, allowing the user to choose

increasingly more specific categories to narrow the search.

URL http://www.yahoo.com

Security
All-Purpose Security Site
Web page with links to PGP and Kerberos software,
companies that make digital-money and secure products,
CERT's software archives, and security FAQs.
URL http://www.catalog.com/mrm/security.html

Argus Systems Group, Inc.
Security systems for UNIX platforms and Microsoft Windows
NT networked environments.
URL http://www.decaf.com/
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Arthur Andersen's Computer Risk Management

Consulting services in information systems auditing and risk
security.

URL http://www.arthurandersen.com/bus_info/services/
crm/index.htm

Atlantic Computing Technology Corporation
This Connecticut-based consulting company specializes in

Internet issues, particularly information security and network

audits.
URL http://www.atlantic.com
Barracuda Security

A vendor that provides physical security products, such as
alarms and indelible-dye cards.

URL http://www.powernet.co.uk/barracuda/
Business Protection Products

The security division of Datamation Systems provides anti
theft devices such as cables and enclosures, security pads,

sound alarms, board protection, disk drive locks, and other

products to protect physical assets.
URL http://www.pc-security.com/

CCC Online
This site is maintained by the Copyright Clearance Center, a

not-for-profit group that helps organizations comply with US

copyright law.
URL http://www.copyright.com
Central Command Virus Protection
This provider of anti-virus solutions offers information on

products as well as a database of known viruses, links to
other software and hardware vendors, and information from

research organizations.
URL http://www.command-hq.com/
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CERT

Computer Emergency Response Team's server with articles

about security concerns, tools, and an archive of alerts about
break-in attempts.
URL ftp://cert.sei.cmu.edu/pub

CERT Security Advisories
Indexed list of Computer Emergency Response Team's
warnings issued to mailing lists about security-related

problems.
WAIS cert-advisories.src

Check Point Software Technologies

Producer of information security solutions, including
firewalls.

URL http://www.checkpoint.com/
CMS Technologies

A provider of physical security products.
URL http://www.cmstech.com/

COAST

Based at the Purdue University Department of Computer

Sciences, the Computer Operations, Audit, and Security
Technology site represents a "multiple project, multiple
investigator effort" in information security research. Current

and past sponsors of COAST include IBM, Security

Dynamics, Hewlett Packard, Sun Microsystems, the Hughes
Research Laboratories, the US National Security Agency, and
others. This site maintains a valuable index of online

resources and puts out an "irregularly-published" electronic
newsletter.

URL http://www.cs.purdue.edu/coast/coast.htmI
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Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility

This non-profit group of computer scientists and others
focuses on the social impact of computers and technology.

The Internet Library site, sponsored by Sunnyside Computing,
offers information about the organization, links to other sites,

a discussion group on the history of cyberspace, and
examination of such issues as privacy rights and technology
ethics.

URL http://www.cpsr.org
Computer Security Products, Inc.
This vendor manufactures physical security equipment.

URL http://www.ComputerSecurity.com/
Computer Security Resource Clearinghouse
Maintains security awareness and training information,

publications, conferences, software tools, as well as security
alerts and prevention measures.
URL ftp://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov
URL gopher://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov
URL http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/
Computers and Information Resources (CIRT) Home Page

This site provides links to resources about ethics and security.

The site was established by Dr. David Grisham, Security
Administrator for the University of New Mexico.

URL http://www.unm.edu:80/~dave/secpage.htmI

URL ftp://ftp.unm.edu

The Core Rules of Netiquette

This online guide for Internet behavior is maintained by
Albion Books.
URL http://www.albion.com/netiquette/corerules.html
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Cryptography, PGP, and Your Privacy Web Page

This site provides links and information about computer
security, including a series of electronic manuals for

managers, such as "Manager's Guide to Email Security."

URL http://www.gocsi.com
Cylink Corporation

Specializes in encryption and network security solutions.
URL http://www.cylink.com/
Data Fellows Virus News Updates
At this site, you can access a database of information about

viruses either alphabetically or through a key word search.
URL: http://www.datafellows.fi/news/vir-news/
Disaster Recovery Journal
This journal archives articles and vendor information and

provides links to other security-related organizations.
URL http://www.drj.com/
Dr Solomon's Online
An information center for users of Dr Solomon's antivirus

software, this site also provides a "Virus Encyclopedia," a
tutorial about viruses, virus alerts, and articles on viruses and

hoaxes.

URL http://www.sands.com
URL: http://www.drsolomon.com
Dynasoft

This company's products include computer security solutions
for client/server environments, including UNIX, and a
smartcard-based PC security system.
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Firewalls
Subscription mailing list focused on the subject of Firewalls
and Internet Security.
Subscribe through email to majordomo@greatcircle.com

with this message: subscribe firewalls-digest

FIRST
The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams is a

coalition of more than 30 computer security incident
response teams from government, commercial organizations,

and academic institutions.
URL http://www.first.org/
GreatCircle Associates

A firm that specializes in training and consulting on Internet

security firewall systems.

URL http://www.greatcircle.com/
IBM Anti-Virus Online

This electronic magazine disseminates information about
computer viruses through articles, virus and hoax alerts, and
technical support from IBM labs.

URL http://www.av.ibm.com/
Information Security

A non-moderated Internet discussion list for information
security and auditing professionals in government, industry,

and academic institutions.

Subscribe through email to listserv@etsuadmn.etsu.edu
with message: SUB INFSEC-L yourname
Information Systems Security Certification Consortium, (ISC)2

A non-profit corporation established in 1989 to develop a
certification program for information security specialists.

URL http://www.isc2.org/isc2.htm#isc2
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International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR)
A non-profit scientific organization dedicated to furthering
research in cryptology and related fields.

URL http://www.swcp.com/~iac
InterNIC Site Security Handbook

Currently under revision, this document is a popular

reference guide for Internet Security issues.

URL http://internic.net

Koehn Consulting
This firm specializes in disaster planning recovery.

URL http://www.mailbag.com/users/koehn/drp.html

Livermore Software Laboratories
Hosts a firewall tutorial that discusses potential security
threats and gives an overview on firewall technology,

products, and implementation.

URL http://www.lsli.com/

McAfee Software

Maker of the anti-virus software, VirusScan.
URL http://www.mcafee.com

Memco Software
Provides enterprise security solutions, including UNIX, single

sign-on, and distributed security administration. The site also
offers security news, resources, and other information.

URL http://www.memco.com/
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National Computer Security Association
An independent organization that acts as a clearinghouse of
information on information security issues. The site offers
information on cryptography, firewalls, and anti-virus
products, and hosts a message board for the discussion of

information security topics. The NCSA also certifies security
products.

URL http://www.ncsa.com
Netscape Data Security
Netscape devotes a section of its site to discussing Internet

security concerns and how its SSL protocol works.

URL http://home.mcom.com/newsref/ref/
netscape-security.htmI

Newsgroups
alt.security
comp.admin.policy
comp.os.ms-windows

comp.security.announce
comp.security.firewalIs

comp.security.misc
comp.society.privacy

comp.security.unix
comp.sys.ibm.as400.misc

comp.virus
misc.legal.computing

sci.crypt
talk.politics.crypto
NIST Computer Security Publications
Provides security publications through email.
Email docserver@csrc.ncsl.nist.gov with message: send

index.
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Subscribe to Computer System Security Laboratory
Newsletter by email mailserve@nist.gov with message:

subscribe csl-newsletter.
OSHA

The Web site of the US Department of Labor's Occupational
Safety and Health Administration contains information on
workplace violence concerns, safety, programs, services and
safety compliance issues.
URL http://www.osha.gov/

Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
At the site of this non-profit group based in San Diego, you

can find papers on personal security and privacy and how
technology affects individual rights.
URL http://www.privacyrights.org/

RSA Data Security, Inc.

This vendor of security software and encryption technologies

publishes white papers as well as a FAQ on cryptography
export laws, which can be downloaded and read in Adobe

Acrobat PDF format.
URL http://www.rsa.com
Rutgers University Network Services WWW Security

Maintains an index of resources, including current security

issues, mailing lists, and a list of documents under discussion

by the WTS Working Group.
URL http://www-ns.rutgers.edu/www-security/index.html
Safetynet

Developer of anti-virus, workstation inventory, and other
security software.
URL http://www.safetynet.com/

344 Information Security Resources

Security Dynamics
Provides information security hardware and software
products. Holds a patent on the SecurlD Card, a personal
identification token supported by various host, server, and

network systems.
URL http://www.securid.com

Security First Technologies
Develops system security for UNIX, networks, and Internet
communication authenticity products.
URL http://www.sware.com/

Security Management Online
Online version of the American Society for Industrial

Security's monthly magazine. This site contains news and

resources, updates on security issues, a discussion forum, and

a marketplace of security-related products and services.
URL http://www.securitymanagement.com/home.html
Seven Locks Software

This software company, maker of the Safe@Home anti-virus

product, provides technical information and white papers on
virus identification and prevention.

URL http://www.sevenlocks.com

Snake Oil FAQ

This document by Matt Curtin, chief scientist with Megasoft,
Inc., explains how encryption systems work and offers tips on
how to choose encryption software.

URL ftp://rtfm.mit.edu/pub/usenet/news.answers/

cryptography-faq/snake-oi I
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Symantec Antivirus Research Center

Symantec, maker of antivirus software, maintains a research
library of recent computer viruses, a virus information

database, information about Symantec products, and special

coverage of Macintosh viruses.
URL http://www.symantec.com/avcenter.index.html

Technologic
An Atlanta-based corporation that specializes in network
security and firewalls.
URL http://www.tlogic.com/

Tecmar Technologies
A producer of tape backup and data storage hardware.
URL http://www.tecmar.com

Telstra Corporation
This Australian company offers a Computer and Network
Security Reference Index with links to WWW resources,
software vendors and information security consultants, FTP

sites, FAQs, and advisory agencies such as CERT and NIST.

URL http://www.teIstra.com/au/info/security.htmI
Trusted Information Systems, Inc.
Provides security analysis and risk assessments, firewalls,

mail encryption, and other tools for network and computer
systems security.
URL http://www.tis.com

UniTrends Software Corporation

This software company provides specialized backup or utility
software for the UNIX platform.

URL http://www.unitrends.com
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The World Wide Web Security FAQ

This frequently-browsed FAQ provides an overview of
security concerns and potential solutions. Topics include:

threats to security, how to run a secure server, how to protect

confidential documents, CGI scripts, client-side security, and
information on Windows, UNIX, and Macintosh servers.

URL http://www.genome.wi.mit.edu/WWW/faqs/
www-security-faq.htmI
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Glossary
Access Control List (ACL)

A

The capability of a router to limit the sorts of packets it

accepts by selectively performing duties based on the facts it
reads about the packet.

access point

A site vulnerability or potential security problem. An access
point is anywhere an unauthorized user may be able to enter

a system, such as a keyboard or dial-in line.
Adobe Acrobat
A helper application that reads PDF (Portable Document

Format) files, files created by converting printer output into
compact files, fonts, and page layouts.

Advanced Research Projects Agency (see ARPA)
American Standard Code for Information Interchange

(see ASCII)

anonymous FTP
This file transfer procedure was developed to allow users to

access files at remote sites by typing "anonymous" when

prompted for a user name, and an email address when
prompted for a password.

application gateway

An early form of firewall made up of bastion hosts that run
special software to act as proxy servers. Also called proxy

gateways.
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appropriate use
A term used in information security policies that defines what
the company allows in the way of employee use of

computers, networks, and other hardware or software
applications.

ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency)

The decentralized computer network of defense agencies and
strategic command posts established by the US government
in the 1960's to ensure the nuclear defense system would

remain functional under a nuclear attack.
ARPANET

The first packet-switching network, developed by ARPA in
1972.

ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange)
A standard numerical code for characters used so that any
computer can read text-based files.

authentication
The process of verifying that an encrypted message was (1)

sent by the person who signed it and (2) was not altered
during transmission. Authentication usually takes the form of

a digital signature.

backbone

B

A high-capacity network that links together other networks of
lower capacity. A wide area backbone network would
typically use digital leased circuits and multiplexers or

routers.
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back end

The server part of a client/server application, it provides
services across the network that have been requested by the
client.
back-up server

Software or hardware which copies files so that there are

always two current copies of each file. Also known as a
shadow server.

bandwidth

The amount of data one can send through any given
communications circuit in one second.
bastion-host/dual-homed gateway

A firewall configuration that designates one computer on
your private network as the "bastion host." The bastion host

is on both the Internet and your network, but it is configured
so that no traffic can pass through it directly to any machine

on your private network.
binary counting system

The counting system used by computers that has two as the
base and uses the digits 0 and 1.

bit

The smallest unit of data in a computer's binary counting
system.

boot virus
A virus that infects the boot section or partition tables on a
hard disk or floppy disk.
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bridge
Device connecting two separate networks to make

interconnected LANs look like a single LAN. Bridges can
connect networks using dissimilar protocols and do not
interpret the data they carry. They control network traffic and
security, filtering where necessary.

browser

Software that reads HTML documents and launches the
transfer protocols necessary to use the document. Browsers

can be either text mode (text only) or graphical user interface
(incorporates graphics and mouse interaction).

browser plug-ins
Tools used to change, enhance, or extend the capabilities of a

browser. Plug-ins are developed to be used within specific

browsers and to interpret particular files or file formats (such

as Shockwave, Real Audio, Adobe PDF).

buffer

A software program, storage facility, or hardware device that

temporarily stores data to compensate for a difference in
transmission speeds or to hold data when there is a difference
in timing of events.

bug
An error in a software program that results from a mistake
made by the software writers. A bug does not indicate the

type of "infection" caused by computer viruses, but is instead
an isolated (although potentially annoying) glitch.

bus topology

A network topology in which all network devices are
connected to the same cable.
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cache

C

To store previously displayed information in the computer
memory for quick retrieval. For example, most WWW

browsers can cache a number of recently viewed pages so
that the user can review them without downloading the

pages again.

checksum
A number in a packet that indicates if an electronic message
has been corrupted either by an equipment malfunction or by

tampering. If an electronic message has been corrupted, the
checksum number will be different than the one in the packet

header.

checksummer
An anti-virus program that identifies changes in executable

files instead of scanning the computer system for a specific

virus.

Chief Information Officer

The person in charge of implementing and overseeing the
information resources of a company, which normally

includes networks, computer systems, and
telecommunications.

ciphertext
An encoded, unreadable string of characters. The process of

encryption creates a ciphertext out of the original message.

See also plaintext.
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client-server technology
A type of distributed system in which software functions are

split between a server computer and a client computer. A
client requests information from the server computer,

according to a set of protocols, and the server responds to the

request.
command.com virus
A virus that changes the operation of the command.com
program that controls most PC operations.

command line

The line next to the system prompt where you tell a
computer what to do, through written commands. For

example, in MS-DOS, the command line is frequently at the

c prompt as in c:/>.
commercial online service
A commercial organization that provides proprietary online

content along with Internet connections to businesses and
home users with PC's and modems (like America Online,
Prodigy, and CompuServe).
conferencing
Meetings, either face to face or through telecommunications.

copyright

The legal rights of someone who has created an original text
or work. Since March of 1989, when the US adopted the

International Berne Convention, the creator holds copyright
to an original work as soon as it is fixed in tangible form,
whether or not it is published and whether or not a copyright
symbol appears on the work.
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cracking

Using programming and system skills to gain unauthorized
access to systems or information.

cryptanalysis

The process of discovering the secret codes used in
encryption. This is often considered "basic training" for

aspiring cryptologists.
cryptology

The study of encryption and decryption, or the mathematical
systems used to code and decode sensitive information that is

sent electronically.

cyberspace

The electronic space through which information flows in
computer networks.

DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency)

D

Formerly called ARPA, this US government agency funded
research and experimentation with the ARPANET and later,

the Internet.

data compression

A way of reducing the amount of data to be transmitted by

temporarily reducing the number of bits needed to represent
the information. When the data is received it is

decompressed into its original form.
decrypt

Decoding. Decrypting a message restores it to its original,

readable form (called plaintext) from its encoded ciphertext
form.
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Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)

A network that connects the "trusted" and "untrusted"

networks in a firewall. The DMZ is a layer between the
networks but is part of neither one.

DES (Data Encryption Standard)
An algorithm designed by the US National Bureau of
Standards for the encryption and de-encryption of data using

a 64-bit key.
dial-up direct (see SLIP/PPP)

digital signature

A standardized document closing that appears at the bottom

of a message or document to authenticate it has been sent
legitimately by its stated sender and that the contents remain

unaltered during electronic transmission.

disaster recovery plan
A business plan for what to do in case a company or

organization's physical location is rendered inaccessible or
destroyed by a natural disaster, accident, or terrorism.
Disaster recovery plans typically outline how business can be

conducted from an off-site location.

discovery virus
A damaging type of computer virus that locates and reports

crucial system information, such as the password of the

system administrator of a LAN.
DNS (Domain Name System)

The computer system that translates text domain names into

IP (numerical) addresses and maintains routing information
for Internet transmissions.
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domain

A computer site on the Internet that roughly corresponds to
city and street name in addresses on letters sent through the
US mail.
download

To copy a file, program, or other electronic material from

some outside source to your computer.

downward capability
A feature of Internet software that allows it to work with less

advanced software that is also running on the Internet.

dual-homed gateway (see bastion)

EDI (Electronic Data Interchange)

e

A way for computers to exchange information electronically
using a shared, standard format.

email (also spelled e-mail)
A fast, inexpensive, communication method that sends

electronic mail messages through a computer network.

emoticons
Symbols used to represent emotion and tone in electronic
messages sent by email or through Usenet.
encrypt

A process that converts plaintext into ciphertext and prevents

any but the intended recipient from reading the message.
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fair use

F

A group of circumstances under which one can technically
violate copyright without being legally liable. Although there
are no hard and fast rules to determine fair use, it is usually

applied when reproduction of the work 1) does not harm its

commercial value, and 2) indicates no potential for
commercial gain on the part of the user.
FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions)

Lists of questions asked frequently by newsgroup or Web site
newcomers, and their answers.

file compression utility
Programs such as WinZip or Stuffit that compress and

decompress data to make files more compact for storage.

File Transfer Protocol (see FTP)
fingerprint
Stored programs against which current programs can be

compared to verify their integrity and protect against viruses.
firewall

A combination of hardware and software used to isolate a
computer or network and protect it from security risk.
flaming

The practice of being unnecessarily belligerent, rude,

denigrating, or hostile in Internet communications.
Frequently Asked Questions (see FAQ)
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front end

The client part of a client/server application that requests
services across a network from a server, or back end. It

typically provides an interactive interface to the user.
FTP (File Transfer Protocol)

1) A client/server program that transfers files between local
and remote computers across the Internet using the File
Transfer Protocol. 2) A protocol method that defines how to

transfer files, such as software programs, graphics, or text
files, from one place to another.

gateway

G

A computer system that reformats data so that the data can

transfer between networks that are usually incompatible.
group

In the context of network security, a group is a set of users

who share common permissions for one or more resources.

groupware
Software tools and technology to support groups of people

working together on a project, often at different sites.

hardware

H

The actual machines, such as computers, monitors, modems, and
printers, used to run computer programs and complete other

tasks.
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hashing (also called key initialization)

The process an encryption system uses to convert a
passphrase into a key. Systems that skip this phase and use a
passphrase as a key are not as secure as ones that employ the
hashing feature.
header

The part of the electronic message that identifies information
about the packet including content type, source, destination,
function, and expected life span.

hoax

A non-existent computer virus. Hoaxes are designed to scare
computer owners, fool the media, or earn publicity, as in the

case of the IRINA virus.
host computer

The computer that serves as an information resource on the
Internet or a central processing unit for a number of
computers, by receiving information from and sending data

to terminals connected through telecommunications lines.

HTML (hypertext mark-up language)
Language used to format text, incorporate graphics and
sound, and imbed links to other documents at other sites on

the World Wide Web. The resulting document is called

hypertext.

HTTP (hypertext transport protocol)
Protocol that specifies the syntax of World Wide Web pages

that allow for links and also defines the specifications for

page addresses (URLs).
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hybrid system

A type of firewall that combines application gateway and
packet filtering features.
hypertext

Data that provides nonsequential links (hyperlinks) between

World Wide Web resources.

IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force)

I

The open, international community of designers, operators,
vendors, and researchers who coordinate the planning and

operating of the Internet.
information content

Informative documents or items provided in electronic form
through Internet sites.

information distribution channel
The route through which information is dispersed.
Information Security Policy

A set of guidelines used by businesses or organizations to
identify potential security risks and offer ways to protect

against such risks.

Information Security Team

The group that creates an organization's information security
policy. This may include company officers, technology

specialists or consultants, financial professionals, network
administrators, and employee representatives.
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information superhighway

A term coined by Al Gore for the up-and-coming high-speed
global communications networks that can carry voice, data,
video, and other services around the world.

integrated services digital network (ISDN)
Low-cost, high-speed, digital communication lines that
provide dial-in Internet users with faster access to World

Wide Web graphics and high-speed data transfer capabilities.
interface

The boundary across which two systems communicate.
Internet

The world-wide network of networks that allows file transfers,
remote login, electronic mail, news, and other services.

Internet Explorer

A Web browser created by Microsoft.

Internet server
An Internet host site that offers a service to other computer

users, such as mail, file transfer, news, etc.
Internet Society
A membership organization that fosters the evolution of the

Internet through its standards setting process, its publications,
and conferences. Standards are set by technical committees

(experts from both the public and private sectors) who
establish procedures and rules that guide Internet operations.

InterNIC (Internet Network Information Center)

The organization responsible for assigning domain names for
Internet addresses and directory services.
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interval iteration scheme

A method of backing up data that rotates media on which

information is stored to ensure that (1) more than one copy of
the data exists, and (2) at least one copy is stored off-site.

intranet
An internal TCP/IP network that provides services similar to

those found on the Internet, but which is not necessarily
connected to the Internet.

intranet server
An intranet host site where the intranet files are stored and
organized and from which the files are distributed to other

computer users.

IP (Internet Protocol)

The language or set of protocols that addresses data and
delivers it to the correct location.

IP session hijacking
A type of network security attack in which a user's session

falls under the control of a cracker.
IP spoofing
A type of network security attack in which one host claims to

have the IP address of another, thereby gaining access to
systems that define which packets may and may not pass

based on the sender's IP address.
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ISO/OSI Reference Model

The International Standards Organization (ISO) Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model defines seven layers
of communication types and the interfaces among them. The
seven layers are: Physical, Data Link, Network, Transport,

Session, Presentation and Applications.

ISPs (Internet Service Providers)
Commercial firms that provide individual Internet accounts to
businesses and home users.

ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations)
US government policy that controls the export of arms and
technologies such as encryption that are considered
potentially dangerous in times of war.

"Joes"

Account passwords that are variations on the name of the

account's owner, thus easily crackable by someone trying to

gain unauthorized access to the computer system.

Kerberos

K

Developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

Kerberos is a private key encryption system that uses an

Internet site (called the Kerberos server) to generate keys
whenever a group of users wishes to send messages.
key escrow

A system proposed by the Clinton Administration that would

grant governmental approval for the export of strong

encryption systems if the encryption keys were held "in
escrow," either by a trusted third party or one or two
governmental agencies. An example is the Clipper Chip.

Glossary 363

keys
Alphanumeric strings that enable an encryption program to

encrypt or decrypt messages.

LAN (local area network)

L

A network that connects multiple computers across a small

area to a server for the purpose of sharing resources, usually
in a business office.

layer
Description of divisions in specifications such as the OSI

communications protocol. Functions are grouped together to
form steps in the hierarchy necessary for successful data

communications.

listserv
A mailing list management program that automatically sends

new messages to list subscribers and responds to email
requests.

macro virus

M

A virus that is contained within automated step sequences (or
macros) in a data file.

mailing list (subscription mailing list)

An online discussion group to which you subscribe to receive

messages directly through your email address.
mainframe

A computer designed for batch rather than interactive use.
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MBPS (Mega Bits Per Second)
A transfer rate for units of information.
middleware

Software that runs between a client and a server to make
communication possible.

military grade

A claim made by some encryption software vendors, the term
"military grade" is meaningless because there is no military
standard for encryption systems.

modem (modulator-demodulator)
A piece of hardware that connects computers and allows

them to communicate with one another by modulating digital
data (generated by the source computer) into analog signals
that travel through the phone lines to a remote modem. The

remote modem then demodulates those analog signals back

into digital data that the remote computer can understand.
modules

Smaller parts of large software programs.

multipartite virus
A virus that is capable of infecting both executable files (like

a program virus) and the boot section or partition tables on a
hard disk or floppy disk (like a boot virus).

Navigator

N

A World Wide Web client by Netscape that facilitates
electronic commerce by encrypting information (such as

credit card data) sent to secure Netscape NetSite servers.
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netiquette

The rules for appropriate behavior that guide Internet
interactions.
network
A system of computers connected by telephone wires or

other means that allow hardware and software to exchange
data.

network administrator

The person responsible for the control of a computer
network. Also called a systems administrator.

network computing
A term analogous to client/server computing.
newbies

Inexperienced Internet users.

Newsgroup
A discussion group on a limited topic that shares information

through Usenet.
newsreader
A software program that provides access to Usenet.

node
A terminal in a computer network.

NOS (Network Operating System)
An operating system that includes all the software needed to

communicate with other computers over a network.
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One-Time Pad

0

A feature of some encryption systems that works by having a
"pad" of random bits in the possession of both sender and

recipient but no one else. The output of an OTP system is
equally likely to decrypt to any same-size plaintext without

the presence of the correct bits. Once the bits are used from
the pad, they are destroyed and never used again.

operating system
A type of software that manages the work done on a
computer. The operating system is responsible for scheduling

tasks, allotting storage space, and directing interfaces among
computers and the various hardware with which they
interact.

packet

p

The basic grouping of Internet data. Any message sent
through the Internet is made up of packets that carry

necessary information, such as the address. The packets are

reconstructed when they reach their destination by TCP/IP
protocols.
packet filtering

A type of firewall that uses access control lists to restrict what
kinds of information a network router will pass on, thereby
limiting outside access to an internal network.
packet switching

A communications method by which individual packets are
routed between hosts through the most expedient route at

that particular time.
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password

The oldest line of computer defense, a password is a word,
phrase, or string of symbols entered into the keyboard by an
individual user in order to gain access to a computer system.
payload

The part of a computer virus program, executed by the
trigger, that affects the computer system. A payload may be a
relatively harmless error message, or something more

damaging, such as the deletion of files or the altering of data.

PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)
A public key security system that uses a formula to create a

key from two prime numbers. The key is used by the PGP
program to encode messages that cannot be decoded unless

you know the two original prime numbers used to create the
key.

plaintext

The original message which is encoded into ciphertext, in the
case of encryption, or decoded from a ciphertext in the case
of decryption. See also ciphertext.
platform

The computer operating system and also the standard that
governs it.
port

A channel in a communications system that is assigned to
each application program.
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pristine backup
A backup file made when all executable files and directories

are known to be secure.
private key system

An encryption system that requires both the sender and

recipient of the data to have the same key. Also called
symmetric system.
program virus
A computer virus that infects executable files (such as .exe

files).

protection instructions

The parts of a computer virus program that protects the virus
from being detected. Protection instructions can take the form
of encrypted data or a "stealth" technique that interferes with

anti-virus software.

protocols
A set of rues that determine how computers will
communicate. Protocols allow computers from different

manufacturers and running different software to (1) agree on
what data means and how to use it, (2) share computing

applications, and (3) communicate back and forth.
proxy

The process or having one host act on behalf of another, as in
the case of a proxy server which retrieves data from the
Internet and returns it to a client computer.
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public key system

An encryption system that assigns one pair of keys each to
the sender and the recipient, designed so that users would
not need to access other sites to generate keys, and so that

keys could be distributed through unsecured channels. PGP
is an example of a public key system. Also called asymmetric

system.

remote

R

Computer (or other hardware) at an outside site with which a
local computer is communicating.
replication instructions

The parts of a computer virus that allow the virus to copy
itself.

RFC (Request For Comment)
Document series begun in 1969 describing the Internet suite

of protocols and related guidelines.
risk analysis

An analysis of a computer system that will determine what
assets an organization needs to protect, how they can be

protected, and the severity of each risk. Balancing protection
cost versus degree of loss is an important part of the analysis.
router

An internetworking device that analyzes network traffic and

determines the best route for information (network packets) to
travel.
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routing

The process of examining the headers on files and moving
them to the next site through the most expedient path to the

destination.
RSA

RSA Data Security, now owned by Security Dynamics, Inc.,
developed an important asymmetric algorithm encryption

system.

S-MIME

A protocol based on the RSA encryption system that

transparently encrypts and decrypts email messages sent via
such programs as Eudora Pro and Netscape Mail.
scanner

An anti-virus program that screens a computer system for

viruses and alerts the user if a virus is found.
screened host gateway

A firewall configuration that includes both a screening router
and a bastion host. The router makes the bastion host the

only machine from your network available from the Internet.
screened subnet

A firewall that consists of a small, isolated subnet created

between a private network and the Internet. Hosts on the

Internet can access hosts on the subnet, as can hosts from
your private network, but no traffic can cross the subnet.
screening router

A firewall method that consists of a piece of hardware
programmed to allow only certain traffic to pass from one

side to the other.
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secure hypertext transport protocol (see SHTTP)
Secure Sockets Layer (see SSL)
server

Internet host site that offers a service to other computer users,
such as mail, file transfer, news, etc.

server certificate

World Wide Web security strategy that protects clients from
inauthentic servers through a one-time challenge-response

exchange. Only servers with the correct server certificate and

corresponding private key for the challenge issued by the
client are judged to be valid.

server software

Software that allows your computer to offer services to other
computers.

SHTTP (secure hypertext transport protocol)

A security protocol that encrypts traffic on World Wide Web
connections.

SLIP/PPP (Serial Line Internet Protocol/Point to Point Protocol)
Two protocols that treat a computer like it has a complete
and continuous connection to the Internet, instead of just
being connected with a modem and telephone line on an

intermittent basis. (Also called dedicated port, dial-up direct,
or dedicated dial-up line service.)

software

Stored instructions (programs) that translate the information
you send to your computer into language the computer can

understand.
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spamming

Inappropriate Internet marketing that consists of arbitrarily
posting a message about expertise, contact information, and

fees to many newsgroups.
SSI (server-side include)

A command that directs the server to run a program, such as
the inclusion of the current date on a Web page.
SSL (Secure Sockets Layer)

A security protocol that creates channel security in which an
encryption key is created during an initial message exchange.
Because this protocol functions independently of other

protocol operations, it can be used with HTTP, FTP, or Telnet

exchanges.
stack (also called suite)

A group of protocols that includes a cluster of related
protocols.
System Administrator

(also called sysadmin or network administrator)

The systems expert in charge of a computer or network.

tape drives

T

Hardware devices, either internal (requiring a card slot) or

external (using a serial or parallel port), that provide
convenient storage of large amounts of data on specially-

formatted high-volume tapes.
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TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/lnternet Protocol)

The shared language or set of protocols that defines how
computers on the Internet exchange information. IP addresses

data and assures it arrives at the correct location. TCP breaks
up data files into packets when sent and reassembles the
packets in the correct order at the recipient site.

telecommuting
Working at home and communicating with your fellow

workers through the phone lines, typically with computer,

modem, and fax.
Telnet

A terminal emulation protocol that allows you to log in to

other computer systems and function like a terminal on the
Internet.

terminal
Part of your hardware, a terminal is an electronic device used

to enter and receive data in a computer system.

terminal emulation software
Software that allows your computer to communicate with a
remote computer as if your computer were actually a

terminal connected with that computer.

Transmission Control Protocol (see TCP/IP)

tools
Programs used to create, manipulate, modify, or analyze

other programs, such as a compiler or an editor.
topology
The shape of the network cabling system.
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trigger

The part of a computer virus program that controls when the
virus is triggered into activity.

UDP (User Datagram Protocol)

U

A simple, transport-layer protocol.

Unix
A popular operating system used by most Internet servers.
Windows NT, Windows, and Macintosh operating systems

can also be used on servers.
URL (Uniform Resource Locator)
Information used by the World Wide Web browser to
determine where an Internet site is and how to connect to it.

Usenet newsgroups

A collection of thousands of subject-specific bulletin-board

type discussion groups on the Internet.
UUCP (UNIX -to-UNIX CoPy)

A type of network that offers limited features, such as file
sharing and email. Originally developed to connect UNIX

hosts, a UUCP is usually built using dial-up connections. Not
an interactive network.

Virtual Private Network (VPN)

V

The process of connecting a main office and a satellite office
through the Internet by using encrypted data to protect
internal resources.
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virus
A program that can "infect" and damage files and programs
on your computer. Viruses are designed to reproduce and
spread within a computer system or network without
revealing their presence.

WAN (Wide Area Network)

w

A network usually constructed with serial lines, extending

over distances greater than one kilometer.
Windows for Workgroups (WFWG)

A Microsoft operating system that allows between two and 20

users to share information such as files and email.
Windows NT (New Technology)

Microsoft's scalable 32-bit version of Windows aimed at
high-end workstation "power" users. It is a standalone

operating system that is also a "network ready" system

capable of being a small application server for a workgroup

of Windows-based PCs.

z

zip disk

High-volume, removable disk that works with a zip drive and
can be used for effective backup storage or to handle very
large files.
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From personal security to organizational
policies, The CPA's Guide to Information
Security, published by Kent Information
Services, Inc., will prepare you to meet the
challenges of information security.

Learn to recognize primary information
security threats, risks, and tools for protecting
information assets.
Understand encryption and how to select
reliable encryption software.
Prepare to establish an information security team
and select important team members.

Master the process of identifying risks and developing
and implementing an information security plan that
emphasizes the role and responsibilities of the CPA.
Chapter Sampler

•
•
•
•

Physical Security-identifies common risks and how to plan for a secure office
setting.
Viruses-describes viruses, how they work, and how to protect information assets
from virus damage.
Network Security-overviews network security issues and strategies for protecting
network assets.
Organizational Security Issues-identifies the components of an information security
policy and strategies for risk assessment.
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